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The recent emergence of online social networks (OSNs) has changed the 
communication behaviors of thousand of millions of users. OSNs have become significant 
platforms for connecting users, sharing information, and a valuable source of private and 
sensitive data about individuals. While OSNs insert constantly new social features to increase 
the interaction between users, they, unfortunately, offer primitive access control mechanisms 
that place the burden of privacy policy configuration solely on the holder who has shared 
data in her/his profile regardless of other associated users, who may have different privacy 
preferences. Therefore, current OSN privacy mechanisms violate the privacy of all 
stakeholders by giving one user full authority over another’s privacy settings, which is 
extremely ineffective. Based on such considerations, it is essential to develop an effective 
and flexible access control model for OSNs, accommodating the special administration 
requirements coming from multiple users having a variety of privacy policies over shared 
items.  
In order to solve the identified problems, we begin by analyzing OSN scenarios 
where at least two users should be involved in the access control process. Afterward, we 
propose collaborative access control framework that enables multiple controllers of the 
shared item to collaboratively specify their privacy settings and to resolve the conflicts 
among co-controllers with different requirements and desires. We establish our conflict 
resolution strategy’s rules to achieve the desired equilibrium between the privacy of online 
users and the utility of sharing data in OSNs. We present a policy specification scheme for 
collaborative access control and authorization administration. Based on these considerations, 
we devise algorithms to achieve a collaborative access control policy over who can access or 
disseminate the shared item and who cannot. In our dissertation, we also present the 
implementation details of a proof-of-concept prototype of our approach to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of such an approach. With our approach, sharing and interconnection among 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction  
Online Social Networks (OSNs), a very popular application on the Internet, have 
attracted almost one billion users, many of whom have incorporated these applications 
into their daily practices [Deep Nishar. April 18, 2014, Twitter Inc. June 2014, 
Socialbakers. 2014, Google Official Blog. April 11, 2012]. Nowadays, there are hundreds 
of OSN sites which facilitate and enable the users to interact and collaborate with each 
other in a virtual community. The rapid rise of a large variety of OSN sites, with the 
massive amount of available information, obviously raises new, serious concerns about 
the security and privacy of their users and requires insights into security and privacy 
issues. Researchers from different computer science disciplines have investigated some 
of the privacy and security problems which arise in OSNs, from different viewpoints 
(e.g., [Raad and Chbeir. 2013, Pesce, et al. 2012, Hu and Ahn. 2011, Gurses and Diaz. 
2013, Hongyu Gao, et al. 2011, Mahmood. 2013]). As a shared platform, the lack of 
collaborative policy for access control and authorization management has become one of 
the most important and crucial issues in OSNs. Currently, OSNs have limited access 
control where the privacy settings of shared content is solely defined and regulated by the 
uploader of the shard content, regardless of other involved users. Hence, because of the 
limited and poor access control mechanisms for shared data in OSNs, the concerns of 
information disclosure are increased. We believe improving OSN access control models 
by devising a collaborative policy and management for it emerges as the first step toward 
tackling the existing security and privacy concerns related to online social networks.  
The recent emergence of online social networks (OSNs) has transformed the 
World Wide Web from an information pool to a platform for communication and social 
interaction. OSN sites (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, Flickr, Twitter, etc.) provide an 
environment and massive types of services to clearly encourage users to socialize and 
interact with each other both on the Web and in the real world. These applications offer 
massive types of tools for their users (e.g., posting, tagging, uploading, commenting, re-
sharing, etc.) to share information (e.g., photos, contacts, interests, activities, 
backgrounds, etc.).  Also, in OSNs, users can build their profiles and begin social 
2 
 
relationships with each other for a variety of purposes (e.g., business, entertainment, 
dating etc.). As a result, OSNs have become the most successful and most widely used 
services on the Web. According to a report by Socialbakers.com, Facebook has almost 1 
billion users [Socialbakers. 2014 ]. In April 2014 LinkedIn reports on its website they 
have 300 million members from more than 200 countries and territories[Deep Nishar. 
April 18, 2014]. Additionally, Twitter has 230 million active users (as of June 2014), 
tweeting an average of 500 million tweets every day[Twitter Inc. June 2014]. Moreover, 
Google+ has 170 million active users (as of April 2012) [Google Official Blog. April 11, 
2012]. Several statistics reveal that OSNs have become one of the highest used web 
applications in our lives all over the world [Goel, et al. 2012]. A Nielsen study shows that 
online users often are willing to spend their web time on social networks and 
blogs[Nielsen. 2012].  
The recent popularity and adoption of OSN sites produce more and more 
information that is publicly available on the Web and easily accessible from anywhere. 
The availability of these vast amounts of personal information within OSNs obviously 
raises security and privacy concerns and issues. Actually, it is clear that sharing personal 
information, photos and other contents are the main purpose of OSNs. Therefore, as a 
shared platform, data in OSNs may be co-controlled by a number of users, just as books 
can be co-authored. Such co-control occurs by using different tools in OSNs such as 
posting, tagging or re-sharing. OSNs’ users have an unclear idea about who can view 
their shared information and whose privacy policies govern the sharing of their 
information. Let us discuses the activity of photo sharing and tagging that is one of the 
most popular features of OSNs and has often become part of personal identity 
management [Besmer and Richter Lipford. 2010]. For example, assume Alice took 
pictures with people at a party, and then she uploaded the pictures to an OSN like 
Facebook, making them available to everyone. Later, she tagged Bob and Carol who are 
co-workers (i.e. added hyperlinks to indicate Bob and Carol). They have many common 
friends and co-workers with Alice, and might find the pictures particularly shaming. 
Existing access control mechanisms in most developed OSNs place the burden of 
regulating policies over who can access the shared data solely on the owner of the profile 
where the data is. In our example, the privacy setting of the photo is only specified by 
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Alice who is the uploader and owns the photo in her profile, regardless of the privacy 
requirements of the users who are explicitly recognized through tags.  One study shows 
that 75% of their participants were aware of the photos that have been posted of them by 
other people via email when being tagged in a photo [Facebook, et al. 2013]. So, even if 
they are aware of the fact that their picture is displayed and controlled by other users, 
they cannot impact the privacy preferences applied to this photo. Although a tagged user 
can detag her/himself to remove the explicit hyperlinks, the photo still exists in the OSN 
site and the user cannot stop other tagged users from sharing the photo with the people 
they have relationships with.  
While OSNs are clearly considered to be a collaborative environment where the 
majority of activities involve at least two parties, current access control mechanisms and 
authorization administration suffer from collaborative policy limitations. This lack of 
collaborative policies for access control and co-administration violates the privacy of all 
stakeholders who share a particular content with the uploader by letting her/him take full 
responsibility over their privacy settings, which is extremely ineffective. Designing a 
suitable approach to address such a problem is the objective of this thesis.  
Our work can be seen as a new step towards an access control model for OSNs. 
We first introduce and analyze scenarios, where more than one user should be involved in 
the process of making a collective access control policy. Those analyses and 
determinations are critical to the success of having collective privacy management of 
shared contents. To make our explanation of sharing patterns easier, we classify them 
into three types: profile sharing where accessors are the social applications, relationship 
sharing where a relationship between two users denotes a shared item, and content 
sharing which is the main type of sharing pattern and has the most sub-categories. 
Additionally, we precisely investigate all cases and subcases of content sharing patterns 
and define all users who have the right to participate in the process of making a collective 
access control policy.  Then, we propose an approach to enable multiple controllers of the 
shared item to collaboratively specify the privacy setting. We begin with a formulation of 
the model and privacy policy specification and the result of this phase is an access control 
policy, P, from each associated controller. Often, multiple users have diverse privacy 
requirements over shared content; hence as part of building a collaborative access control 
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model we propose a strategy to resolve the conflicts. Our principles for the conflict 
resolution strategy are essentially chosen to achieve the desired equilibrium between the 
privacy protection of online users and the value of sharing in OSNs’ sites. Next, by 
taking into account those principles, policies that are individually regulated by each 
associated controller and our multiple controllers’ scenarios, we develop a flexible and 
lightweight framework to achieve the collaborative privacy polices governing who can 
access and share the shared items in OSNs.  
Our proposed approach includes three algorithms to address the problem of 
collaborative privacy polices .The first algorithm, called PermittedandDeniedAccessors, 
produces the final lists of accessors who are permitted to view the shared data and those 
who are denied. Based on our evaluation and determination for relationships between 
controllers and shared items and the type of activates applied to items, we have seen that 
dividing accessors into viewers and disseminators is an effective security practice. 
Moreover, according to our investigation of shared data situations, shared data 
dissemination comes in two varieties. Consequently, we introduce the AccessorSharing 
and ControllerSharing algorithms to reach collaborative decisions about who can 
disseminate the shared item. The AccessorSharing algorithm produces list of accessors, 
who are allowed to disseminate the shared item with their social networks (e.g., friends, 
family members, classmates, etc.). Because we have several associated controllers and 
they can disseminate the shared item with users who originally could be unauthorized to 
access the shared item, we come up with a ControllerSharing algorithm. We have 
formalized the ControllerSharing algorithm to enable controllers to regulate their privacy 
and protect their items from being used against them in some way.  
To demonstrate the efficacy of the approach, we have implemented our 
PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm. A proof-of- concept prototype is to show the 
usability and feasibility of such an approach to achieve a collaborative access control 
policy over who can access a shared item. Our prototype application simulates all 
multiple controllers’ scenarios, where contents are related with multiple users who are 
explicitly identified through posts, shares, tags or other metadata, as a first step. 
Moreover, our prototype application enables each associated controller to specify her/his 
privacy policy. Then, we run PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm to collaboratively 
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produce the final lists of accessors who are permitted to view the shared data and those 
who are denied. In order to validate our approach, we conduct experiments using our 
prototype and discuss the results obtained in detail.  
The organization of the remainder of this dissertation is as follows. We begin by 
reviewing the fundamental, relevant concepts in Chapter 2. It covers the four dominant 
themes of the research that are online social networks (OSNs), which is the platform of 
our problem, and several privacy issues and concerns in OSNs. In Chapter 2, we also 
review the access control models of data management systems and investigate and 
discuss the crucial requirements that an access control model for social network services 
should have. We end this chapter by presenting the related works that propose access 
control solutions for OSNs. In Chapter 3, we analyze and explore a number of OSN’s 
scenarios where items are linked to numerous users who are explicitly recognized and 
have the right to participate in the shared item’s privacy setting. Afterward, in Chapter 4, 
we formulate an access control model that determines the essence of the collaborative 
authorization requirement. Furthermore, we present a collaborative policy specification 
scheme for access control and authorization administration. We also explain the 
principles of our conflict resolution strategy. Finally, Chapter 4 provides algorithms that 
we design to address the problem of collaborative privacy polices for shared items in 
OSNs. Chapter 5 presents the implementation details of a proof-of- concept prototype of 
our approach to show the usability and feasibility of such an approach. We conclude the 




Chapter 2  
2 Literature Review   
  This literature review explores the four dominant themes of the research. First, we 
offer a brief overview of online social networks, which is the platform of our problem. 
Second, we discuss some privacy issues and concerns in OSNs that we address in this 
thesis. Understanding these risks and challenges helps to design a suitable approach to 
address them. In the next section, we provide overview of access control models in data 
management systems (DMS). Furthermore, we investigate and discuss the critical access 
control challenges in OSNs; then, we present the key requirements that an access control 
model for social network services should have. This section ends with review the main 
access control solutions for OSN. We categorize existing related works into two types 
based on type of administration policies. We discuss access control models for OSNs that 
do not consider collaborative authorization administration of shared data in OSNs. 
Furthermore, we review and discuss in detail the approaches that have been proposed to 
provide a collaborative policy for OSN access control models. Finally, we provide a brief 
discussion of the trust notions in social network because we combine trust values 
between individuals in our algorithms.   
2.1 Online Social Networks    
 Networks have been used in many systems such as computer networks, the World 
Wide Web, biochemical networks and social networks. Each of these networks consists 
of a set of nodes or actors representing, for instance, web pages on the World Wide Web, 
connected together by edges or relations, representing links between web pages. Our 
focus in this thesis is on social networks on the Internet. However, we start by describing 
some basic ideas related to social networks in general. Primarily, a social network can be 
compared to the concept of society where individual actors (nodes) are connected with 
each other by relationships (edges). Thus, actors and relations represent the building 
blocks of social networks; first of all, an actor is a social entity that socializes with other 
entities to maintain existing relations or to establish new ones [Wasserman and Faust. 
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1997]. Furthermore, a relation symbolizes a linking between two actors. On social 
networks, the concept of relationship is important when studying the structure of social 
networks, and is described by numerous features such as its type, direction, strength, and 
weight. 
Since the World Wide Web and the Internet are continuously increasing in their 
popularity, massive types of services are available through them. In this context, a virtual 
community has been created for users to interact and collaborate with each other on the 
Internet, known as an online social network (OSN) [Chiu, et al. 2008, Howard. 2008]. 
They can also be called social network sites [Boyd and Ellison. 2007], social web sites 
[Kim, et al. 2010], or online networking sites [Gross and Acquisti. 2005]. From this 
moment on, and in the rest of the thesis, for simplicity purposes, we refer to these web 
services using the simple and extensive term of online social networks (OSNs). An OSN 
is “a web based site that allows individuals to construct a public or semi-public profile 
within a bounded system, articulate a list of other users with whom they share a 
connection, and view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others 
within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site 
to site”, as said by Boyd and Ellison [Boyd and Ellison. 2007]. As the area of OSNs has 
become a development part of the online activities on the web and various online services 
insert constantly new social features to their offerings, the classification of OSN services 
broadens. OSN services range from social interaction-focused sites such as Facebook, 
Friendster, or MySpace, to data dissemination-centered services as Twitter, to 
professional expertise and accomplishments -centric networks such as LinkedIn, to social 
communication features added to existing sites and services such as Flickr, YouTube, or 
Amazon [Pallis, et al. 2011, MusiaÅ‚ and Kazienko. 2013]. These services are generated 
and maintained by commercial companies. Although each of these services has different 
characteristics of social interaction, using the previous definition, let us try to generally 
specify some basic properties of an OSN’s service. First, it is an online site, platform, or 
service that provides environment and tools to build the social network or social relations 
among people. Furthermore, OSNs offer a wide range of tools for their users (e.g. 
tagging, uploading, commenting, re-sharing, etc.) to share interests, activities, 
backgrounds, or real-life connections. Also, in OSNs, each user is defined by a virtual 
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representation, often a profile, that contains the list of her/his connections (e.g. friends, 
colleagues, family members) and a variety of additional services; for example, they can 
participate in group or community activities and receive notifications on the activities of 
her/ his connections.  
For the sake of clarity, we briefly explain the concepts of social network users, 
user profiles and social links precisely in the context of OSNs. Firstly, the user is the core 
of an OSN; the majority of existing definitions of social networks are centered around 
users [Boyd and Ellison. 2007, Schneider, et al. 2009]. When these users join social 
networking sites, they have to create a personal profile to upload and post their items 
such as photos, opinions, etc. Then, the user makes connections to entities/individuals 
already members on these sites. Also, she/he socializes by interacting with other users by 
a wide variety of communication tools provided by these sites. Second, an OSN’s user is 
virtually represented by a profile where identifying information (e.g. name, age, gender, 
photos and online status) and user’s interests and preferences (e.g. joining groups, rating 
movies, books or music and liking brands) are shown. Consequently, user profiles shape 
users’ personalities, identities, and behaviors on social networks you [Mislove, et al. 
2010]. Finally, a user usually socializes with other network members who are already 
known to her/him. Additionally, a new member can establish new connections to 
individuals who are often suggested by the site upon the shared personal information 
such as name, location, photographs, birthday, personal interests, etc. Although users 
actually get linked to different types of contacts such as friends, family members, 
colleagues, co-workers, and strangers, current OSNs rarely discriminate between social 
relationship types. Indeed, OSNs often provide only a default relationship type that 
connects users of particular OSN site to each other. For example, social links are known 
as friends, regardless of its veracity or trust level.  
Nowadays there are hundreds of OSN applications available in the World Wide 
Web, supporting a vast range of interests and practices. As a result, OSNs have become 
one of the highest used Web applications in our lives, so they dominate the time that 
users spend on the web [Goel, et al. 2012].  Many statistics indicate that OSNs have 
become a fundamental part of the online activities on the World Wide Web all over the 
world. A Nielsen study [Nielsen. 2012]shows that online users often are willing to spend 
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their web time on social networks and blogs. According to a report by Socialbakers.com, 
which shows how much the number of OSNs users rapidly increases, Facebook has 
almost 1 billion users. Thus, currently it is considered to be the largest OSN with more or 
less 1 out of 7 people in the world having a Facebook account [Hampton, et al. 2011, 
Socialbakers. 2014 ]. Moreover, Twitter, which is under the scope of business and 
entertainment social networks, has 230 million active users (as of June 2014), tweeting an 
average of 500 million tweets every day [Twitter Inc. June 2014].  
Due to the large size of OSNs, graphs are the most appropriate and common way 
to represent these networks. Consequently, the platform of OSNs is the social graph, 
where G   =    (V,E), with vertices 𝑉 =    {𝑣!, . . . , 𝑣!}  corresponding to individuals and edges 𝐸 = {(𝑣!   , 𝑣!)/  𝑣!   𝑣! ∈ 𝑉, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗  , 1   ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗   ≤ 𝑛}  modeling the relationships among 
vertices [Mislove, et al. 2007]. Under the umbrella of social networks are many different 
types of graphs to represent different forms of data and to pattern the structural properties 
of social networks. Graphs can have their edges directed or undirected, weighted or un-
weighted, labeled or unlabeled. In OSNs, both directed and undirected graphs can be used 
depending on the nature of the relationship. For instance, Facebook is a typical example 
of social network formed as an undirected graph, where friendships between users are 
symmetric. In other words, 𝑅!" or 𝑅!" both indicate a friendship link between user 𝑖 and 
user 𝑗. By contrast, Twitter is an example of a directed social network where relationships 
are not bidirectional. An edge between two nodes represents the followee-follower 
relationship, thus 𝑅!" denotes user 𝑖 is following user 𝑗. 
Recently, we have been witnessing the popularity of a large variety of OSN sites 
increase rapidly. In fact, the main driving force behind their proliferation and success is 
that they offer ingenious ways for users to create, search and manage their own OSN 
communities. Additionally, they are usually open systems and a valuable source of social 
network data. Consequently, with this rapid expansion of OSN sites and the radical shift 
in the number of involved users around the world, there has been increasing concern 
about the privacy of individuals participating in them. The case of OSN is especially 
important because such open availability of personal information highly exposes OSNs 
users to a number of security and privacy risks. Researchers from different computer 
science disciplines have investigated some of the privacy problems that uniquely arise in 
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OSNs (e.g. [Chi Zhang, et al. 2010, Lewis, et al. 2008, Carminati, et al. 2014, Gail-Joon, 
et al. 2011, Hongyu Gao, et al. 2011, Mahmood. 2013]). Indeed, the privacy issue within 
the context of OSNs opens a new interesting challenge in the research community and 
has received a lot of attention.   
2.2 Privacy Threats in Online Social Networks   
Nowadays more and more information is publicly available in OSNs. These 
networks are increasingly attracting the attention of users who are interested in preserving 
existing relationships, making new connections, and using the numerous social networks’ 
services for example, sharing photos, ideas, interests, events, and activities within their 
individual networks. Although massive amounts of private and personal information 
could be delivered through different Web sites such as medical information, taxes or 
social networks, the data delivered by OSNs is especially important because they have 
been gaining popularity among Internet users. Also, OSNs are expanding rapidly and 
providing more personal information than we could ever expect. For example, Google+ 
has 170 million active users (as of April 2012) and Pinterest, which is the third most 
popular online social network in the U.S., had collected 10.4 million users as of February 
2012 [Google Official Blog. April 11, 2012, Experian Marketing Services. 2012]. 
Moreover, LinkedIn boasts on its web site that it has added more than 23 million 
members since December 31, so in April 2014, it has reached 300 million members in 
more than 200 countries and territories [Deep Nishar. April 18, 2014]. Although 
Facebook was only launched eight years ago, at the time of writing this thesis the total 
number of daily active users is closing in on 1 billion [Facebook. September 2014]. 
Hence, the availability of these vast amounts of information within OSNs obviously 
raises privacy and confidentiality issues. 
With respect to other Web applications, OSNs with over 1 billion users present 
new challenges concerning the privacy of personal information. In fact, OSNs are built 
on interaction, where users often willingly share personally identifying data about 
themselves, and mostly they are open systems. Online users arguably have an unclear 
idea about who can access their private or semi-public information or what portion of 
their information needs to be accessed. While the risk of exposing personal information 
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and the user population’s lack of awareness are addressed and described by several 
studies and recent news reports (e.g. [Carminati and Ferrari. 2008, Gates. 2007, Joshi and 
Kuo. 2011, Gurses and Diaz. 2013, Gail-Joon, et al. 2011, Hongyu Gao, et al. 2011, 
Mahmood. 2013, Raad and Chbeir. 2013, Loukides and Gkoulalas-Divanis. 2009, Gross 
and Acquisti. 2005, Becker. 2009]), OSNs’ security and privacy requirements still are not 
well understood or completely expressed. Indeed, there are explicit differences between 
the privacy issues in databases and in OSNs, especially in the way they are shaped, 
maintained, and in their use. Classic databases are created by an entity with the objective 
of keeping track of individuals according to diverse principles and with a specific 
purpose. The major objective of database security is to provide data security from 
unauthorized access and use. In other words, individual entities whose information is 
stored in a database have no access to each other’s records. This privacy issue occurs 
when the owner of databases is asked for some data and needs to transfer some of the 
data to accomplish this request. On the contrary, in OSNs Internet users join voluntarily 
to share their personal information, which are represented by different types of data, with 
one another. It is clear that sharing personal information, news and other contents are the 
main purpose of OSNs. Therefore, OSNs allow Internet users to access other network 
user’s information, thus an attack on user privacy often comes from another user in the 
same social network. Though security and privacy issues arising in OSNs are different 
from those in databases, the definition and treatment of privacy in these social networks 
is inspired by the corresponding concepts and philosophies in databases.  
In this section we discuss the main privacy threats to OSNs, then in the following 
section, we present the access control model as solution to address the existing security 
and privacy concerns and issues related to OSNs. When this is discussed in the context of 
OSNs, the word privacy is used.  Traditionally, in the computing field, people have talked 
about access control.  Privacy in databases often involves statistical inference of specific 
facts about people whose information is stored in a database.  Access control in 
computing systems determines who can perform operations on (or just read) specific 
pieces of data, or files.  Since most of the data stored in OSNs is discrete, i.e. facts about 
users’ backgrounds, date of birth, etc., or involves discrete items like a photograph or a 
post, in traditional computer security deciding who can perform operations on this data 
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would be considered access control.  However, since much of the information on OSNs 
deals with people, or their opinions of posts by reposting something or liking something, 
deciding who can access this data is usually referred to as a privacy issue. We will use 
both terms in what follows, and in the context of this work, both privacy and access 
control concerns refer to the same thing – who can see something on someone else’s 
profile.  
Researchers from different computer science disciplines have investigated some 
of the privacy and security problems that arise in OSNs (e.g. [Pesce, et al. 2012, Gurses 
and Diaz. 2013, Squicciarini, et al. 2009, Hongyu Gao, et al. 2011, Mahmood. 2013, 
Raad and Chbeir. 2013]). Data privacy is defined as "freedom from unauthorized 
intrusion"[Vaidya, et al. 2006]. However, what are the fundamental assumptions about an 
unauthorized intrusion in OSNs is an open question because the concern about the 
security and privacy of OSNs’ users and resources is a young field.  
Privacy on OSNs is a complex concept, which encompasses major challenges. 
Indeed, researchers working from different perspectives differ not only in what they 
define as privacy but also in their fundamental assumptions about what the privacy 
threats in OSNs are. However, several topics regarding privacy breaches in OSNs are 
attracting more and more interest among scholars such as the surveillance problem, attack 
technique, users’ limitation, disclosure, design flaws, limitations, etc. In general, we 
organize these problems into two broad categories: social privacy and institutional 
privacy. Social privacy focuses on how and when personal information of online users is 
shared with other users because the users are the primary consumers and component of 
these services. Moreover, social privacy can be defined according to Gurses and Diaz 
[2013] as “problems emerge through the necessary renegotiation of boundaries as social 
interactions are mediated by OSN services”.  Privacy disclosure that could arise from 
users’ lack of awareness, the services provided, third party apps, other users, or privacy 
setting flaws and limitations. In contrast to the social privacy perspective, institutional 
privacy refers to undesired access by governments, service providers, or corporations to 
OSN users’ personal information and social interactions stored on the OSN company’s 
servers. The surveillance problem usually occurs by using data mining techniques. Social 
privacy and institutional privacy in OSN applications are two macro areas including 
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several privacy issues. Our objective is to discuss several problems that lead to our 
specific issue that we address in this thesis. Subsequently, because institutional privacy 
does not specifically belong to our problem, we have chosen to leave it out of this 
dissertation's scope. 
Social privacy (disclosure) issues have become a major concern for both OSN 
site’s users and providers. We distinguish the four types of social privacy problems where 
information acquisition is based on privacy disclosure: users lack awareness, design flaws 
and limitations, breaches from other users and collective privacy management limitations. 
These issues are not new by themselves, but they are unique to OSNs and are worth 
reexamining.  
• Users limitation:   
User awareness is an aspect that the literature has repeatedly emphasized (e.g. 
[Ngeno, et al. 2010, Becker. 2009, Li, et al. 2013, Acquisti and Gross. 2006]). While 
revealing information on the web is a voluntary activity on the part of the users, most 
users are not aware of who is able to access their data and how their data can possibly be 
used and redisseminated. Vorakulpipat et al. find that while 52% of the respondents 
claimed to have a sufficient level of information privacy awareness, 75% of the users 
could not identify basic information systems security threats such as phishing, identity 
theft or attribute disclosure [Vorakulpipat, et al. 2011]. Due to the lack of awareness 
among Internet users, huge amounts of user’s personal information such as pictures, 
contacts, and videos, are quickly falling into the hands of authorities, strangers, 
adversaries, recruiters and the public at large [Aimeur, et al. 2009]. Indeed, users’ lack of 
awareness can lead to identity and attribute disclosure, which arises when an 
unauthorized user is able to access and determine the value of a sensitive user attribute, 
one that the user intended to be available only for authorized users. For example, 
Congressman Wiener shared his inappropriate pictures, occasioning public controversy 
leading to his resignation [Barret and Saul. 2011]. Furthermore, the earliest studies on 
concrete social network services present experimental evidence of the extraordinary self-
disclosure practices within the sites. Works by Stutzman [2006], Lampe et al. [2006]and 
Acquisti and Gross [2006]find that students in the different university networks vastly 
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shared sensitive information on Facebook. Despite this, it seems nowadays that Internet 
users are becoming more and more aware of privacy risks connected to OSNs. In fact, for 
the majority of privacy threats, if users do not take the initiative to protect their data, most 
defense mechanisms would fail disastrously. 
• Breaches from other users:  
One of the main types of attacks on OSNs is attacks from other users. OSNs offer 
Internet users new and interesting means to interact, communicate, and socialize. As a 
result, a huge amount of information, which could contain political views, a link they 
want to share, thoughts, sexual orientation, etc., expose a lot about the user. So, she/he 
will be of interest to various groups including friends, friends of friends and strangers to 
attack. All major OSNs allow a user’s friends to view the personal information the user 
has uploaded to her/his space by default, but prevent others from doing so. However, in 
OSNs the notion of friendship is merely a social link that the two users have arranged to 
establish in that OSN, regardless of their actual offline relationship. Consequently, this 
contradiction causes a possible stealing of personal information by authorized users in 
OSNs. Several studies present potential attacks and risks from friends in OSNs 
[Mahmood and Desmedt. 2012, Mislove, et al. 2010, Akcora, et al. 2012]. In [Mahmood 
and Desmedt. 2012]the authors familiarize the targeted friend attack by creating a 
pseudonymous profile. Their single pseudonymous profile had access to the private 
information of 4,339 users. Beyond user-to-user relationships, most OSNs offer friend 
recommending systems to recommend a list of other users whom this user may know, 
have mutual friends or have common attributes. This feature leads to social link 
disclosure, which happens when an adversary is able to find out about the existence of a 
relationship between two users. Furthermore, a social link disclosure could lead to a 
cross-site profile cloning attack. Work by Jin, et al.[2013] demonstrates that an attacker 
using just one attacker node (2-hops) can identify more than 60% of a user’s friends. 
Indeed, threats from the mutual friend feature are potentially more dangerous than 
breaches from friends because it’s less likely to arouse suspicion. On many occasions, we 
accept a lot of friendship requests on OSNs without thinking about the short-term or 
long-term consequences of such a relationship.  
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• Design flaws and limitations: 
Regrettably, current OSN applications indirectly necessitate the users to become 
system and policy administrators and experts to protect their online information. Another 
major problem that causes personal information disclosure is that users face great 
difficulties and complexities in effectively configuring their privacy settings. 
Furthermore, the risk from limitations and flaws of privacy setting design is greatly 
increased by OSNs’ rapid growth as well as their continual adoption of new services. The 
design limitations and flaws refer to the weak privacy controls offered by current OSNs 
and the possibility of explicit attacks. One of the major design flaws that might abuse or 
misuse such critical and sensitive information is the default or ‘recommended’ privacy 
setting. While social network sites provide five different granularities for their users: only 
me, specific friends, friends only, friends of friends, and everyone, the default setting for 
most pieces of content is public (everyone) meaning the user shares her/his content with 
all one billion Facebook users if they do not change or modify their privacy settings. The 
results of Liu, et al.’s [2011]work reveals that 36 % of Facebook items still remain shared 
with the default privacy settings, general. Only 37 % of users have expectations which 
correspond to the default privacy settings; thus when these are incorrect, pieces of 
information are exposed to more users than expected. Another design weakness is the 
limitation in the granularity of photo privacy settings. Pictures are categorized into 
albums, and privacy settings are specified on album granularity, hence all pictures in a 
particular album have the same privacy preference.  
To successfully use OSNs’ privacy settings, users must first find them and 
understand their terminology. Additionally, they need to understand the privacy-related 
consequences of their behaviors and decisions. However, privacy policies in existing 
OSNs are too complex for most ordinary users to manipulate and understand [Johnson, et 
al. 2012, Raad and Chbeir. 2013, Anderson and Stajano. 2013]. In fact, most users have 
no experience to articulate their privacy preferences effectively. Further complicating this 
issue is the frequent changing these settings have over time, so the complexity of 
elucidating privacy settings is greatly increased. Also, the privacy tools are not 
meaningful enough to express users’ disclosure preferences. According to a recent study 
in[Madden. 2012], 48 % of OSNs users still face some level of difficulty in controlling 
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the privacy settings on their account.  In all, current OSNs privacy mechanisms skip 
significant metrics such as risk, trust, humanization design, and some social metrics.  
• Collective privacy management limitations:   
In spite of the fact that collaboration and sharing represent the main building 
blocks of existing OSN sites, OSNs yet do not support any mechanism for collaborative 
management of privacy settings for shared data. While owning photos and posting 
comments to users’ profiles are considered as the general purpose of social network 
services, users can be tagged in photos and reply (comment) to or re-share an existing 
post. Since multiple controllers’ scenarios are raised by using different tools in OSNs 
such as posting, tagging and re-sharing, collaborative administration policies are 
becoming more and more important in many OSNs scenarios. Let us discuses the 
activities of photo sharing and tagging that are an integral and exceedingly popular part 
of profiles on most OSNs like Facebook. For example, Facebook hosts 250 billion photos 
(as of September 2013) [Facebook, et al. 2013]. On an average day, more than 350 
million photos are uploaded. Besides photo sharing, tagging represents one of the 
prominent features of OSNs; it has often become part of personal identity 
management[Besmer and Richter Lipford. 2010], instead of merely sharing activities 
with friends. The first limitation of photo sharing activity in current OSNs is that when 
uploading photos, the request for permissions from other users appearing in the photo is 
not demanded, even if they are explicitly recognized through tags or other metadata. 
In[Facebook, et al. 2013], researchers show that being tagged in shared photos is the most 
prevalent way that participants know about photos they were depicted in. 75% of their 
participants were aware of the photos that have been posted of them by other people via 
email when being tagged in a photo. Consequently, the tagging feature enables internet 
users to review all photos of them that exist, which leads us to the hypothesis that being 
tagged in shared photos is seen to have some privacy benefits. However, existing access 
control mechanisms in OSNs choose to place the burden of privacy policy solely on the 
owner who has shared data in her/his profile, raising serious privacy concerns. For 
example, suppose Alice took pictures with people at a party, and then she uploaded the 
pictures to an OSN like Facebook, making them available to everyone. Afterward, she 
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tagged Bob who is one of the people in the pictures (i.e. add hyperlinks to indicate Bob). 
He shares many friends and colleagues with Alice, and might find the pictures 
particularly shaming. Indeed, existing access control mechanisms in OSNs offer 
individual (rather than group) processes to regulate the decisions of accessing shared 
data. In our example, pictures are solely controlled and managed by Alice who has them 
in her profile, even though he is aware of the fact that their pictures are displayed and 
controlled by other users, Bob has no control over them and cannot impact the privacy 
preferences applied to these photos. Even if tagged users can detag themselves to remove 
the explicit hyperlinks from the photo to their profile, the photo still exists in the social 
network site. Also, they cannot stop other tagged users from sharing the photo in their 
social networks. As a result, current access control mechanisms and authorization 
administration suffer from collaborative policy limitations. In fact, shared pictures have 
an impact on the privacy of all users who appear in a picture and are mentioned in 
metadata like tags and comments. Henne, et al. [2014] report on how well their 
participants feel informed about two dissimilar types of photos of themselves on social 
network sites. 56% of their participants claimed that their level of information about 
acceptable photos is worse than neutral. In contrast, in the case of inappropriate photos, 
70% of them selected a level worse than neutral to totally unsatisfactory. Therefore, 
current OSN privacy mechanisms violate the privacy of all stakeholders who share a 
particular photo with the uploader by letting her/him take full responsibility over their 
privacy settings, which is extremely ineffective.  
The significant privacy threat of information disclosure is increased by limited 
and poor access control mechanisms for shared data in OSNs. They are clearly 
considered to be a collaborative environment; the majority of OSN scenarios involve at 
least two parts. Designing a suitable approach to address this problem is the objective of 
this thesis. In this regard, more insight into scenarios where contents are associated with 
multiple users who are explicitly identified through posts, shares, tags or other metadata 
is presented in Chapter 3. Finally, in spite of the fact that a lack of a joint administration 
policy raises a number of important issues (e.g. [Li, et al. 2013, Vorakulpipat, et al. 2011, 
Acquisti and Gross. 2006]), this problem has only been explored in few studies 
[Squicciarini, et al. 2010, Carminati and Ferrari. 2011, Sun, et al. 2012, Hu, et al. 2013, 
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Xiao and Tan. 2012], which we will review in Section 2.3.2.2.2 .  
Although these privacy issues are addressed and discussed as if they are 
independent phenomena, they are closely intertwined and are sometimes combined. For 
instance, because users are generally unaware about who can access their profile and 
specifically which parts of their profiles are accessible and to whom precisely, other users 
can easily violate these users’ privacy. Moreover, the issues of design flaws and 
limitations, and users’ lack of awareness differ in the way they are tackled, but they are 
explicitly and implicitly entangled. For example, users still create threats to their own 
privacy by using inappropriate and limited access control settings. Similarly, the problem 
of poor access control for shared content is not independent of the attacks from other 
users problems. The lack of a collaborative administration policy might have 
consequences for the effectiveness of maintaining the associated users’ privacy 
boundaries by not allowing them to participate in shared data privacy settings. Indeed, all 
these issues refer to major gaps and limits in the architecture of access control 
mechanisms.  
Finally, note that all of these privacy issues indicate that the existing primitive 
access control mechanisms as well as their designs must be improved to better address 
threats and meet users’ expectations. With respect to traditional environments, in online 
social networks the increased risk to personal data processed is highlighted because this 
information is connected to user profiles, furthermore spreads across users’ social 
activities and communications. Consequently, to address the privacy concerns, we 
believe improving the OSN access control schemes seems to be the first step toward 
addressing the existing security and privacy concerns related to online social networks. 
Nowadays, conventional access control techniques have several disadvantages when it 
comes to protecting the privacy of online social network users. Hence, the need for new 
access control mechanisms that are integrated with privacy preserving techniques 
specifically tailored to OSNs and based on metrics such as trust, co-controllers, and 
social metrics is becoming more compelling.  
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2.3 Access Control Models 
As we discussed above, recently we have seen unprecedented growth in the 
popularity of OSNs for sharing data such as pictures, videos, audio, etc. between people.  
It comes with scientifically challenging problems and concerns about protecting the 
information of online users. In OSNs, users are encouraged to broaden their social 
network and to share their content with others; consequently, those activities obviously 
raise user’s privacy and content confidentiality issues. Online users usually want to 
selectively share their content in OSNs; thus, an access control mechanism is what gives 
users more control on the spread of their information. Access control techniques are 
intuitively introduced to protect users’ privacy, prevent unauthorized access and to 
selectively share contents in social networks. While access control mechanisms are 
simple and may only require comparison of credentials, OSNs have specific access 
control requirements, due to their particular characteristics. They require more fine-
grained control and new controlled data sharing solutions that respect what has been 
proposed so far in the field of database management systems (DBMSs) and operating 
systems. Theoretical work on access control has led to several frameworks for achieving 
the desirable access control requirements for social networks and representing access 
control mechanisms in a flexible and fine-grained way, (e.g. [Carminati, et al. 2009a, 
Xiao and Tan. 2012, Hu, et al. 2013, Fong. 2011b, Cheng, et al. 2012a, Anwar, et al. 
2010]. Nowadays, these access control frameworks, which are proposed for OSNs, 
replace a particular policy model such as discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory 
access control (MAC), or role-based access control (RBAC) paradigms, which are used 
in traditional systems. DAC is a means of restricting the access of subjects to objects 
based on the identity of subjects and a set of authorizations. DAC provides discretion to 
individual users over who is allowed to access the data they create or own. Also, in this 
type of access control pattern, a user has comprehensive control over all system resources 
that are owned and executed by her/him. In contrast, MAC utilizes security classification 
labels that represent security domains. Thus, the subject’s and object’s security 
classification determines the accesses that subjects can execute on the objects in the 
system [Ferrari and Thuraisingham. 2000]. The security classes associated with subjects 
are a measure of how trustworthy the subjects are; so, this trust model is based on subject 
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labels defined as a clearance level [Ferrari. 2010]. The sensitivity of data is measured by 
object security levels that are enforced by the system. Consequently, in a MAC paradigm, 
user privileges cannot be passed from one user to another and there is no concept of 
ownership.  In addition to DAC and MAC, in 1996 Sandhu et al. proposed the RBAC 
approach where restricting resources or system access to authorized objects is regulated 
according to their role (job descriptions) [Sandhu, et al. 1996]. In RBAC, privileges are 
associated with roles instead of being resource-owner centric as in DAC or security 
classification labels as in MAC.  
In this section, we first briefly present the basic concepts of access control and 
give a brief history of the main research in the field of access control.  
2.3.1 Access Control Models in Data Management Systems 
Access control is one of the most important features of today’s systems to protect 
data stored into Data Management System (DMS) [Ferrari. 2009, Bertino and Sandhu. 
2005] . The technical ability to do something with a computer resource such as view, 
modify, create or delete is what we mean by access. Access control usually determines 
whether the ability is explicitly enabled or restricted in some way [Bertino and Sandhu. 
2005]. Its overall goal is the protection of DMSs resources (i.e., data and services). 
Indeed, DMS access control focuses on addressing three main issues [Samarati and de 
Vimercati. 2001, Bertino and Sandhu. 2005]:  
• Data confidentiality or secrecy refers to preventing improper or unauthorized access 
and to limiting data access and disclosure to authorized users.  
• Data integrity that is protecting data from intentional or accidental unauthorized 
modifications or deletions by restricting the number of users with access 
• Data availability ensures that authorized users have access to information resources. 
Also, it refers to preventing hardware and software errors that could make some of 
the data unavailable to authorized users.   
Under this conceptual umbrella of access control preservation and according to their 
functional purposes, DMS access control mechanisms are divided into several categories 
such as logical or technical, compensation, preventive, administration, recovery, 
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corrective and detective. Access control mechanisms are a central element of computer 
security, since they are the basis of implementing both information confidentiality and 
integrity. ITU-T Recommendation X.800 defines access control as follows: 
“The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a 
resource in an unauthorized manner.” 
 Access control mechanisms are used to enforce a policy, which is specified by Security 
Administrators (SAs) or users, of restricting access to a data object to only those users 
(subjects) who are authorized [ISO. 1989].   
2.3.1.1 Basic components of access control 
According to the aforementioned definitions of access control, the basic concepts 
of access control are access control policies and authorizations. The policies are 
considered as inputs for access control and as high-level rules according to which access 
control must be regulated. Indeed, policies, which may be made by a management official 
responsible (e.g., security administrators, users, etc.) for particular systems, applications, 
or resources, articulate who can access which objects and in which manner (e.g., read, 
write, execute, delete, etc.), and, optionally, under what conditions (e.g., time, location, 
history, etc.) [Stallings. 2008, Benantar. 2006]. The rules may depend on many varied 
factors such as roles, permissions, dynamically deduced rights, or the specific user 
requirements. A simple example of access control polices is granting authorization to 
managers to read the psychological evaluations of employees only during their work 
shift. In order to enforce polices automatically, they should be translated into a set of 
authorizations. So, whenever a subject requests to access an object, the access control 
mechanism verifies the rights of subject against the set of identified authorizations.  
The basic form to represent and store authorizations can be abstractly modeled as 
a triple (subject, object, access mode) indicating that the subject is approved to access the 
object under a specific access mode. While authorization can depend on the protected 
objects represented, there is a uniform way to represent the authorization; for example, in 
a relational database system, the authorizations regularly are stored in the system catalog 
as tuples. An access control model provides a formal representation of the authorizations 
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and their enforcement. Then, by the access control mechanism that works as a reference 
monitor, a decision is made whether a subject’s request can be granted totally or partially 
or should be denied. Indeed, the reference monitor is the basis of access control 
mechanisms and the trusted computing base (TCB) component of a computing system. 
Its concept, presented by Lampson in the early 1970s [Lampson. 1974], defines a set of 
design requirements on a reference validation mechanism that intercepts every access 
request (e.g., read, write, etc.) from a subject to perform on an object to determine 
whether a subject can be partially or totally granted or it must be denied [Benantar. 
2006]. Thus, reference monitors have two main aspects: access control enforcement, and 
the computation of an access control decision. The development of the reference monitor 
must have some essential properties such as: it must unbypassable, that is, it must 
mediate all access requests to the systems and their resources. The second property is that 
it must be tamper-proof, to protect the reference validation from any alteration that could 
result from a malicious user. In the worst case, we must be sure the reference monitor is 
qualified to detect any improper modification. As we previously mentioned, 
authorizations are the second basic building component for access control that declares, 
in a basic format, who can access which object and under which mode or condition. 
However, this function may require further components to determine an access control 
decision that may not be accurately captured by the basic format. Consequently, 
extending the authorization format has been addressed by several researchers to offer 
more an inclusive authorization language [Jajodia, et al. 2001, Bonatti and Olmedilla. 
2007, Bonatti, et al. 2009, Bertino, et al. 2000]. 
2.3.1.2 Administration of access controls 
Additionally to the main two components of access control, administration is one 
of the most involved and challenging aspects and functions in access control. Access 
control administration deals with collection of duties, responsibilities and tasks that are 
appointed to administrators to grant or revoke authorizations. The access control 
administration function collectively involves monitoring, modifying, testing, and 
managing user accounts and accesses on the system. Administrative policies state who is 
allowed to grant and revoke privileges to subjects and regulate the performance of other 
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administrative operations such as creation, modification and deletion of roles [Sandhu 
and Samarati. 1994]. Although this is one of the most significant aspects of access 
control, it is probably the least understood and most complicated aspect of access control. 
In order to understand access control administration, we introduce the three basic 
approaches to administering access controls that are centralized, decentralized or a 
combination of these, which often is adopted by hybrid environments. In fact, the 
appropriate decision to choose an access control administration method depends on the 
needs and circumstances of a particular organization and the sensitivity of its information 
[Ferrari. 2010, Guttman and Roback. 1995, Stallings. 2008, Sandhu and Samarati. 1994]. 
In a centralized administration approach, only one (or few) trusted entities is responsible 
for configuring access controls. The security administrator(s) is typically the central 
office where all access control design is done. Using centralized administration is very 
simple because policies are maintained and modified only in one central location. 
However, it is a very strict approach because the ability to grant or revoke the 
authorizations resides with very few individuals. Also, one of the main disadvantages in a 
centralized administration model is that if changes need to be done quickly, going 
through single authority location can be time consuming. The second administration 
mode is decentralized administration, which captures the simplicity and flexibility 
requirements of the real world. In this type of administration, the creator of an object 
becomes its manger that directly controls the access on the object. Moreover, a 
decentralized paradigm of administration is easier to implement because the access 
control unit is not a single point of failure. Although decentralized administration gives 
the users who are close to the resources the right to control the access, owners may 
practice security and access control in different ways that introduces conflicts. In 
addition, when access is not administered centrally, keeping all owners on track to 
regulate who can access their objects makes a general administration and invalidation of 




Figure 1: The main components of access control and their interactions. 
The main components of access control and their interactions and coexistences between 
each other and with other security services are illustrated in Figure 1. 
2.3.1.3 Access control paradigms 
Many real world domains such as government, the military, enterprises, etc. have 
complex policies and various privacy anxieties, where evaluating access requests is based 
on the application of different requirements and rules. Access control techniques dictate 
how the administrator grants an access permission to a subject to perform her/his duties 
on a particular object. Access control models are frameworks for implementing 
components, deploying mechanisms and ensuring the integrity of security policies that 
facilitate authorized access to protected resources. There are several methods of limiting 
access to authorized subjects that have been devoted to improving access control. Three 
main types of access control models have emerged: 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC):   
The policies of mandatory control access (MAC) are based on mandated 
regulations determined by a central authority that is a security policy administrator [61]. 
Loosely, we can name any access control model that enforces security policies 
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independent of user operations as mandatory access control. Thus, in MAC, the end user 
has no ability to override the policies or provide any privileges to any subject. Indeed, the 
concept of owner administration does not exist in MAC; however, its policies regulate 
accesses to data by subjects based on policies that are defined by prearranged subject 
attributes (e.g. security clearances) and object security levels that are enforced by the 
system [Brand. 1985]. MAC is associated with two security models: the first is the Bell-
LaPadula model, which was published in 1973 and focused on the confidentiality 
(secrecy) of data[Bell and La Padula. 1976], whereas the second associated model, the 
Biba model is focused on the integrity of information [Biba. 1977]. MAC models are 
used as a response to the security requirements of the military and other governmental 
organizations where the system administrator takes charge of the full access control and 
keeping secrets is the primary goal.  
Discretionary Access Control (DAC): 
MAC, while highly important to military applications and governmental 
organizations, is not the most commonly used method of access control in commercial 
applications or operating system such as Unix, Linux and Windows 2000. These systems 
allow subjects, who could be the owner or creator of an object, to decide access rights on 
their objects. This model is called discretionary access control (DAC), and first appeared 
to implement Access Control Matrices introduced by Lampson in his paper on system 
protection[Lampson. 1974]. Indeed, this pattern is labeled discretionary access control or 
DAC because it is at the discretion of subjects to make policy decisions, which determine 
who can access the objects they create or own, and assigns security attributes such as 
accessors’/or requestors’ identity and authorization rules[Brand. 1985]. Unlike the MAC 
framework where access cannot be passed from one subject (user) to another, in a DAC-
based system, privileges can be transferred, suspended, resumed or revoked with relative 
ease [Benantar. 2006]. DACs are typically implemented in one of two ways: Capability-
based security or Access Control Lists (ACLs). First, an ACL defines a set of subjects 
(users), which for example, may be listed as owner, group, or others, who are allowed to 
access a particular data object along with types of actions they can perform by using 
primitive control values such as read, write, execute, etc.[Ritchie and Thompson. 1983]. 
Second, capability-based security grants a subject the permissions with specific 
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capabilities (e.g. has been issued to the requestor, hasn't been revoked or expired) to 
access the data object[Levy. 1984]. Furthermore, DAC can include and implement 
transaction controls, time-based controls and other fundamental systems of identity-based 
access control (IBAC). DAC permits a wide and common range of administrative 
policies, which represent important aspects of an access control model in general and 
discretionary access control in particular. Centralized, cooperative, ownership, 
hierarchical and decentralized are some of administrative policy approaches supported by 
DAC[Ferrari. 2010]. The bottom line is that using DAC provides flexibility and enabling 
of fine-grained control over system objects. These are the reasons why many application 
environments, especially commercial DBMSs, adopt DAC.  
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): 
The need to specify and enforce enterprise-specific security policies in a way that 
satisfies and covers the requirements of most commercial enterprises and to simplify 
authorization administration have been the motivation for many researchers and 
practitioners to develop a new access control approach which captures real-world access 
control requirements. Hence, the role-based access control model (RBAC) has been 
invented for large enterprise solutions where a role represents a particular function within 
an organization and can be seen as a set of responsibilities that the user in this role can 
perform. Like a position in the real world, an RBAC role connects to a set of permissions 
to perform some operations or duties on some objects. The early references of using roles 
can be found in Baldwin’s paper [Baldwin. 1990] where they are called protection 
domains. Then, in the early and middle of 1990s RBAC was introduced by Ferraiolo and 
Kuhn [Ferraiolo and Kuhn. 2009], Sandhu, et al. [1996]  and Nyanchama and Osborn 
[1994, 1999], as a way to simplify authorization administration within companies and 
organizations. The standard for RBAC was proposed by Ferraiolo, et al. [2001]as one of 
the new generation of access control mechanisms.  
In role-based security systems, the role is an intermediate element between 
subject (user) and permission. A permission denotes the ability that a subject (user) can 
execute certain operations on certain objects. Users are then made members of roles, thus 
acquiring the roles’ permissions. Consequently, all authorizations are granted to the role 
associated with activities that can be executed on objects by getting these authorizations. 
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In contrast to Access Control Matrices (AM) and Access Control Lists (ACL) a user, 
under an RBAC model, is not directly authorized to any right, but has to activate a role 
that has already been assigned to her/him. Indeed, roles raise the access control to a 
coarse-grained level to manage accesses, so a user can be assigned to more than one role, 
which can be activated on different occasions. Moreover, different users can 
simultaneously play the same role. On the other hand, the role concept puts access control 
in a more granular manner that can specify what types of activities can be performed 
within an object, not just on the object as a whole. Furthermore, Sandhu, et al. in[1996] 
presented the family of RBAC models which includes sessions as a supplementary 
feature. A session represents what a user has activated at run time, and distinguishes 
RBAC from traditional group mechanisms. As a result, by session management we can 
easily restrict a user to not activate conflicting roles at the same time. The RBAC 
standard was proposed by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
[Ferraiolo, et al. 2001], and is now an ANSI standard [INCITS. 2004]. Most studies 
confirm that roles are a useful and suitable approach for many commercial enterprises 
and government organizations. First of all, because roles signify a specific function 
within an organization and the number of roles of related authorizations is usually much 
fewer than the number of users or individual permissions, knowing what a user’s 
organizational accountabilities are is easier to manage than assigning individual 
permissions to single users. Moreover, roles can also be simply used to manage and 
control the administrative mechanisms because the concept of role is more stable than 
individual user ownership in a large number of business activities. For instance, when 
user changes or deletes her/his function within organization, the security administrator 
only needs to cancel or change the roles corresponding to the user’s job; when a new user 
joins the organization, the administrator simply needs to grant the appropriate role 
membership(s). Therefore, these transactions do not have any influence on the roles and 
their relevant permissions. Lastly, because of its relevance, RBAC has been extended into 
various models with the aspiration to address the access control challenges and satisfy the 
requirements of applications, commercial enterprises and governments such as Temporal 
RBAC (TRBAC) [Bertino, et al. 2001], Generalized TRBAC (GTRBAC) [Joshi, et al. 
2005], Generalized RBAC (GRBAC) [Moyer and Abamad. 2001] , etc.   
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2.3.2 Access Control Models in Online Social Networks  
In this section, we discuss the requirements for access control in OSNs. However, 
we will present the privacy settings that are implemented and used in current OSNs. Most 
OSNs provide only the most basic access control policies. For example, most social 
networks (e.g. Facebook, Google+, MySpace, Friendster, etc.) focus on profile privacy 
rather than settings for contents. Also, even though a few of them support grouping of 
users, the process of grouping users into lists as in Facebook or into circles as in Google+ 
is troublesome and time-consuming task for the end-user. Although access control in 
most current OSNs is essentially based on relationships among users and resources, the 
user is offered a limited number of privacy setting options by choosing options such as 
public, private, set of users whom she/he has a direct relationship or simple alternatives to 
these basic settings such as “friend of friend”. By these limited options, users may grant 
access to unauthorized users; nevertheless, they are restricted and inflexible in signifying 
authorized users. Even though most OSNs provide fine-grained control on profile 
elements such as personal photos, status or other basic information, they only offer one 
binary type of relationship that is friend or not. Consequently, this limitation violates a 
significant security principle which is keeping consistency between online and offline 
social networks [Chi Zhang, et al. 2010]. Various studies expose the complex and 
unfriendly access control interfaces of OSNs (e.g., [Lewis, et al. 2008, Boyd and 
Hargittai. 2010, Johnson, et al. 2012, Gross and Acquisti. 2005]); moreover, in some 
OSNs, the access control interfaces are very hard to find. Gross and Acquisti in 
[2005]measure and analyze users’ behaviors towards privacy policy and their 
participation with available privacy policies in Facebook. Their study shows that only a 
small fraction of users were conscious of the availability of the privacy settings. As a 
result, the users have to be experts to control portions of their data in OSNs.  
Access control in OSNs carries numerous unique features different from access 
control in traditional data management systems. Also, the privacy issues and concerns in 
OSNs differ from that in databases. Subsequently, the definition and treatment of privacy 
in OSNs is dissimilar to that in traditional databases. Many traditional approaches that 
maintain privacy in data management systems such as MAC, DAC, RBAC, etc. are not 
appropriate options to work with in an OSN context. As we previously discussed in 
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mandatory and role-based access control (MAC and RBAC), policy is typically specified 
by the security administrator. Access control policy in DAC is defined by the resource 
owner. These ways of specifying policies are working properly if users know their 
accessors because they are able to put up a set of permissions to accurately grant the 
access only to intended subset of their friends. However, in OSNs scenarios where users 
mostly do not know a priori all their possible indirect accessors (friends), a traditional 
access control policy is not enough because in such situations users will have to specify a 
huge number of policies. Similarly to DAC, owner-based administration is adopted by 
OSNs. In OSNs the administrator of data is a user who may desire to regulate access to 
her/his resources and activities related to herself/himself, therefore user-specified policies 
should be the access model for OSNs. Other than the content owner, some associated 
users (e.g. users tagged in photos owned or uploaded by another user or parent) may also 
desire to participate in the content’s privacy setting to regulate how the content or user 
can be exposed. As we previously mentioned, a reference monitor is the fundamental 
component in access control, which scrutinizes each access request to the system based 
on the specified access control policies to determine whether the access request can be 
authorized or denied. Thus, to enforce the privacy policy in OSNs we need a suitable 
architecture for access control enforcement. Several studies have demonstrated semi-
decentralized and fully decentralized solutions are more suitable to Web-based Social 
Network (WBSN) than a traditional, centralized approach (e.g., [Yeung, et al. 2009, 
Carminati, et al. 2009b]).  
2.3.2.1 Access control model requirements for OSNs 
OSNs are quite large and complex clusters of personal data and therefore we need 
new approaches to describe and execute access control on that data. Indeed, many recent 
research results demonstrating that users' actual privacy settings do not match their 
sharing intentions are particularly troubling[Madejski, et al. 2012, Liu, et al. 2011]. 
Access control in OSNs presents numerous unique characteristics different from access 
control in traditional data management systems. However, providing broad and ideal 
access control scheme requirements for OSNs has become a much more difficult task due 
to the increase in the amount of content shared and the increase in the number of users. 
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Furthermore, defining the structure of each social network and the nature of their data is 
not a simple task, because most OSNs combine different elements and more than one 
type of network (e.g., relationship network, trust network and group network). Also, 
OSNs may change their focus and provided services over time. In 2007, Gates identifies a 
set of requirements in order to successfully develop access control in Web 2.0, which 
includes OSNs [Gates. 2007]. Relationship-based, fine-grained, interoperable, data 
exposure minimization and sticky-policies are the necessary requirements to establish 
access control systems for Web 2.0, as identified by Gates [2007]. Truly, there is not a 
clear path that directs researchers and developers in the duty of developing an access 
control model for OSNs that tackles the limitations of the privacy settings and addresses 
the whole set of requirements. Although online social networks’ security and privacy 
requests still are not comprehensively recognized or fully defined, some research has 
investigated requirements for access control systems for OSNs (e.g., [Carminati, et al. 
2009a, Cheng, et al. 2012b, Cheng, et al. 2012a, Carminati, et al. 2014, Gates. 2007]). 
Based on Gates’ [2007]considerations, and according to [Carminati, et al. 2009a, Cheng, 
et al. 2012b, Cheng, et al. 2012a, Carminati, et al. 2014], next we summarize the key 
requirements that a future access control model for OSNs should have. 
• User-friendly: Providing a natural and user-friendly way of defining access 
control rules. Although social networking capabilities provided by Web 2.0 have 
increased, most of the access control interfaces are complex and not flexible. 
Some are very hard to find and use. An ideal access control model must be 
effective and flexible to use, matching real world scenarios.   
• Flexibility with data: Social networks with different interests offer diverse access 
control mechanisms. However, an ideal access control model should have the 
ability to work with all types of data regardless of where they are stored. 
• Fine-grained: It is essential to develop an access control paradigm for OSNs in a 
fine-grained format. Actually, most OSN applications focus on profile privacy, 
but online users should control their contents even for the shared data, selecting 
who is allowed to access it and under which conditions in a fine-grained method. 
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Also, allowing fine-grained control for data and accessors should be offered by a 
future access control model for OSNs.  
• Relationship based: Recently, there is consensus that an access control model for 
OSNs should be relationship-based because it is very intuitive for users to adopt 
their social relationships to define authorized members for their information (e.g., 
[Masoumzadeh and Joshi. 2011, Fong, et al. 2009, Carminati, et al. 2009b, 
Carminati, et al. 2011, Fong and Siahaan. 2011, Cheng, et al. 2012b, Cheng, et al. 
2012a, Hu, et al. 2013]). In OSNs, user-to-user (U2U) relationships between the 
accessing user and the resource owner is a common characteristic that 
relationships in OSNs have. Moreover, between users and resources there are 
some different types of relationships such as ownership, like, tag, comment, post, 
etc. However, existing OSNs treat ownership as the only manifestation of user-to-
resource (U2R) relationship; consequently the authority of accessing resources is 
still controlled based on the relationships between the accessing user and the 
controlling user (U2U). Also, due to many functionalities presented by today’s 
OSN applications and many user activities found in them, there exist several 
different types of resource-to-resource (R2R) relationships such as pictures under 
the same album, comments or likes to a blog post, etc.  An ideal access control 
scheme must be able to express U2R and R2R relationships in addition to U2U 
relationships for authorization policies and decisions. Additionally, there are 
several characteristics that relationships in OSNs should have. First of all, types of 
relationships can be mutual such as friend or colleague and one directional such 
as parent-of or fans or followers. Furthermore, relationships can be direct (e.g., 
Alice has a direct relationship of type “colleague -of ” with Bob) or indirect (e.g., 
Alice and Carol are not directly connected, but they are related in that Carol is a 
friend of Bob, and Bob is a friend of Alice). The type and depth of a relationship 
determine the level of information disclosure; for example, users commonly allow 
their close friends to view private information more than other types of contact. In 
contrast, it would be less embarrassing for users to share embarrassing photos 
with strangers than with close friends or even with friends of friends [Akcora, et 
al. 2012]. Also, relationship-based access control should take into account the 
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specification and composition of complex relationships. Finally, in order to have 
more flexible relationship-based access control, users should be able to customize 
their relationships by defining names and properties.  
• Interoperable: An access control model for OSNs should be able to exchange and 
make use of information between the multiple applications. Usually, users have 
accounts on different OSNs such as Facebook, Blogger, LinkedIn, etc. Thus 
rather than users redefining the access control policies for each individual site, 
they might want their policies and preferences to follow them regardless of where 
their data are stored.   
• Trust-based: To improve OSNs’ access control systems, the concepts of trust and 
depth have to be considered. An access control policy for OSNs should make a 
user able to state how much she/he trusts other users. Trust may be useful in 
determining who is authorized to access OSN resources because trust values are 
often associated with different levels of information disclosure[Jøsang, et al. 
2007]. For example, users usually share confidential content only with the most 
trustworthy friends rather than with users who have the minimum trust level of 
friendship. However in some cases, users are willing to disclose particular data to 
anonymous strangers, but not to those who know them better such as family 
members or close friends[Joshi and Kuo. 2011]. In either case, trust values can be 
helpful to build an access control scheme that is intuitive and simple to use, 
keeping consistency between the way of managing online and offline social 
networks.  
• Co-ownerships: Another key parameter that is essential to develop an effective 
and flexible access control manner for OSNs is joint administration of policy. For 
instance, consider the case where Alice uploads a photo in her profile, and assume 
that she tags Bob and Carol in the photo. Users tagged in a photo owned by 
another user may have some rights to control the release of the photo to other 
users. Indeed, due to the increase in the amount of content shared, collaborative 
policies for access control and authorization administration is becoming more and 
more important in OSN scenarios. An ideal access control model must consider 
all subject-to-object relationships, besides the traditional ownership 
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administration policy adopted by DMSs as we formerly mentioned.  
2.3.2.2 Prior Access Control Models for Online Social Networks   
Parallel to the increase of popularity, research on access control has been growing 
with the results of the proposal of several access control models. Although there is no a 
clear and well defined path for developing access control systems in OSNs, several 
proposed models attempt to address some of the requirements specified by Gates [2007]. 
In what follows, we discuss the main existing works addressing access control for OSNs. 
We categorize them into two types based on type of administration policies. First, we 
review approaches that do not consider collaborative authorization administration of 
shared data in OSNs. On the other hand, we review and discuss in detail the approaches 
that have been proposed with respect of the need for a collaborative policy for OSN 
access control models. 
2.3.2.2.1 Access Control Models with Single Specification (Owner) 
Improving and proposing a number of access control mechanisms for OSNs 
appear as the essential step toward addressing the existing security and privacy concerns 
of online users. In this section we provide an overview of existing research in the field of 
access control in OSNs. In fact, access control in OSNs presents a number of unique 
characteristics different from traditional access control techniques. In mandatory and 
role-based access control, the policy is typically regulated by the security administrator. 
However, in OSNs, users desire to specify policies to their resources and activities related 
to themselves; consequently access control in OSNs is subject to user-specified policies.  
A number of proposals, in various levels of maturity, that attempt to develop 
usable and fine-grained access control mechanisms for protecting personal and shared 
data are emerging in OSNs. A first approach was proposed by Gollu, et al. [2007] , where 
a social-networking-based access control scheme suitable for online information sharing 
is given. Their approach considers users’ identities as key pairs and identifies social 
relationships based on social attestations. To define and manage the access lists of users, 
they adopted simple access control lists. In [Hart, et al. 2007], the authors discuss the 
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access control requirements of WBSNs in general, and OSNs in particular, and they 
proposed a content-based access control model. In this approach, relationship information 
available in OSNs is used to denote authorized subjects. However, resources are denoted 
by their content, which is derived based on content analysis techniques and users’ tags. 
Hart, et al.[2007]solely considered direct relationships in WBSNs.  
Initial access control models for social networks concentrate mainly on computing 
trust values for users, inspired by research developments in trust and reputation 
computation in social networks. Kruk, et al. proposed one of the earliest approaches that 
considers asymmetric friendships that are quantified in the context of Friend of a Friend 
(FOAF) in a distributed identity management system based on social networks [Kruk. 
2004, Kruk, et al. 2006]. Also, they combine trust metrics and degree of separation 
policies to control accesses of friends to data in a social network. However, this approach 
supports only a one type of relationship and adopts centralized access control 
enforcement. For those reasons, this approach is not appropriate for the OSN domain, 
which is naturally dynamic and decentralized. Furthermore, to preserve the 
trustworthiness of users’ data in social networks, Carminati, et al. propose a similar 
concept of trust-based access control model which is more mature [Carminati, et al. 
2006]. They have proposed it in a semi-decentralized [Carminati, et al. 2009b] and in a 
decentralized architecture [Carminati, et al. 2008, Xue, et al. 2011] with relationship 
types, distributed trust metrics and degree of separation policies [Carminati, et al. 2006, 
Carminati, et al. 2007, Carminati and Ferrari. 2008, Carminati, et al. 2009b]. In the 
context of trust, Ali, et al. suggest to customize trust metrics to enforce access boundaries 
[Ali, et al. 2007]. This works by adopting a multi-level access control approach, where 
each user in an OSN has a security level that is computed as the average of the trust 
values assigned for her/him by other users in OSN. Also, all resources in OSN have 
security levels that are assigned by owners. Consequently, the access is based on the 
security level between user and resource, where if a resource’s level is equal to or less 
than a user’s level, the user is authorized to access. Moreover, automatically classifying 
nodes in regions is a different trust measure that is proposed by Villegas, et al. [2008].  
However, these methods focus mainly on subject specification based on trust and 
distance measures. Carminati, et al. propose an approach that utilizes semantic web 
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technologies [Carminati, et al. 2009a, Carminati, et al. 2011]. With the Web Ontology 
Language (OWL) and the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) they define three kinds 
of policies, namely, access control policies, administration policies and filtering policies. 
Access control policies are permissions to access; administration policies are to specify 
who is allowed to define those policies; and filtering policies are used to limit someone’s 
access to information by an administrator. This work offers a model that shows different 
user-user and user-resource relationships. Some others propose to use semantic web 
technologies, including the Resource Description Framework (RDF) [Ryutov, et al. 
2009]. Also, their proposal of a rule-based access control model is based on a constrained 
first order logic. Although two prior approaches offer models to use ontologies, they fail 
to provide protection for relations, which is central in the Masoumzadeh and Joshi 
approach because relations are mainly used in the rule based access control model 
[Masoumzadeh and Joshi. 2011]. Their approach allows both users and the system to 
express policies based on access control ontologies. Furthermore, they adopt ontologies 
to analyze what privacy-sensitive information is protected by the stated policies of the 
OSN, and find out missing policies for that privacy-sensitive information; moreover, it 
offers ideal policies to protected users’ sensitive information[Masoumzadeh and Joshi. 
2013].  
In [Fong, et al. 2009, Anwar, et al. 2010, Fong. 2011a], Fong, et al. look to 
formalize and generalize the access control model implemented in Facebook. The 
Facebook-style Social Network System (FSNS) is generalized into two steps, namely, 
reaching the search listing of the resource owner and accessing the resource, respectively.  
In the first phase, the accessor has to find the owner of the target item; afterward in the 
second phase, the owner’s permissions will decide whether the access is permitted or not. 
Accessing data and policies for search, communications, and traversal are formalized by 
this model. One feature of Facebook is that access control policies are topology-based 
[Anwar, et al. 2010, Fong, et al. 2009]. Although an FSNS is an information-sharing 
platform that chooses to use an access control mechanism similar to that of Facebook, 
FSNS’ policy vocabulary supports topology-based policies that are not yet offered by 
Facebook, such as n-common friends and clique. However, the drawbacks of this work 
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are that it lacks support for multiple relationship types, a trust metric of relationships and 
directed relationships. 
In OSNs, it is more natural to take access decisions based on the existence of a 
particular kind of relationship or particular path of this kind of relationship between the 
resource owner and accessor. Furthermore, changes in relationships may commonly lead 
to change in authorizations; thus, access control in OSNs has to tackle the administration 
of access control policies in addition to normal usage of relationships [Cheng, et al. 
2012b, 2012a]. For these reasons, the majority of the access control proposals appearing 
so far are based on user relationships. The term Relationship-Based Access Control 
(ReBAC) is a new paradigm for access control that was invented by Gates [2007]. She 
takes into account the relationship or the transitive closure of the relationship between 
users and/or resources as essential requirements to protect in Web 2.0 applications. In 
fact, ReBAC is flexible to support OSN access control requirements, since users can 
neutrally express their authorizations in terms of relationships. The structures of 
relationship networks in current OSNs are highly dependent on the type of the social 
network we are dealing with. In Section 2.1, we described the major online social 
networks at present but defining the characteristics of the relationship network of each 
OSN it is not a simple task, because most OSNs merge different types of relationship 
networks. OSNs, furthermore, may change their focus over time in a way that impacts 
their relationship network structure. Despite this, we discuss the common and broad 
characteristics of relationship networks in OSNs. First of all, relationships could be 
(always) mutual (e.g., the “friend” relationship) in an undirected relationship network. On 
the other hand, in directed networks, they are not mutual (e.g., the “follow” relationship), 
where the direction of the relationship denotes which user (node) has established the 
relationship and the user (node) for whom a relationship has been established. Second, 
the main feature of a relationship in an OSN is its composition. In particular, binary 
relations are composable and transitive, for example, considering the relationship friends 
where we can infer the friends-of-friends relation by the composition friends 𝜊 friends. 
While a composite binary relationship highly supports policies of composition in 
relationship-based access control, it can be used to express delegation of trust in a natural 
way [Blaze, et al. 1996, Weeks. 2001, Li, et al. 2003]. Finally, the type of relationship is 
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often impacted at the level of information disclosure. Thus, authorization decisions may 
be different in each type; for example, users usually share more private information with 
close friends and family members than with other types of relationships such as 
coworkers or colleagues.   
Based on the above features that relationships in OSNs have, and inspired by 
Gates [2007] who, as we mentioned before, takes into account the existence of a 
relationship or a sequence of relationships between users in social networks to articulate 
the protection requirements of Web 2.0 applications, several approaches have been 
proposed to meet those requirements. Following Gates, researchers have offered more 
advanced relationship-based access control models (ReBAC) and access control policy 
expressions to talk about relationships. The majority of the access control models that 
have been proposed to address the problem of access control in OSNs explicitly or 
implicitly apply the ReBAC paradigm. We begin with the work of Carminati, et al. who 
proposed the first relationship-based access control model in [Carminati, et al. 2009b], 
where access control policies are formed as constraints on the relationships between 
accessor and the item owner. They interpret the constraints in the relationship according 
to three aspects: relationship type, depth and trust level that are specified by the item 
owner to grant or prevent access to the resource. Afterward, by using the semantic web 
technologies including OWL and SWRL in [Carminati, et al. 2009a]the researchers 
extend the model of [Carminati, et al. 2009b]. The authors used semantic web technology 
to define user profiles, relationships between users, items that are treated as independent 
entities, and relationships between users and items, which are extended more than a 
regular relationship such as ownership. For example, the relationship between a user and 
a photo that she/he is tagged in is expressed as ‘photoOf’ in their language. In 
[2009]Fong, et al. developed a formal algebraic access control scheme to model 
Facebook privacy settings. They model the access control procedure as two stages: 
reaching the search listing of the item owner and accessing the item. Their access control 
policies are primarily based on the relationships between the accessor and the item owner 
and graph-theoretic properties such as “n-common friends” and “n-clique”. However, this 
model does not support direct relationships, various relationship types (only friends) such 
as user-to-resourse or resourse-to-resourse relationship and trust metric of relationships. 
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Afterward, Fong [2011b]formulated a model for social computing applications, in which 
authorization decisions are based on the relationships between the resource owner and the 
resource accessor in a social network to meet Gates’ requirements of protection in Web 
2.0 applications [Gates. 2007]. Moreover, Fong uses a modal logic language for policy 
specification and composition and tracks social networks that are poly-relational. Later, 
Fong and Siahaan examined and demonstrated that there are well-known relational 
policies that cannot be articulated in the ReBAC policy language. Consequently, they 
extended and improved the model language to facilitate the specification and composition 
of ReBAC policies [Fong and Siahaan. 2011]. In opposition to earlier work [Fong, et al. 
2009], these two works support multiple relationship types and directional relationships; 
also, the relationships and authorizations in these models are formalized in access 
contexts and a context hierarchy [Fong and Siahaan. 2011, Fong. 2011b]. Last but not 
least, these models were enhanced by Bruns, et al.[2012]who adopted a hybrid logic to 
further facilitate and make efficient policy evaluation and specification. From the 
perspective of helping online users to analyze their access control policies, Anwar and 
Fong designed a visualization tool to evaluate the consequence of the access control 
formation [Anwar and Fong. 2012]. 
User-to-user relationship-based access control (UURAC) is a model proposed by 
Cheng, et al. [2012b]who also provide an expression-based policy specification language, 
which offers further advanced and fine-grained access control in OSNs. However, the 
UURAC model supports only one relationship type for authorization and specification of 
policies, namely the user-to-user relationships type. To improve UURAC limitations, 
Cheng, et al.[2012a]later proposed a rich social network model that includes user-to-user, 
user-to- resource and resource-to-resource relationships. This work considers the 
resources as entities, which is similar to the one in [Carminati, et al. 2009a], and the 
actions that users perform on their resources are recognized as relationships. Moreover, 
users’ administrative activities beside normal usage activities are supported. By explicit 
treatment of user-to-user, user-to-resource and resource-to-resource relationship-based 
policies, access control policies and conflict resolution, they significantly extend the 
previous UURAC model. Applying conflict resolution policies over relationship 
precedence is the strategy used to address policy conflicts in [Cheng, et al. 2012a].  
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Recently, a new system has appeared to enable online users to think differently 
about their privacy in OSNs [Pang and Zhang. 2013]. In contrast to [Cheng, et al. 2012b, 
2012a], Pang and Zhang proposed a new access control scheme for OSNs that focuses on 
existing public information in OSNs. They proposed a new manner for users in OSNs to 
express their privacy requirements based on their connections through public 
information. By comprising both a user relationships network and public information 
network they provided a new social network model for online users to regulate access to 
their resources. Afterward, authors developed a hybrid logic to be used for expressing 
access control policies. They offered a number of policies based on relationships and 
public information and articulated them in their developed logic. 
2.3.2.2.2 Access Control Models with Multiple Specifications (Co-
owners) 
In response to the need for joint management for data sharing in OSNs, 
Squicciarini, et al. [2009, 2010]have provided a novel collective privacy mechanism for 
better managing shared content between users. Their work considers the privacy control 
of content that is co-owned by multiple users in an OSN, such that each associated 
controller may separately specify her/his own privacy requirements for the shared 
content. They categorized associated controllers into two groups: first, owners are those 
users that manage access to the shared content and they can be a single user or a group of 
users. Moreover, they own and share ownership authorities with the originator who 
originally creates or uploads a particular content to the OSNs. Also, this work considers 
users who request access to certain content as viewers. The Clarke-Tax mechanism (a 
voting algorithm) is adopted to enable collective enforcement for shared data. 
Furthermore, a game theoretical method [Grossklags, et al. 2008], based on the voting 
algorithm, is applied to evaluate the scheme and to consider the privacy requirements of 
all stakeholders. Building upon the Clarke-Tax mechanism, the time needed to implement 
the algorithm is so little, that the collaborative management of the privacy settings is 
transparent to the user. In their work, by determining the maximum depth of viewers in 
the social network graph, each co-owner can identify privacy policies for her/his 
contents. For example, if an owner regulates her/his access requirement with a maximum 
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depth=1, the allowed viewers are equivalent to direct friends, while a maximum depth of 
2 would equate to friends of friends. Although their contributions include a solution for 
policy conflicts among multiple owners and inference techniques that free the users from 
the burden of manually regulating privacy preferences for each content, automatic 
negotiations adopted in their approach offer limited capacity for negotiation. Moreover, 
one of the possible side effects could be caused by the auction process that only the 
winning attempts could control who can access the shared content, instead of 
harmonizing all stakeholders’ privacy preferences. For example, owners cannot protect 
their content if other co-owners strongly request to publish this content. Their method is 
not as simple as it is claimed to be; it could be actually hard for ordinary OSN users to 
understand the Clarke-Tax mechanism and specify appropriate bid values for auctions 
which are essential for their process to derive a collaborative decision. Lately, CoPE, 
presented by Squicciarini, et al.  [2011a]  as a system, provides users with privacy 
mechanisms to collaboratively control and protect the access to their data. This 
application is implemented within the context of Facebook to support the collaborative 
privacy-control mechanisms that offers the ability to all stakeholders to manage 
accessibility of shared data. 
Carminati and Ferrari in [2011]discuss access control for data sharing in social 
networks, with emphasis on conflict resolution in circumstances where multiple 
controllers are involved. In particular, they introduce a collaborative access control 
mechanism in OSNs that integrates the topology of social networks in policy-making. 
They improve topology-based access control taking into account a set of collaborative 
users by giving a new class of security policies, called collaborative security policies, 
which indicate the set of users who should contribute to the collaboration. Additionally, 
Carminati, et al.[2011]propose a model that employs semantic web technologies to 
support a rich way of symbolizing collaborative users.   
Similarly, with respect to collaborative access control, the authors of [Wishart, et 
al. 2010]offer policy-based approaches to control access to shared data in social 
networking applications. Their collaborative approach to authoring privacy policies takes 
into account the needs of all associated users who are affected by disclosure of content. 
The originator of the content on the social network is allowed to specify policies for the 
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content she/he uploads. Then, the policy application can be edited by users who are 
nominated from the social networking service. In their approach, all requests that came 
from users, who are interested in the access or dissemination of the content, are passed to 
the Policy Decision Point (PDP). This PDP evaluates the policy for the content using a 
knowledge base. Although Wishart, et al.[2010]work is one of the few solutions to offer 
user-interfaces, a general drawback of their solution is the limited ability to determine co-
owners. The authors choose to place the burden of specifying policies for the content and 
inviting co-owners solely on the uploader of the content. They do not offer capacity for 
users to claim co-ownership of content or mechanisms to realize which user has the right 
to participate as co-owner. 
There are also some works discussing the collaborative privacy management 
problems in the popular social networks. CAPE, presented by Xiao and Tan [2012], takes 
into account peer effects in making collaborative access control polices; thus they believe 
some conflicts of co-managers' intentions will vanish naturally. Their proposed 
framework, CAPE, is based on graph theory and their ideas behind integrating peer 
effects is that OSN users are connected and immensely influenced by their neighbors. 
Consequently, by simulating such social interaction automatically, they allow co-owners 
to adjust their privacy settings according to their neighbors' actions and intentions. 
However, a general drawback of their approach is formulating their model based on an 
emotional mediation among multiple co-owners. It is difficult to trust and validate such a 
claim that co-owners will change their privacy settings according to their neighbors’ 
intentions. Moreover, they do not offer a solution to deal with the conflict that may be 
caused by a malicious co-owner who could subversively affect other co-owners’ actions. 
Sun, et al. [2012] proposed a recent approach that discusses the design of access 
control mechanisms for protecting shared data where multiple co-owners may have 
differing and conflicting privacy requirements. They offer a trust-augmented voting 
scheme to solve the particular problem of how to merge diverse privacy requirements 
from co-owners of shared contents. The core idea in their approach is combining trust 
relations among users in OSNs and Condorcet’s voting schemes [Young. 1988], where 
trust values are considered as vote weights. They believe that trust should be a key 
contributing factor to be considered when multiple co-owners collaborate to decide the 
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privacy policy on a shared content. In addition, they choose voting as a natural way to 
construct a mechanism that takes individual’s privacy preferences into a joint decision 
reflecting the collaborative privacy intentions of the group of owners who are sharing 
ownership of particular content.  Although their approach is based on the fact that trust is 
naturally inherent in OSNs and that a preferential voting scheme is a meaningful and 
straightforward way for co-owners to formulate their privacy requirements on shared 
data, the owner solely can decide for her/himself how she/he wants the privacy setting of 
shared content to be when a co-owner’s decision is overridden. Also, if an owner is not 
satisfied with the decision produced by a vote, she/he can solely specify the privacy 
policy for shared content. So under these circumstances the drawback of their solution is 
that the decision for regulating the access to the shared data still rests only on one owner 
who is the uploader of shared content or the owner of the space where the shared content 
is. 
Still in the field of collaborative access control in OSNs, Hu and colleagues 
proposed several works to address the privacy risks that are caused by the limited access 
control mechanisms in current OSNs, which do not provide effective mechanisms to 
enforce privacy concerns over data associated with multiple co-owners. First, in 
[2011]Hu and Ahn proposed a multiparty authorization framework (MAF) that enables 
collaborative management of shared content in OSNs. MAF is formulated to capture and 
realize the core features of multiparty authorization requirements in OSNs. They explored 
the privacy risk of lacking collaborative access control for data sharing in OSNs, which 
could sap the users privacy. Moreover, they combined MAF with a multiparty policy 
specification scheme and corresponding policy evaluation mechanism. MController is a 
proof-of-concept implementation of their approach that is deployed as a third-party 
application on Facebook, along with performance analysis. In fact, it is not uncommon 
that conflicts will arise when we attempt to reach a collaborative decision. To meet this 
requirement, Hu, et al. have studied data sharing in social networks, with emphasis on 
conflict resolution in the case of multiple co-owners involved in regulating shared data 
policies [Hu, et al. 2011]. They offer a novel solution for detecting and resolving privacy 
conflicts for collaborative data sharing in OSNs. Their systematic conflict detection and 
resolution mechanism balances the need for privacy protection and the online users’ 
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desire for data sharing by quantitative analysis of privacy loss and sharing risk. Privacy 
conflict identification can be realized through specifying the privacy settings to reflect the 
privacy requirements; furthermore, in a privacy conflict identification, the authors adopt 
an algorithm for identification of conflict. Also, in their paper, they discuss several 
situations of privacy conflicts for understanding the risks caused by those conflicts. 
Finally, to implement the approach they have designed a third- party Facebook 
application called Retinue which is in charge of the privacy conflict detection and 
resolution, and the production of a conflict-resolved privacy policy, which is then used to 
decide who has the access rights to the shared data. However, the above-mentioned 
approaches to address privacy policy conflicts and collaborative management of shared 
data still need improvements. We believe that before the decisions are created, we have to 
set a negotiation mechanism for conflicting privacy policies. By this suggestion, users 
may become aware of what data about them will be exposed; this knowledge can lead 
them to address some privacy policy conflicts. 
In addition, Hu, et al. [2013]significantly improve the multiparty authorization 
framework by presenting data sharing patterns with respect to co-controllers’ 
authorizations in OSNs. Also, they have enhanced a method to represent and reason 
about their model in a logic program. By these improvements they have formulated the 
Multiparty Access Control (MPAC) model to grasp the main features of multiparty 
authorization requirements that have not been actually accommodated so far by any 
existing access control systems and models for OSNs. Furthermore, they have enhanced a 
policy specification scheme and a voting-based conflict resolution mechanism. Their 
proposed conflict resolution mechanism assembles each co-owner's decision policy and 
sensitivity towards a particular content and hence leverages each co-owner's preference in 
the process of making a collective decision. Moreover, they present methods to perform 
analysis on the access control model such as correctness analysis and authorization 
analysis. The research papers [Hu and Ahn. 2011, Hu, et al. 2013, 2011] support some 
theories that we are extended in this dissertation. However, the appropriate strategy for 
conflict resolution, in their solution, is selected by the single owner who has the shared 
content in her/his profile [Hu, et al. 2013]. Thus, they do not treat all associated 
controllers equally in the process of making a collective decision. Even if the owner 
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desires to have highest priority in the control of shared data, we believe it may be more 
appropriate if all co-owners participate in the process of selecting the strategy for conflict 
resolution. Although they have defined types for the related co-owners based on their 
relationships with the shared content, those controllers have the same influence in the 
process of making a final decision. However, we believe to have collaborative decision- 
making be both efficient and effective, we have to give a weight to each ownership type 
that represents the priority of this type of ownership in the control of shared data. As a 
result, their privacy conflict resolution approach needs more comprehensive 
investigation. In addition, their analysis of data sharing associated with multiple users in 
OSNs is limited, and they did not inclusively articulate all scenarios of privacy conflicts 
for understanding the risks posed by those conflicts. We believe that, in [Hu, et al. 2013], 
they need to explore more criteria to evaluate the features of their solution for 
collaborative management of shared data. 
With respect to a multiparty access control (MPAC) model, Hu, Ahn, and 
Jorgensen propose and implement an approach for collaborative management of shared 
data in Google+ [Hu, et al. 2012]. This is despite the fact that Google+ has the notion of 
circles that allow users to selectively share data with certain groups within their social 
network, instead of sharing with all the users in their social networks [Kairam, et al. 
2012]. However, Google+ still offers limited access control that only supports a single 
owner to regulate the access policy of the shared content. Consequently, they expand and 
articulate a collaborative access control model called MPAC+, to determine the 
essentiality of collaborative authorization requirements in Google+, along with a policy 
specification scheme and conflict resolution mechanism, which interacts with conflicts of 
privacy requirements by keeping the balance between the need for privacy protection and 
the users’ request for data sharing, for collaborative management of shared data in 
Google+. They end by giving a prototype implementation of their collaborative privacy 
management approaches, called Sigma. Since the MPAC+ approach is built on the 
similar concept of MPAC, in general they have similar drawbacks. Furthermore, their 
approach has to be implemented and evaluated in a Google+ platform to show more 
precise and accurate results.  
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Photo sharing (tagging) is the most important service in many online social 
network sites that needs joint management. Thus, it has been recognized by recent works 
[Besmer and Richter Lipford. 2010, Pesce, et al. 2012, Squicciarini, et al. 2009]. In 
[Besmer and Richter Lipford. 2010], the authors believe understanding users’ privacy 
concerns and desires leads them to design an efficient collaborative access control 
mechanism. So they have investigated users’ privacy concerns about a photo tagging 
service and proposed a set of design considerations for a tagged photo privacy 
management approach. Then, they have created a privacy mechanism attempting to 
address those needs and follow those considerations. One of their findings is the issue of 
photo ownership is very significant and relevant to the photo tagging service; thus they 
provide a mechanism as part of a collaborative management tool in a way that benefits all 
tagged users. Although the authors report a comprehensive understanding of privacy 
concerns and requirements of users and found a number of important design 
considerations for a photo tagging privacy mechanism, their investigation and findings 
are only based on Facebook. Consequently, the concerns and findings of users’ privacy 
requirements they discovered may not be applicable to other social network sites such as 
MySpace and Google+.  
2.4 Trust in Online Social Networks  
As introduced in section 2.1, OSNs nowadays have become essential activates in 
our daily life. OSNs reflect human relationships on the Web, allowing users to establish 
new relationships and maintain existing relationships. Then, they connect to other users 
they know, to share information, interests and to have group activities (e.g., games, 
events). Since the literature demonstrates that social life is simply impossible without 
trust [Schlenker, et al. 1973, Luhmann. 1979], trust becomes one of the most crucial 
concepts in online social networks and online communities for improving privacy 
mechanisms and reducing concerns about personal information disclosure.  
Trust has been defined in several different disciplines such as psychology, 
economics, sociology and computer science. The concept of trust in these different 
disciplines differs in how it is represented, computed, and used. Thus, there is a wide and 
diverse range of synonyms for trust, and the answer to “what is trust?” cannot be easily 
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offered. Generally, the verb trust can mean to have confidence or believe in something or 
someone such as the honesty, skill or safety of a person, organization or thing 
[Cambridge Dictionaries online. 2014]. In computer science, most of the works regarding 
trust have been concentrated in the area of security, and then it has been rapidly applied 
to other areas such as game theory and electronic commerce. Consequently, numerous 
definitions have been offered seeing trust from diverse viewpoints; however, these 
explanations may not be directly related to OSNs. Although the majority of the studies 
concerning trust in OSNs have used mathematical techniques to develop and verify OSN 
services, the meaning and modeling trust in OSN are significant challenges.  
To simulate trust in OSNs, we have to keep in mind three main properties of trust. 
Based on [Golbeck. 2006, Golbeck and Hendler. 2006, Sherchan, et al. 2013, Golbeck. 
2005], the main characteristics of trust can be defined as follows:  
• Asymmetric: Between two users, the trust level is not identical; that means trust is 
not necessarily the same in both directions. For example, Alice may trust Bob 
80%; however, Bob may not have the same amount of trust feeling about Alice. 
Bob may only trust Alice 20% in return for example. In the undirected social 
graph, which is the basis of friendship oriented networks (e.g., friends in 
Facebook), this property is difficult to capture. 
•  Transitivity: Trust is not perfectly transitive in the mathematical sense where if 
Alice highly trusts Bob, and Bob highly trusts Carol, then it is not necessarily true 
that Alice so highly trusts Carol. There is a notion that trust can be passed 
between people [Golbeck. 2005]. Let us suppose that Alice and Bob know each 
other very well. When Alice asks Bob for an opinion about a hotel, Alice 
considers Bob’s opinion then integrates that to help shape an initial opinion of the 
hotel. Likewise, an OSN user can distinguish the most appropriate content 
depending mostly on her/his friends’ past experiences. 
• Personalization: Trust is inherently a personal opinion. In fact, two people often 
have very different opinions about the trustworthiness of the same person. For 
example, Alice and Bob may have very different opinion about Carol, but actually 
there is no right or wrong trust value except from the perspective of Alice and 
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Bob. According to Deutsch's definition: we commit to take the ambiguous path if 
we believe that the trusted person will take the action that will produce the good 
outcome [Deutsch. 1962]. Whatever qualifies as a suitable outcome varies from 
one person to another. 
On existing OSN graphs, a label is assigned to each link to symbolize the trust 
value of the relationship. In other words, users can explicitly assign a trust value to those 
who they have direct relationships with. Subsequently, a user can often make a decision 
based on this trust value of others and their opinions. On the other hand, when users are 
not directly connected, a seeker needs know the trustworthiness of data and ensure it is 
not from a malicious user who may give false information that might lead to disclosing 
private information. An important problem of trust in OSNs is to determine how much 
one user in the trust graph should trust another one who is not directly connected to 
her/him. The issue of trust is treated by an approach called trust inference. This problem 
of trust is illustrated in Figure 2. The node that denotes the individual who requests to 
compute her/his trust value to another one is called the source. In contrast, the node that 
the source requests to deduce about is called the sink. 
 
Figure 2: Trust Inference from node A to node E. 
As shown in Figure 2, we can say A, or the “source”, is directly linked with B and C, but 
is not directed linked to D or E. Moreover, we can recognize A is indirectly connected to 
E through two paths, A->B->D->E and A->C->D-> E, therefore generating two trust 
values of the “sink”, E, when we are deciding the trust inference value of A to E.  
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In the context of OSNs, a trust inference mechanism can be described as the 
ability to determine how much a user (source) trusts the sink when the user does not 
know the sink directly.  It can be used for aggregating, filtering, and ordering of 
information [Sherchan, et al. 2013]. There are a number of techniques that are proposed 
by scholars around the world to find suitable algorithms for inferring the optimum path 
and the trust value. The most common algorithms for trust inference include TidalTrust 
[Golbeck. 2005], SocialTrust [Caverlee, et al. 2008], SUNNY [Kuter and Golbeck. 2007] 
and FuzzyTrust [Lesani and Bagheri. 2006, Lesani and Montazeri. 2009]. We believe the 
notion of trust is naturally present in OSNs, and furthermore, users naturally tend to use 
linguistic expressions when they are asked about their trust to other individuals. For these 
reasons, we adopt the FuzzyTrust algorithm in our approach for calculating trust values, 
as coined by [Lesani and Bagheri. 2006]. In the following, we discuss the FuzzyTrust 
algorithm and TidalTrust algorithm because it is used as the basis for FuzzyTrust 
algorithm. 
In Golbeck’s work [2005], additional to deducing some trust graph properties 
from real networks, the author proposes the TidalTrust algorithm to derive a trust value 
between two users in the social network using the FOAF vocabulary. In this algorithm 
the trust values are considered to be numbers in a continuous range of [0…10], where 
each neighbor of the source is assigned a particular trust value. Afterward, the source 
node searches the path from her/his node to the sink by votes from all its neighbors, then 
paths are estimated and the shortest path is used. Golbeck assumes that neighbors with 
higher trust ratings have mostly concurred with each other in the trustworthiness of the 
information source (sink). Consequently, shorter paths have a lower average difference 
and higher trust ratings have a lower average difference. As a result, the approach takes 
into account the shortest paths from source to sink as the most accurate path. The 
TidalTrust algorithm is simple and its low complexity (𝛰  (|V| + |E|)) is suitable to any 
social network requiring high scalability such as online social networks.  
The FuzzyTrust algorithm is proposed by Lesani and Bagheri [2006] to tackle the 
problem where trust inference in a large trust graph is faced with contradictory 
information. They offer fuzzy linguistic terms to assign trust ratings to other nodes in the 
trust graph and developed an algorithm based on these. The fuzzy membership functions 
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for the linguistic terms such as low, medium, medium low, medium high and high can be 
used, which makes it easier for users to specify a trust value. Similar to the TidalTrust 
algorithm, this algorithm adopts the shortest path assumptions for trust calculation. 
Moreover, it computes trust from a stronger path when we obtain more than one path 
having the same depth from source to sink because Golbeck [2005] shows that paths with 
higher trust ratings produce better trust inference. The FuzzyTrust algorithm [Lesani and 
Bagheri. 2006, Lesani and Montazeri. 2009] performs a breadth-first like search through 
the nodes to detect the shortest and strongest path. Although this algorithm uses the 
TidalTrust algorithm as a basis, the results of Lesani’s and Bagheri’s simulation show 





Chapter 3  
3 Collaborative Access Control Scenarios   
 In this chapter, we explain scenarios where more than one user should be 
involved in the access control process. Multiple controller scenarios are raised by using 
different tools in OSNs such as posting, tagging and sharing. Often, multiple users have a 
variety of privacy policies over shared content; however, existing access control 
mechanisms in OSNs choose to place the burden of privacy policy solely on the owner 
who has the shared data in her/his profile. To safeguard all associated users’ privacy in 
OSNs, collaborative privacy protection mechanisms are needed. First we introduce and 
analyze multiple controllers’ scenarios to determine all users who have the right to 
participate in the process of making a collective access control policy. Those analyses 
and determinations are critical to the success of making collective privacy management 
of users’ shared content. To clarify the scenario analysis, we categorize them into three 
types: profile sharing where accessors are the social applications, relationship sharing 
where a relationship between users represents a shared item that users may have different 
authorizations concerning who can know about it, and content sharing which is the main 
type of sharing pattern and has the most sub-categories.  Thus, we precisely analyze all 
cases and subcases of content sharing patterns. We employ Facebook as the running 
example to make our explanation of sharing patterns easier. Although we use Facebook 
for examples, our discussion could work for other online social networks, such as 
Google+. 
3.1 Profile Sharing 
Several OSNs are able to provide open platforms to enable any third-party 
developers worldwide to create full applications on the top of users’ profiles, inside the 
framework. To enable social applications to be more purposeful and meaningful, they 
may consume user profile attributes, which usually include information such as the user’s 
name, birthdate, status, address, emails, education, interests, photos, music, videos, and 
many other attributes. At the same time, third-party applications could be extended and 
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use attributes of user’s friends, which would pose serious privacy concerns for the 
friends. When users and their friends use the same application, both the user and her/his 
friend want to control which attributes the application can access. Current OSNs allow 
only one side of the relationship to govern access to the profile attributes of the other 
side. Hence, the decision of an accessing application is solely regulated by the user who 
desires to share her/his friend information with a third party application in the OSN. To 
address such a critical issue, we consider the user’s friend is an owner who owns shared 
data on her/his space, which consists of profile attributes. The second controller is a 
contributor who shares her/his friend’s profile attributes with a social application. Then, 
we offer a mechanism to combine owner and contributor privacy settings of the shared 
profile attributes. Figure 3.displays a profile sharing pattern. Our proposed solution, to be 
introduced in Chapter 4, PermittedandDeniedAccessors, with its necessary inputs, is 
shown intervening between the application and the data to be controlled.  
 
Figure 3: Pattern of profile sharing. 
3.2 Relationship Sharing 
Users in OSNs are connected by social relationships, which characteristically are 
bidirectional. OSNs enable users to share their relationships with other members in 
OSNs. In fact, there are two users who establish the relationship in OSNs; consequently, 
both of them have the right to manage who can see the relationship between them. 
However, current OSNs provide limited access control that allows only one side of a 
relationship to restrict access where the user on the other side of the relationship may 
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have a different privacy preference. Consequently, the result of current OSN access 
control causes a high level of disclosure in online relationships because the participants in 
a relationship may have dissimilar sensitivity levels with respect to each other. The 
associated users in this case are co-owners. The need for a solution addressing the 
problem of relationship information leakage is demonstrated in Figure 4, where the 
relationship is the shared item between two users. The first user is called a stakeholder 
who specifies a policy to hide her/his relationships from the public. The second user is an 
owner who adopts a weaker policy that allows the public to see her/his relationships list. 
In this scenario, to regulate a satisfactory policy we have to consider owner and 
stakeholder authorization requirements to achieve a collective decision.  Again, our 
proposal for handling this, PermittedandDenied Accessors, which is given in Chapter 4, 
is shown intervening between the accessor and the data.  
 
 
Figure 4: Pattern of relationship sharing. 
3.3 Content Sharing 
OSNs offer mechanisms that facilitate users to socialize in the digital world. The 
main purpose of relationships in OSNs is to share various resources, which includes 
information, photographs, music and videos. Posting, tagging and information exchange 
are sharing tools that are provided by many OSNs such as Facebook, Google+ and My 
Space. In this section, we introduce content sharing scenarios for which privacy policies 
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in current OSNs do not adequately provide collective privacy controls on shared content. 
First, a user is able to post notes and news in her/his own space, upload pictures and 
videos, tag others members in her/his contents and share her/his contents such as pictures, 
videos, news etc., with other users. Furthermore, OSNs allow users to post contents on 
their friends’ profiles and share their friends’ contents. We organize the scenarios for 
content sharing depending on the sharing tools that are applied to the content. 
3.3.1 Tagging 
The tagging is the most popular social networking features. Tagging a user not 
only facilitates users to organize their photos, but also urges users to share and 
disseminate photos in OSNs. However, tagging carries several questions about what 
objects the tagging refers to, and who are the interpreters. Presently, OSNs give the user 
being tagged permission to accept the tagging or remove it; however, the photo is still in 
the OSN. Thus, current access controls in OSNs offer limited support to tagged users, 
who may be explicitly identified through tags, because the holder of the tagged photo is 
the sole decision maker to regulate access over who can see and share the photo. To limit 
disclosure of information, we choose to divide the burden of privacy setting among all 
associated users who appear in the photo and the owner of the profile where photo is 
shared. Thus, we can reach a collaborative decision, which is represented by the result of 
our PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm that considers privacy settings of all co-
owners. By making a cooperative decision, each associated controller can declare her/his 
desire about who can access to the photo and who cannot.  
Let us explain the tagging scenario by example where a picture contains four 
users, Alice (A), Bob (B), Carol (C), and David (D). First, Alice uploads the photo to her 
profile and tags Bob, Carol, and David in the photo. We consider Alice as the owner of 
the photo, and Bob, Carol and David as stakeholders. In this case, the owner, who 
launches the action using the tagging tool, and the stakeholders have to specify their 





Figure 5: Tagging scenario. 
3.3.2 Posting 
To encouraging users to share data with others, OSNs provide another sharing 
tool, posting, where user can post content in someone else’s profile. When a user posts an 
item in someone else’s space, she/he becomes the contributor. The owner of the profile 
where the contributor posted the content is called the owner. In current OSNs, access 
control supports privacy decisions as an individual process. Then in a posting situation, 
the decision maker is only the owner who receives the posted item in her/his profile. 
Consequently, the contributor, who is the original uploader, is not able to regulate who 
can access her/his posted content, which may lead to violations of her/his privacy. To 
address this limitation, we analyze the scenario where all associated controllers are able 
to participate in the access control decision. By combining all controllers’ privacy 
requirements, we offer collaborative access control rules that are represented by the result 
of our PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm. 
Let us consider a more complex example, where Alice not only posts a photo in 
Bob’s profile but also tags Carol in this photo. We call Alice, who uploads the photo, a 
contributor. Bob, whose profile is the location of the shared photo, we call an owner and 
Carol is considered to be a stakeholder. Alice (A), Bob (B), and Carol(C) should 
cooperatively manage the access to their shared photo. Figure 6 shows this posting 
scenario where the contributor posts content in another user’s profile and the content may 
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have multiple stakeholders. PermittedandDeniedAccessors is again intervening, with 
appropriate inputs. 
 
Figure 6: Posting -Tagging scenario. 
3.3.3 Sharing 
The sharing tool supports distributing data among members in OSNs in various 
ways. Users can share their contents with others in their social network; otherwise, users 
can share others users’ contents. Also, users can share other user’s content and post it in 
someone else’s space. In general, whenever types of sharing apply to an item in OSNs 
there is high potential of identification all linked users who are related to this item. 
Current OSNs, until now, provide individual processes to make a decision over who can 
access the shared items. As a result, those items, which obviously expose the identity of 
all associated users, may violate a users’ privacy and lead to their embarrassment. We 
believe it could be more practical and reliable to allow all linked users to participate in 
the privacy setting of a shared item. To reach this goal, first we introduce and analyze 
three multiple controllers’ scenarios that are raised by using the sharing tool, then we can 
solve the problem of how to merge privacy opinions from co-controllers of shared items.     
3.3.3.1 Sharing user’s content with other users 
For the first multiparty sharing scenario, when a user shares her/his content with 
others, the content will be in turn be posted in another’s profile. Presently in OSNs, the 
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regulator deciding who can access the shared item is only the owner of the profile. 
Consequently, the original user who shared the content will lose control over it. For 
instance, when Alice (A) desires to share her photo with her friend Bob (B), the photo 
will be in turn posted in Bob’s profile. Intuitively, the decision over who can access this 
photo should be regulated by Alice and Bob. In this situation, we call Alice the originator 
and Bob, who has the shared photo in his space, the owner. The initial access control 
policy of this item reflects the originator’s privacy requirements; furthermore, the privacy 
setting of the new owner should impact the final access control policy of the shared 
content. By our PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm, we merge the owner’s and 
originator’s privacy requirements to achieve final and collaborative access control polices 
of shared content. Figure 7 demonstrates the content sharing pattern that is generated by 
using the sharing tool where users share their contents with others members. 
 
 
Figure 7: Simple sharing users’ contents with other user scenario. 
Under the case of sharing users’ contents with others scenario there are two 
subcases. The first is when an item that is desirable to share, is linked with stakeholders 
through tags. Therefore, the sharing request could become from the owner or one of the 
stakeholders according to our analyses of the tagging scenario. OSNs allow tagged users 
to share contents that have tags in them to other users. In current OSNs, the tagging user 
is not required to ask for permission of the other tagged users or the uploader, when 
she/he desires to share content with her/his social network. Also, when the user who 
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published the item and tagged other users in it wishes to share content with someone else, 
she/he is not required to ask tagged users, who are appearing in the item, permission. In 
general, most OSNs offer access control that supports only a single user’s privacy 
requirements. For this reason, others associated users do not have the ability to control 
their data and they cannot influence the privacy policy applied to this data. In response to 
this issue, we are going to analyze the sharing-tagging scenario to capture users who 
should be involved in the process of making a collective decision about disseminating a 
shared item. Our Controller Sharing algorithm is a method to achieve the cooperative 
decision. To clarify this further, let us suppose the scenario where Alice (A) wishes to 
share a photo with her friend Bob (B), and Carol (C) and David (D) were tagged in this 
photo. Alice’s desire may cause exposure of Carol’s and David’s privacy; consequently, 
collaborative access control may be more intuitive. In our example, we classify Alice as 
the owner of the photo and Carol and David as stakeholders; in fact, all of them should 
have some impact on the final decision of Alice’s sharing request, even Alice. 
Alternatively, a user who is tagged can further share the photo with her/his social 
network. Consequently, a sharing request could come from the owner or stakeholders. As 
a result of the tagging-sharing users’ contents with others scenario, the photo will be in 
turn posted in Bob’s profile and he can specify an access control policy as owner. Also, 
the original user who shared the photo with Bob, in our example Alice, should control 
who can access the photo in Bob’s profile as originator. Figure 8 shows the tagging-
sharing users’ contents with others’ use case that is generated by sharing an item that is 




Figure 8: Tagging-sharing users’ contents with other user scenario. 
The second subcase of sharing users’ contents with others scenario, which is more 
complicated, occurs when users who may be the owner or stakeholders wish to share 
their contents with others, and that content originally was posted by someone else in the 
owner’s space. As we mentioned previously, current OSNs offer limited access control 
support - only a single decision maker may restrict access over shared contents, 
regardless of other users’ privacy concerns, even if they essentially are linked or appear 
in the contents being considered. For example, we will analyze the posting-tagging-
sharing users’ contents with other users scenario. Also, we will determine users who 
should have the right to be involved in the process of making a collective decision about 
who can disseminate the shared item.  
Consider a scenario where, Alice (A) wishes to share a photo that originally was 
posted in her profile by Dave (D) who tagged Carol(C) in the photo. Intuitively, each of 
those users would want to participate in the process of making a cooperative decision 
about Alice’s request. In response to this desire, we have classified associated users as 
follow: Alice is the owner, Dave is a contributor and Carol is a stakeholder. When 
Alice’s sharing request is permitted, the photo will be in turn posted in Bob’s profile. 
Hence, the reposted photo is controlled by Alice as originator and Bob as owner. Note 
that Dave and Carol are not involved in the process of making a decision over who can 
access the photo in Bob’s profile because they already offered permissions to Alice to 
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share the photo with her friend Bob. Below, Figure 9 demonstrates a posting-tagging-
sharing users’ contents with other user scenario that is generated by sharing content that 
was originally posted and has tagged users.  
 
Figure 9: Posting-tagging-sharing users’ contents with other user scenario. 
3.3.3.2 Sharing others users’ content 
OSNs encourage users to share more data by enabling them to share others’ 
contents. While, OSNs’ users can share their contents with others users, they can request 
other users to share their contents. When a user shares others users’ content, it will be in 
turn posted in her/his profile. In current OSNs, a reposted item is only controlled by the 
owner of the profile; thus, the original uploader will lose control over who can access the 
reposted item in the new owner’s profile. We believe that users who are connected with 
an item should be involved in the process of making shared item access control policy. 
For this reason, we are going to analyze all cases of sharing the others users’ contents 
scenario.  
For the simple case, let us assume that a user, say Alice (A), views a post in Bob’s 
profile and desires to share it with her social network. If Bob (B) allows her to share his 
post with her social network, the post will be in turn posted in her profile. Then, Alice, 
who disseminates the post, can regulate her privacy policy as owner for this post, and the 
original policy that was adopted by Bob, who is the originator now, should influence the 
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final access control policy of the reposted content. By classifying all users connected to a 
shared item, we can consider the privacy settings of all of them to determine the 
collective decision on the access restrictions over shared content. We will discuss how 
our algorithm PermittedandDeniedAccessor works to reach acollective decision in the 
next Chapter. The simple case of sharing others’ contents scenario is shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Simple sharing others users’ contents scenario. 
The sharing others users’ contents scenario has complex cases. The first is when a 
user desires to disseminate content that has tagged users who have already been tagged 
by the owner of this content. Thus, there are stakeholders who have to be involved in the 
process of making collaborative privacy decisions over who can repost the content in 
her/his profile. For example, suppose Bob (B), who is the owner in our prior example, 
has a photo where Carol (C) and Dave (D) are explicitly identified through tags. When 
Alice (A) desires to share this photo with her social network, her request should satisfy 
the owner’s and stakeholders’ privacy requirements. We are going to discuss how this 
works in Chapter 4 by introducing the AccessorSharing algorithm. Assume the result of 
the collaborative decision grants Alice permission to share the photo with her social 
network. The photo will be in turn posted in her profile; consequently, it is 
collaboratively controlled by Alice, who is a new owner of the reposted photo, and Bob 
who represents the original controller of this photo. Our PermittedandDeniedAccessor 
algorithm, which we will introduce in the next Chapter, offers the process to make the 
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cooperative decision over who can view the reposted item in the new profile. However, in 
existing OSNs the decision about sharing Bob’s content and the access restrictions over 
who can see the reposted photo in Alice’s profile are only regulated by the owner of the 
profile, regardless of the privacy requirements of the other connected users such as Carol 
and Dave in our example. Figure 11 shows our analysis for the first complex case of 
sharing others users’ contents scenario. 
 
 
Figure 11: Tagging- Sharing others users’ contents scenario. 
The last case in the sharing others users’ contents scenario is more intricate. When 
Alice (A) desires to share a photo that original was posted by Edward (E) in Bob’s profile 
and he (Edward) tagged Carol (C) and Dave (D) in the photo, those users who are linked 
to this photo in diverse ways should participate in the process of making a collaborative 
decision about Alice’s sharing request.  As we mentioned before, the AccessorSharing 
algorithm will be discussed in Chapter 4 in order to enable associated users to make a 
collective privacy decision. However, existing privacy mechanisms in OSNs enable the 
owner of the profile to be the sole decision maker. Figure 12 demonstrates Posting-
Tagging-Sharing others users’ contents scenario that is generated by sharing content was 




Figure 12: Posting-Tagging-Sharing others users’ contents scenario. 
3.3.3.3 Sharing other users’ content and posting it in someone 
else’s space 
The last multiple controllers scenario is caused by the usage sharing feature in 
OSNs, when an intermediate user is involved in a sharing scenario. Let us consider, for 
example, situation where Alice (A) views a photo in Bob’s (B) space and desires to share 
and repost the photo in Carol’s (C) space, where Carol is one of her friends. Then, the 
photo will be in turn posted in Carol’s space, who thus becomes the new owner of Bob’s 
photo. We call Bob the originator and Alice the contributor who reposts the photo. 
Analyzing the relationship between connected users and shared content allows us to 
develop a collaborative method for specifying privacy policies of shared content. This 
scenario will be covered in Chapter 4 by the PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm. 
However, in current OSNs policies over who can access the photo in Carol’s profile are 
only created by Carol who is the owner; in contrast, the original owner, who is Bob in our 
example, will not be able to influence the access restrictions over the reposted photo. 
Also, Alice, who posted the photo in Carol’s profile, cannot regulate her privacy 
requirements under existing privacy protection mechanisms. This simple case of sharing 





Figure 13: Simple sharing other users’ content and posts it in someone else’s space 
scenario. 
A more complex situation occurs when the original content has tagged users. By 
following a prior example, suppose Bob’s photo that Alice desires to share with her 
friend Carol is linked with Dave (D) and Edward (E) by tagging. We believe all 
connected users such as Bob, Dave and Edward have the right to participate in the access 
control process to restrict dissemination of the photo. For a photo in Bob’s space, we 
consider him as the owner, Dave and Edward are stakeholders and Alice is a requester. 
When a collaborative decision grants Alice the permission to share the photo with her 
friend Carol, the access restrictions over who can view the photo in Carol profile should 
be cooperatively regulated by all users who are related to the considered resource. Our 
related users are classified as follows: Alice is the contributor, Bob is called the 
originator and Carol is the owner. However, unfortunately, current OSNs offer limited 
methods for specifying privacy policies in this scenario. In fact, it supports the owner of 
the profile, where the shared content resides, to be the sole decision maker for the sharing 
request, which in our example is Bob, and Carol for the accessing request. Figure 14 
illustrates this tagging-sharing other users’ content and posts it in someone else’s space 
scenario and which algorithms, which will be discussed in more detail in the next 
Chapter, will be used to decide how collaborative users can participate in the access 




Figure 14: Tagging-sharing other users’ content and posts it in someone else’s space 
scenario. 
The most complex form occurs when Alice (A) decides to disseminate a photo 
that was originally uploaded into Bob’s space by Frank (F) who also tagged Dave (D) 
and Edward (E) in the photo. Consequently, for the photo in Bob’s space we call Alice 
the accessor who requests to share content, Frank the contributor of the content, and Dave 
and Edward are stakeholders of the photo. Our AccessorSharing algorithm supports all 
collaborative users to participate in the sharing control policy process over who can 
disseminate the shared content. Furthermore, when the photo is reposted in Carol’s space, 
Alice becomes a contributor, Carol is the owner, and Bob is the originator. The 
collaborative access control polices of the photo in Carol’s space, which is given by the 
result of the PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm, are regulated by all users who are 
related to the considered photo. The posting-tagging-sharing other users’ content and 
posts it in someone else’s space scenario is demonstrated by Figure 15. On the other 
hand, current OSNs offer only an individual process to regulate the access control policy 





Figure 15: Posting-tagging-sharing other users’ content and posts it in someone 
else’s space scenario. 
To conclude, in this chapter we presented scenarios where contents are linked 
with multiple users who are explicitly identified through posts, shares, tags or other 
metadata. We believe to protect users’ privacy in OSNs, we first need to analyze multiple 
controller scenarios to recognize users who have the right to participate in the privacy 
setting for a shared item. As we previously investigated, whenever types of sharing tools 
apply to an item in OSNs, multiple controller situations will occur. We have analyzed 
three main classifications of sharing patterns, profile sharing, relationship sharing and 
content sharing. We focused on the last pattern where content is the shared data. This 
pattern has three subcases that are tagging, posting and sharing. In general, existing OSNs 
provide limited access control that supports only a single user’s privacy requirements in 
all the aforementioned multiple user scenarios. This limitation leads to disclosures of 
other individual user’s information of which they may be unaware.  In particular, they 
may be unaware of the fact that their content is disseminated and controlled by someone 
else, and that they cannot influence the privacy setting applied to their data. By requiring 
the approval from associated controllers, we offer access control models that enable 
collective users to manage and control their shared contents’ access and dissemination 
policies. Our collaborative access control models are represented by the 
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PermittedandDeniedAccessors, Controller Sharing and AccessorSharing algorithms, 
which will be discussed in more detail in the next Chapter.  
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Chapter 4  
4 A Collaborative Access Control model  
Current OSNs offer access control mechanisms where the decision over who can 
access or disseminate the shared item is solely regulated by the owner of the profile 
where the considered item is. OSNs are multi-user virtual environments, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, that raise several cases where contents can have multiple controllers. 
However, these multiple controllers are not allowed to mange and control their data in all 
developed OSNs, which provide only the most basic access control mechanism. Hence, a 
lack of collective management can lead to de facto public disclosure. In addressing user 
privacy, our intent is to let each user in a set of collaborative controllers identify her/his 
privacy requirements and participate in the process of making a collaborative access 
control policy. In these circumstances, each associated controller might have different 
and possibly contrasting privacy requirements. In response to this, in this Chapter, we 
present an approach that combines different controllers’ privacy preferences into a single 
privacy policy. In particular, how to resolve such conflicts in contradictory privacy 
requirements and to support a reasonable access control model to make a collective 
decision over shared contents in OSNs is an open problem. Additionally, it is unclear 
how to combine all the privacy requirements for a shared item without violating 
individuals’ requirements. As a consequence, the purpose of our approach is not only to 
combine the multiple controllers’ privacy settings, but take into account various factors 
such as types of relationships, controllers’ types and weights, the distance between users, 
accessors’ weights, and a trust inference algorithm to establish an effective methodology 
for making collaborative access control decisions that achieves an optimal balance 
between availability and protection of shared items in OSNs.  
We begin with an abstract representation of an OSN and formal definition of our 
access control model. Moreover, we present a collaborative policy specification scheme 
for access control and authorization administration. Afterward, we discuss our principles 
for a conflict resolution strategy. Finally, based on these considerations, we introduce our 
algorithms for collective privacy management, where the first algorithm, called 
PermittedandDeniedAccessors, produces the final lists of accessors who are permitted to 
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view the shared data and those who are denied. We also introduce the AccessorSharing 
and ControllerSharing algorithms to reach collaborative decisions about who can 
disseminate the shared item. 
4.1 Representation of OSNs  
In this Section, we provide an abstract representation of an OSN. Our purpose is 
not to represent any concrete OSN, but to specify the significant elements of OSNs, upon 
which to construct our collaborative access control model. In addition, we introduce our 
scheme for expressing privacy policies for a collaborative access control model in OSN.  
In the beginning, an OSN is a relationship network, a set of users, a set of 
contents and a set of user relationships. The relationship network of an OSN is an 
undirected and labeled graph where nodes denote users, edges represent their 
interdependencies and the label indicates the type of the relationship between users such 
as family, friend, colleague, coworker, etc. Current OSNs, offer certain and fixed types of 
relationships, for example the followee-follower relationship or friends relationship. 
Indeed, the privacy risk of lack of support for the varied types of relationships in existing 
OSN sites is studied by several researchers such as Gates [2007]. It is clear that users 
should be provided with more flexible relationship-based access control to govern access 
to their information, especially when users collaboratively create content. As in the real 
world, people can have in mind a specific audience for accessing, sharing or 
disseminating their pictures, events or activates. In order to have flexible relationship-
based access control, our model supports varied types of relationships and enables users 
to specify accessors based on their relationship type. Moreover, in reality, OSNs have an 
important feature that enables a user to selectively share content with a specific group of 
people. This is called ‘circles’ in Google+, a social networking service introduced in 
2011. Similarly, ‘lists’ or ‘groups’ are available in networks such as Facebook or Twitter.  
It is a useful mechanism allowing users to organize their networks and to effortlessly find 
users or friends, who may have the same hobbies, interests, schools, political standpoint 
etc. OSNs offer for each user a web space, which is called a wall or profile in Facebook, 
where they can define personal information, a list of contacts and their photos and albums 
and customize it as they wish. Bedside the relationship network, which is usually used to 
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model OSNs, we also employ trust a social network. Similarly for the relationship 
network, trust relations between users in OSNs can be modeled as graphs. A trust social 
network, is modeled using a directed labeled graph where each node represents a user, 
edges denote the trust relation and labels indicate the trust value of the relationship. A 
trust value assigned to each edge expresses how much one user trusts another. 
4.1.1 Controllers’ definitions 
We defined four types of controllers in OSNs, accommodating the special 
ownership requirements coming from multiple associated users scenarios for managing 
the shared items collaboratively as we discussed and investigated in the previous Chapter. 
The idea of classifying collaborative controllers is to identify associated users on the 
basis of their relationships with a particular item (shared item). They are the owner, who 
owns the data item in his/her profile, a contributor, stakeholder and originator. In our 
approach, we aim to cooperatively employ their privacy requirements in collaborative 
access control governing shared contents. We formally define these controllers as 
follows: 
Definition (1) Owner: Let I be a data item in the profile of user u in an OSN. The user u 
is called the owner of I. In addition, the owner could be a user who owns the profile 
where a shared item is in turn posted.  
Definition (2) Contributor: Let I be a data item in the profile of someone and user u be a 
user who shares I with her/his social network or another user’s social network. Moreover, 
u could be a user who publishes I in some else’s profile. The user u is called the 
contributor of I. 
Definition (3) Stakeholder: Let I be a data item in the profile of any user in an OSN and 
T be the set of tagged users linked with I. A user u is called a stakeholder of I if u ∈ T and 
is not the owner of I 
Definition (4) Originator: Let I be a data item disseminated by user x from user u’s 
profile to x’s profile in an OSN. We call u an originator of I when it turns up in x’s 
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profile. In other words, the originator is the user who owns the profile where the shared 
item first appeared. 
4.1.2 The formal definition of the model 
An OSN is characterized by the following core components: 
• U = {u1 , …, u 𝑛} is set of users in an OSN such that each user has unique 
identifier.  
• RT is a set of relationship types in OSN, which is a relationship network. Users 
connect to each other by various types of relationships in OSNs. 
• R = {r1 , …, r 𝑛} is a list of relationship sets in OSN, and the relationship list of 
user i is r𝑖  = {rl𝑖1 , …, rl𝑖𝑛}, where i ∈ U.  Each entry of a relationship set is 
denoted by rl𝑖𝑗 = < u𝑗, rt  𝑖𝑗 > where the first element is the user identifier u𝑗 ∈ U, 
and rt 𝑖𝑗 ∈ RT is the type of relationship between u𝑖 and u𝑗.  
• G = {g1 , …, g𝑛} is a set of groups in OSN where each one has unique identifier. 
The set of user 𝑖’s groups is g𝑖  ={ug𝑖1 , …, ug𝑖𝑛} ,where 𝑖 ∈ U. Each group, say 
ug𝑖𝑗,  has a set of users who are its members are {um1𝑗 , …. ,um𝑛𝑗},where each 
um𝑖𝑗 ∈ U.  
• CT = {OW, CB, ST, OG} is a list of ownership types, where OW, CB, ST, and 
OG denote, respectively, the owner, contributor, stakeholder, and originator 
types. 
• D = {d1 , …, d𝑛 } is a collection of users’ data in OSN, and each element is a set 
of a particular user u’s contents d𝑢 = {c𝑢1 , …, c𝑢𝑛} where u ∈ U. Then, each c𝑢𝑗 is 
represented as <id𝑗, content𝑗 > where id𝑗 is the unique item id and content𝑗  is the 
content of this item.  
• relation-members: a mapping function applied to each user u to identify the set of 
users with whom he/she has a relationship rt; it is denoted by 𝑢 !" 𝑈  
• R.of.R-members: a mapping function applied to each user u to identify the set of 
users who have a transitive relation of relationship type rt with u. It is denoted by 𝑢 !".!".!"   𝑈. 
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• controllers: a mapping function applied to each content c to identify the set of 
users who have any type of ownership with it; it is denoted by 𝑐 !"   𝑐𝑈.       
• administrated-groups : a mapping function applied to each user to identify the set 
of groups that belong to her/him, denoted by 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑏𝑦 𝑢 →   g𝑢  . 
• group-members : a mapping function applied to each group g to identify the set 
of users who are members in this group; it is denoted by 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠(g𝑖  )   →   {um1𝑖  , . . . , um𝑛𝑖} 
 
Figure 16: Representations of the social network structure. 
Figure 16 illustrates an example of a graph representation of a social network 
used for exploring collaboration for social network features. It shows the relationships of 
six users, Alice (A), Bob (B), Carol (C), Dave  (D) , Edward(E) and Frank (F), along with 
their ownership of contents and their memberships in groups of other users. Note, we 
work with a social network that structurally has undirected relationships. For example, if 
Alice has a coworker relationship with Edward, then automatically Edward has a 
coworker relationship with Alice. Also, different relationship types connect users, such as 
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family, colleagues and coworkers in this example rather than just friendship, which is 
typically used to represent social relationships. Moreover, two users might have a 
transitive relationship which urges them to share and disseminate data in OSNs. For 
example, in Figure 16, Alice has a family relationship with Frank; similarly, he has a 
family relationship with Carol. Consequently, Alice and Carol have undirected transitive 
family relationship. In addition, each user can categorize her/his relationship list into 
groups; then, she/he is considered as the administrator of those groups. In this case, the 
group has one owner, who owns the profile where this group belongs, and has one or 
more members. For example, as we can see in Figure 16 Alice owns the group where 
Edward has a membership relation with her group.  
Although groups are controlled and regulated by a single owner, contents may 
have multiple controllers. For instance, one of Frank’s items has two controllers: the 
owner is Frank whose profile holds this item, and the originator of it is Alice. 
Furthermore, a user can control different items by varied types of ownership. An example 
of controlling multiple contents with diverse rights is that Carol is the originator of some 
item of Frank’s content; on the other hand, she regulates one of Alice’s contents as a 
stakeholder.  
4.1.3 Privacy policy specification  
Various access control schemes have been proposed recently to support fine-
grained privacy policy specification for OSNs (e.g. [Carminati, et al. 2006, 2009b, 
Villegas, et al. 2008, Carminati, et al. 2011, Fong. 2011a]). However, those schemes 
support only a single controller to specify the access control policy of shared items. By 
supporting collective access control policies, sharing and interconnection among users in 
OSNs will be promoted in a more trustworthy environment. Before introducing the 
collaborative access control policy enforcement, we are going to introduce the 
specification of individual access control policies where a set of collective users, who are 
related to the considered data item, separately identify their privacy requirements.   
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4.1.3.1 Accessor Specification:  
To enable the controller to accurately identify a set of users who can access 
her/his data and who cannot, we divide the accessor specification into two sets: 
accessor.permit and accessor.deny. In addition, for more precise specification, each set of 
accessors can be specified by three parameters that are user names, group names and 
relationship types.  Accessor.permit is a list of users who are granted to access to the 
shared data by an individual controller. In contrast, accessor.deny is a list of users who 
are disallowed access to the shared items through user name, group name, or relationship 
name. Those represent types of accessors that a controller can customize to regulate 
her/his access control policy. We define the accessor specification as follows: 
Definition (5) accessor specification : ac ∈ U ∪ G ∪ RT which can be user, group, or 
relationship type, where 
 
Then, act ∈ UN ∪ GN ∪ RN is a list of accessor types, where UN, GN, and RN denote 
respectively, user name, group name, and relationship name. The permitted accessor 
specification is defined as a set, permitted accessors = {permitted accessor 1 , …, 
permitted accessor 𝑛 }, where each component is a pair  <ac, act>. In addition, the denied 
accessor specification is expressed as a set, denied accessors = {denied accessor  1 , …, 
denied accessor 𝑛 }, where each element is of similar structure, <ac, act>. 
When a subject is both permitted and prohibited to perform an action on an 
object, conflicts may occur. The combined use of positive and negative authorizations in 
§ U = {u1 , …, u 𝑛} is a set of users who have any direct relationship with the 
controller.  
§ G is derived from a list of the controller’s groups g𝑖  ={ug𝑖1 , …, ug𝑖𝑛} 
where g𝑖 ∈ G and 𝑖 ∈ U. For details see Section 4.1.2.   
§ RT indicates the relationship types where controller has them in her/his 
social network. In addition, controllers can use types of transitive 
relationships to specify who is allowed or denied access to her/his data. For 
details see Section 4.1.2.   
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our accessor specification brings conflict problems of how the two specifications should 
be treated. Although conflict resolution is a more complex matter and does not usually 
have a unique answer, we provide rules to regulate accessor.permit (a.p) and 
accessor.deny(a.d) sets properly as follows: 
 
Figure 17: A taxonomy of accessor types. 
From Figure 17, we can infer that the list of accessor types is a hierarchical list for 
classifying and identifying accessors. The taxonomy is from most the generic accessor 
type to most the specific accessor type; thus a relationship name is more general than a 
group name and a group is more general than an individual user. First of all, 
accessor.deny can be null. The controller allows everyone in his/her social network to 
access the considered shared data. A user’s social network includes all users who have an 
existing relationship with the controller or a relationship of degree two from the 
controller (e.g. friend.of.friend).  
Secondly in a hierarchical list of accessor types, the intersection at the same level 
should be empty, where a.p𝑖 ={a.p𝑖1 , …, a.p𝑖𝑛}∩ a.d𝑖= {a.d𝑖1 , …, a.d 𝑖𝑛}= ∅ ,where 𝑖 ∈ U 
, ac of each a.p𝑖𝑗 and a.d𝑖𝑗 ∈ RT and act of each a.p𝑖𝑗 and a.d𝑖𝑗 is RN. Likewise at the group 
name level, a.p𝑖 ={a.p𝑖1 , …, a.p𝑖𝑛}∩ a.d𝑖= {a.d𝑖1 , …, a.d 𝑖𝑛}= ∅, where 𝑖 ∈ U , ac of each 
a.p𝑖𝑗 and a.d𝑖𝑗 ∈ G and act of each a.p𝑖𝑗 and a.d𝑖𝑗 is GN. Similarly for user name level a.p𝑖 
={a.p𝑖1 , …, a.p𝑖𝑛}∩ a.d𝑖= {a.d𝑖1 , …, a.d 𝑖𝑛}= ∅, where 𝑖 ∈ U , ac of each a.p𝑖𝑗 and a.d𝑖𝑗 ∈ 
U and act of each a.p𝑖𝑗 and a.d𝑖𝑗 is UN. In OSNs, a user can be a member in multiple 
controllers’ groups; therefore user could belong to denied group and permitted group at 






we investigate if there is a conflict in accessor specification that is raised by conflicting 
memberships. To resolve this type of conflict, we take into account the denied vote.  For 
example, suppose Alice has a friend relationship type with Bob who is a member in 
Alice’s coworker group and colleague group. When she permits her coworker group to 
access item and denies her colleague group to view this item, the system will deny Bob to 
access. Consequently, if we have one vote to authorize an access, and another to deny it, 
we apply the denial- takes-precedence principle [di Vimercati, et al. 2005]. The case of 
conflicting memberships may be more complex when we have an accessor who is a 
member in two permitted groups, but she/he is a member in one denied group. 
Accordingly, to solve such a conflict, we apply many-takes-precedence principle that is 
the higher number of positive/negative policies prevail over fewer positive/negative ones. 
As a result, denial takes precedence and many takes precedence are the conflict 
resolution policies we adopt to solve the conflicting memberships that may occur in the 
accessor specification step.1 
The last rule in the accessor specification is resolving conflicts between UN, GN 
and RN by taking into account the most-specific-takes-precedence principle [di 
Vimercati, et al. 2007, 2005]. Based on our taxonomy of accessor types in the accessor 
specification, we consider UN the most specific policies and RN is the least specific. For 
clarification, consider the scenario where Alice permits her coworker group (GN) to 
access the shared item and denies her friends (RN). Bob has a friendship relation with 
Alice and at the same time is member in her coworker group. Thus, to solve such an 
accessor specification policy conflict, our model considers Bob as a permitted user. Let 
us discuss another case to illuminate how such conflicts can be solved by the most-
specific-takes-precedence principle. Suppose Alice regulates her accessors policy as 
follows, deny family group (GN) and family relationship (RN) to access the shared item 
and permit Carol by name (UN) who has family relationship with Alice, so she is also a 
member in Alice’s family group. According to our conflict resolution policy, we consider 
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Carol as a permitted user even though she is denied in RN and GU accessor types 
because Alice permits her in the most specific type, which is UN.  
In summary, our accessor specification supports both positive and negative 
authorizations which can cause conflicts when a controller specifies whose can access 
her/his data. Consequently, we apply different conflict resolution policies and some rules 
to solve such conflicts.   
4.1.3.2 Data Specification:  
 The user profile, user’s relationships and user’s content embody the user’s data in 
OSNs. However, our model focuses in the last component, the user’s content, and assigns 
a level of sensitivity to content based on how much a disclosure would harm the user. 
Furthermore, sensitivity levels of shared contents help effectively to solve conflict 
between controllers. While the users should specify their sensitivity level of shared items 
in previous work as numbers [Hu, et al. 2013], people logically use linguistic expressions 
when they are asked about their sensitivity level of data. Consequently, we use fuzzy 
logic, which seems closer to the way users would express their tolerance, such as low, 
medium or high and so on. Sensitivity levels (sl) are assigned to the shared item by each 
controller who is related to the considered item. Hence, we introduce sl with varying 
degrees of sensitivity. Data specification supports the linguistic terms as a sensitivity 
level of a particular item for a controller. The linguistic variables, which are the input that 
are assigned by controllers, and numerical values, which are used in our algorithms 
which will be given at the end of this chapter, are defined as follows: 
Table 1: Sensitivity levels 
Linguistic	  term	   Numerical	  value	  
NONE	   0.00	  
LOW	   0.25	  
MEDIUM	   0.50	  
HIGH	   0.75	  
HIGHEST	   1.00	  
The definition of the data specification is as follows:  
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Definition (6) data specification:  c ∈ D is a data item and sl is rational number in the 
range [0,1] which is assigned to c. The data specification is defined as a pair: (c, sl) where 
sl represents the sensitivity level. 
4.1.3.3 Individual access control policy:   
An individual AC policy consists of five elements where each controller is 
required to determine the list of permitted users as well denied users to the considered 
item. Moreover, an individual access control policy requires a controller, during policy 
specification, to assign a sensitivity level to the considered item. Formally, the Individual 
access control policy is  𝒑 =  < 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟,𝑻𝒚𝒑𝒆𝑪, 𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒅  𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒎,𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒆𝒅  𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒓𝒔,𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒅  𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒐𝒓𝒔 >, where  
• Controller is the user who regulates access policy over the considered item, 
where the controller ∈ U  
• TypeC is type of the controller, where TypeC ∈ CT 
• 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 is denoted with a data specification defined in Definition 6 
• 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠  is a list of users who are allowed to access the item, 
represented with the accessor specification given in Definition 5  
• 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠  is the list of users who are rejected to access the item, 
represented with the accessor specification given in Definition 5   
To illustrate the aforementioned individual access control policy, we next turn to some 
examples as follows (in natural language): 
1. Bob grants permission to any user who has a family relationship with him to view 
his travel photo identified by travel1 with a high sensitivity level, where he is the 
owner of the photo.  
2. Alice authorizes users who are members in her Co-project group or have 
coworker relationship type with her to view a photo that she posts it in her 
manager space identified as schedul-meeting02 with a low sensitive level from 
her side, and then Alice is considered to be the contributor of the photo.  
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3. Dave prevents his friends to see his post; on the other hand, he allows his 
brothers, Bob and Frank, to view this post that is known as invitation-BD20 with a 
medium level of sensitivity, where Dave is the owner of the post. 
4. Edward denies his family members and users who are his coworkers to access a 
photo, fun-event00, that he is tagged in with a highest sensitivity level. 
Nevertheless, he authorizes users who are his colleagues and Carol to view the 
considered photo, where Edward is a stakeholder of the fun-event00 photo. 
5. Carol denies users who are her colleagues to view the post writing-memory10, 
that she allowed her sister Alice to share with her social network with a medium 
sensitivity level. Carol is considered as the originator of the shared post.    
Are defined as follow:  
1. p = < Bob, OW, < travel1, 0.75>, {<family, RN>}, {}> 
2. p = < Alice, CB, < schedul-meeting02, 0.25>, {<coworker, RN>, < Co-project, 
GN>}, {}> 
3. p = < Dave, OW, < invitation-BD20, 0.50>, {<Bob, UN>, <Frank, UN>}, 
{<friend, RN>}> 
4. p = < Edward, ST, < fun-event00, 1.00>, {< colleague, RN>, <Carol, UN>}, 
{<family, RN>, <coworker, RN>}> 
5. p = < Carol, OG, < writing-memory10, 0.50>, {},{<colleague, RN>}> 
4.2 Requirements for a conflict resolution strategy 
By identifying an individual access control policy for each controller belonging to 
a set of collaborative users that we have identified on the basis of their relationships with 
the considered content, now we need to turn to an aggregation process to yield a final 
access control policy for the shared content. However, before reaching the collaborative 
access control policy that aims to satisfy all associated controllers’ desires, we need to 
define some rules and principles. The purpose of this step is to enforce the combining 
process of individual access control policies effectively. Indeed, when we try to combine 
diverse individual access control polices, which come from different perspectives and 
requirements, conflicts between controllers’ policies are bound to happen. Conflict 
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resolution is a complex problem and does not normally have a unique answer [Jajodia, et 
al. 2001, Lunt. 1989]. Nevertheless, the conflict issue can be addressed by defining a 
conflict resolution strategy. Varied criteria could be adopted to correspond different 
policies that enable the system to solve the conflict. A conflict resolution strategy consists 
of a set of rules that enables a system to decide either to permit or deny an accessor. The 
result of a collaborative access control policy depends on the chosen conflict resolution 
strategy. Therefore, in this section, we are going to explain our rules and principles to 
resolve conflicts. Then, those principles will be merged to work together to obtain the 
final lists of permitted and denied accessors of particular shared content from all the 
individual policies. 
The tradeoff between providing privacy protection and the value of sharing in 
OSNs is a primary focus of our model. Consequently, the rules of our conflict resolution 
strategy are basically chosen to achieve the desired equilibrium between the privacy of 
online users and the goal of sharing data. The first principle is that, although all 
associated controllers should be able to control shared data, the impact and priority level 
of their policies is different. We call the impact of their policies the Controller Weight 
that is determined by the relationship between the controller and the shared item. In 
addition, as we discussed previously in Chapter 2, communication in a social network 
reflects human social interactions; hence, we believe connecting and sharing with other 
users in OSNs are not possible without trust. In fact, trust is critical to establishing any 
communication in OSNs. For this reason, we consider the trust value among the set of 
collaborative controllers and accessors as a second principle to resolve a conflict. Lastly, 
according to the most-specific-takes-precedence principle, we have the third principle 
which is Assessor Weight. For more details on our principles for the conflict resolution 
strategy, next we have a separate discussion section for each principle. 
4.2.1 Principle 1. (Controllers’ Weight Scheme) 
The essential step to resolve conflicts constructively is by assigning a weight (or 
score) to controllers, according to their categories. Even though all related controllers 
should have the ability to be involved and have an impact on making a collaborative 
access control decision over the shared item, we believe that each controller’s privacy 
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requirements have distinctly different priority and influence. Because of this, we provide 
a weighting scheme that is required to assign a value to each connected controller. As we 
previously mentioned, there are four types of ownership: owner (OW), contributor (CB), 
stakeholder (ST), and originator (OG), where the idea behind those types is to identify 
collaborative users on the basis of their relationships with a particular shared item. 
Hence, a controller’s weight is mainly calculated based on her/his relationship with the 
shared content. The weight is a rational number in the range [0,1], where the weight of 
controller u is denoted by w (u). According to the aforementioned content sharing 
patterns, we can infer the users who belong to a set of collaborative controllers of an item 
that has multiple controllers, and assign a weight to each of them.   
In the tagging scenario in Figure 5, where we have the owner who uploads a 
picture to her/his profile and tags other users in it, we assign a weight of 1 to the owner. 
Additionally, we have stakeholders, a second type of ownership in the tagging situation, 
who are tagged users. Indeed, the owner is not required to ask for the permission of the 
stakeholders appearing in the picture, even if they are explicitly identified through tags. 
Hence, we believe stakeholders should be given the same owner priority to manage their 
identity through the photos across many audiences and people in their social networks. 
Similar to the owner, we assign a weight of 1 to the stakeholders. 
Secondly the posting scenario, in Figure 6, in addition to the owner and 
stakeholders, we have the contributor who posts the content in the owner’s space and 
might tag other users in the considered content. Here there are two circumstances to 
determine the contributor’s weight. First, if a contributor belongs to the set of users who 
have any type of relationship or transitive relationship with the owner, we assign a weight 
0.50 to the contributor. Otherwise, when the contributor does not belong to the owner’s 
social network, which includes all users who have existing relationships or transitive 
relationships with the owner, we assign a weight of 0.25 to the contributor. In other 
words, a contributor’s weight is based loosely on the distance between the contributor 
and the owner. If the contributor is connected with the owner by shorter distance (1 or 2), 
they get a higher weight than others. The reason behind our way of weighting the 
contributor is that when she/he is one or two degrees of separation from the owner, the 
possibility to have common users between them is high. Consequently, the number of 
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accessors who belong to a contributor’s social network and can access, tag and share the 
item with others is high; thus, intuitively a contributor should have high weight to impact 
highly in the process of making collaborative access control decisions over the 
considered item. Our weighting approach is based on the confirmed result in sociology 
that friends tend to be similar [Feld. 1981, Carley. 1991]. A contributor who is in one 
degree of separation from the owner should have the most friends in common, while a 
contributor who is two degrees of separation from the owner should have fewer common 
friends and so on. To summarize, a contributor who belongs to the owner’s social 
network is weighted 0.50, otherwise 0.25. An exception is if the contributor posts a 
picture in the owner’s profile and tags her/himself and other users in a given picture; we 
consider her/him as a stakeholder because she/he is identified through the tag. 
The sharing scenario has three subcases; first, in Figure 7, when the owner or one 
of the stakeholders shares their contents with any user in the OSN, the item will be 
reposted in the user’s space. For reposted content, we assign a weight of 1 to the owner of 
the profile where the content has been moved to; moreover, we have an originator (the 
initial owner or stakeholder) who shared the considered content with new owner. The 
approach we are going to apply for the originator’s weight is to have it equal to the 
contributor’s weight, which was previously discussed. The originator who belongs to the 
new owner’s social network is weighted 0.50, otherwise 0.25.  
In the second sharing situation, in Figure 11, when a permitted accessor, one who 
is allowed by collaborative access control to view an item, desires to share the item with 
her/his social network, she/he becomes the owner after reposting the considered item in 
her/his profile. Then, this owner of the reposted item is weighted 1 as the owners were in 
the previous scenario. Furthermore, the owner of the initial item is converted to being the 
originator of the reposted item. To assign a weight to the originator, we consider a trust 
value that is a new factor in place of the prior factor, which was the degree of separation 
between two users. Trust in social networks has been generally discussed in the previous 
Chapter, but in the next section we are going to precisely illustrate a trust inference 
approach that we adopt to determine how much a user in the trust network should trust 
another user who is not directly connected to her/him. To weight the originator in this 
scenario, first we infer how much the originator trusts the owner of the reposted item’s 
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profile, and then subtract from one the trust value that is computed. Finally, we get the 
originator’s weight as follows:  𝑤 𝑂𝐺 = 1− 𝑇𝐺. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝐺,𝑂𝑊  
if	  	  	  TG.infer(OG,OW)	  =1	  then	  
w(OG)	  =0.25	  
where TG is trust graph and 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 is a function to infer how much the originator trusts 
the owner according to the trust graph. The trust network and inferred trust value will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.3. However, here we focus on weighting 
controllers. Based on equation (1), if the originator trusts the owner at the highest level 
which equals 1, the originator’s weigh will be w(OG)= 0. In this case, we weigh the 
originator with minimum controller weight in our model which equals 0.25.  
The last case of usage sharing in OSNs occurs when an intermediate user is 
involved in the sharing scenario. For disseminated content, as in Figure 13, we assign 
weight 1 to the owner. To weight a contributor, who is the intermediary, we adopt a 
similar approach that we used to weight contributors in the previous scenarios. There are 
two cases to consider for the originator. First, if the originator has a relationship with the 
owner of the profile where the item will be reposted, we apply the same approach that we 
adopted to weight the contributor in the second scenario. On the other hand, if the 
originator does not know the owner of the profile where the content will be disseminated, 
we weight her/him by using the trust inference method as shows in equation (1). 
In brief, the Controllers’ Weight scheme is a method to determine a priority and 
impact level of a controller’s policy. Although all associated controllers should be 
allowed to define their access control policies over a shared item, we believe it might be 
more effective to assign weights to collaborative controllers. Hence, they have a different 
priority especially when they participate in the process of making a collaborative decision 




(1)   
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Table 2: Controllers' Weights. 
Controller	  Type	   Status	   Weight	  
Owner	   All	   1	  
Stakeholder	   All	   1	  
Contributor	  
When	  (simple,	  accessor	  
sharing	  by	  intermediary)	  
If	  (Distance	  =	  1	  or	  2)	   0.50	  
Contributor	  
When	  (simple,	  accessor	  
sharing	  by	  intermediary)	  
If	  (Distance	  >=3)	   0.25	  
Originator	  
When	  (controller	  sharing)	  
If	  (Distance	  =	  1	  or	  2)	   0.50	  
Originator	  
When	  (controller	  sharing)	  
If	  (Distance	  >=3)	   0.25	  
Originator	   When	  (accessor	  sharing)	  
𝑤 𝑂𝐺 = 1 −𝑇𝐺. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝐺,𝑂𝑊 	  	  
Originator	  
When	  (accessor	  sharing	  
by	  intermediary	  who	  has	  
relationship	  with	  
originator)	  
If	  (Distance	  =	  1	  or	  2)	   0.50	  
Originator	  
When	  (accessor	  sharing	  
by	  intermediary	  who	  has	  
relationship	  with	  
originator)	  
If	  (Distance	  >=3)	   0.25	  
Originator	  
When	  (accessor	  sharing	  
by	  intermediary	  who	  does	  
not	  have	  relationship	  with	  
originator)	  
𝑤 𝑂𝐺 = 1 −𝑇𝐺. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝐺,𝑂𝑊 	  	  
4.2.2 Principle 2. (Accessors’ Weight Scheme) 
An individual access control policy (p) holds positive and negative authorizations. 
Also, those authorizations are represented by the accessor specification, which has been 
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identified earlier in Definition 5. We believe that not the all accessors are equal because 
they are specified differently. Thus, we assign diverse weights to accessors based on how 
they are authorized or denied. In response to this assumption, we adopt the most-specific-
takes-precedence principle to weight our accessors [di Vimercati, et al. 2005, 2007]. 
Actually, we weight the accessor by weighting her/his specification type w(act),where w 
is a rational number in the range [0,1] and act is a list of accessor types as identified in 
Definition 5. As we discussed above in the accessor specification section, accessors can 
be granted or denied by the types of accessor specification that can be a relation name, 
group name or user name. Those are respectively ordered from most generic type to most 
specific type; consequently, user names, which is the most specific type, takes the highest 
weight that is defined as w (act)=1, where act ∈ UN. For a group name type, we assign a 
weight equal to 0.75 (high), i.e. w (act)= 0.75, where act ∈ GN. Finally, w (act)= 0.50 
(medium), where act ∈ RN indicates a generic type of accessor specification. 
4.2.3 Principle 3. (Inferring Fuzzy Trust) 
Trust has a critical position in communications and interactions between people; 
consequently, social life is simply not possible without trust. In fact, OSNs are trying to 
simulate real social networks on the web. In real social life, our relationships with people 
can be classified with different circles, like family, friends, coworkers, colleagues, 
classmates, etc. Moreover, even in the same colleagues circle, we may stay closer to 
some people than to others. However, current OSNs offer a basic mechanism like a friend 
list that does not support a distinction between the types of friendships. We believe that 
additionally, OSNs should hold multiple types of relationships to connect users and begin 
transactions; it might be more controllable for OSN users if we distinguish the tie 
strength and the relationship quality and intensity between users. Thus, we adopt a trust 
relation to estimate the intensity of a relationship between users. 
A graph structure is usually used to model trust relationships of users in OSNs. 
Modeling the users as nodes, trust relationships as directed edges and trust values as edge 
labels, this graph is called the trust graph. Figure 18 shows an example of a trust graph 
representation of a social network used for inferring trust values between users. Both the 
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rust and relationships graphs, which was previously represented in Figure 16, are used in 
our collaborative access control model.  
 
Figure 18: Trust Graph. 
The trust graph is viewed as directed graph. Users explicitly identify a trust value 
for those with whom they have a direct relationship. When users are not directly 
connected, the process of determining how much the first user in the trust graph trusts 
another one is called trust inference. As mentioned in Chapter 2, various methods to infer 
trust have been proposed in the literature. Using fuzzy logic and its operators in trust 
models has been first considered in OSNs by Lesani and Bagheri[2006] and then by 
Lesani and Montazeri [2009] and Kim and Han[2009].We adopt the Lesani and Bagheri 
[2006] approach to calculate the trust value between two users in a trust social network 
who are not directly connected. The FuzzyTrust algorithm is similar to the TidalTrust 
algorithm[Golbeck. 2005], which was proposed by Golbeck for deriving a trust 
relationship between two users in the social network using the FOAF vocabulary, as it 
uses the same shortest path for trust computation. But with a slight difference, they 
propose fuzzy linguistic terms such as low, medium, medium low, medium high and high 
to denote trust of other users and develop an algorithm based on these rather than 
(1,2,3..n) in TidalTrust [Golbeck. 2005]. The FuzzyTrust algorithm considers the 
problem when there is conflict of information from different sources in a large social 
network. Furthermore, this algorithm calculates trust for indirect connections from 
stronger and shorter paths as follows: 
86 
 
• Iterate the nodes from trustor (source) to trustee (sink) similar to the breadth first 
search, level by level, to find the shortest paths through other users who are called 
recommenders. 
• Set the path strength as a fuzzy set from trustor (source) to trustee (sink) through 
other users who are called recommenders.   
We use the FuzzyTrust algorithm to infer trust values in our algorithms but with a slight 
difference in some considerations. Basically, a trust social network is raised when each 
user in an OSN gives individual trust value to users who have a direct connection with 
them, and a trust value can be a fuzzy linguistic expression such as low, medium, high 
and highest that are provided by our model T = {low, medium, high, highest}. The 
linguistic variables, which are the input that are assigned by users, and numerical values, 
which are used in our algorithms which will be given at the end of this chapter, are 
defined as follows: 
Table 3: Trust values. 
Linguistic	  term	   Numerical	  value	  
LOW	   0.25	  
MEDIUM	   0.50	  
HIGH	   0.75	  
HIGHEST	   1.00	  
Trust values are .25, .50, .75or 1in our trust graph. We consider the assumption that users 
in OSNs who are directly connected to each other by any type of relationships should 
have at least the default level of trust which is Low. In other words, the existence of an 
undirected relationship between two users is associated with the existence of a directed 
trust relationship between those users. Furthermore, we consider the same characteristics 
of trust that the FuzzyTrust algorithm adopts, i.e. that it is asymmetric. Considering the 
asymmetry of trust, the trust social network would be a directed graph, and this property 
tells us that the trust level is not necessarily identical in the two directions between two 
users.  
Our main motivation for selecting trust a FuzzyTrust algorithm to work with a 
trust graph for trust inference is so we can use a fuzzy linguistic expression. In OSNs we 
mainly deal with end-users, consequently those linguistic terms are easier and natural for 
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users to assign trust values to others. Likewise end-users prefer to hear linguistic 
expressions when they ask others about their trust of an unknown user (trustee). In 
addition, we can handle conflicts where trust inference in a trust online social network 
can encounter contradictory information. Moreover, the results of Lesani’s and 
Bagherip’s simulation show that the FuzzyTrust algorithm offers more precise 
information than TidalTrust.  
Finally, the main idea for incorporating trust into a set of principles we use to 
produce a collaborative access control is that it makes privacy very controllable for OSN 
users. Also, the estimation of the trust value is quite useful to identify privacy threats. 
Users’ opinions in OSNs can be evaluated by taking trust relations into account. 
4.3 Algorithms for Collaborative Privacy Decisions 
As we have given definitions of the conflict resolution strategy principles. Also, 
we defined our policy specification scheme that has controller types, accessor 
specification and data specification. Now, based on these considerations, we propose to 
address the problem of collaborative privacy polices of shared items in OSNs. In this 
section, we investigate how collaborative privacy management of shared data with our 
principles can be achieved. Intuitively, this problem allows a conflict in the policies 
associated with controllers attempting to control their data. We develop a flexible and 
lightweight framework to achieve effective conflict resolution and to support the tradeoff 
between privacy and the benefit of sharing data in OSNs. The combined use of accessor 
weight, controller weight, and trust inference has been adopted as a convenient approach 
to resolve multiparty privacy conflicts in OSNs. This section is structured as follows. We 
begin by describing algorithms in pseudo code form then explain algorithms in detail and 
finish with examples. 
4.3.1 PermittedandDeniedAccessors Algorithm  
The proposed algorithm presented below tries to find the final lists of accessors 
who are permitted to view the shared data and those who are denied.  The 




Algorithm 1.PermittedandDeniedAccessors  
	  
input	  :	  (𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑃 = < 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟,𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝐶, 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟,𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 > ,𝑇𝐺  )  //	  item	  is	  a	  particular	  shared	  item	  where	  item	  ∈	  D	  ,	  P	  set	  of	  p	  where	  each	  p	  ∈	  P	  and	  
p	  is	  access	  control	  policy	  that	  is	  assigned	  by	  each	  associated	  controller	  for	  the	  data	  item	  
in	  question	  and	  𝑇𝐺    is	  trust	  graph	  where	  each	  user	  u	  ∈	  U	  assigns	  a	  trust	  value	  to	  those	  
who	  they	  have	  direct	  relationships	  with.	  	  	  
output	  :  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  :	  int	  [	  ]	  ,	    𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  :	  int	  [	  ]	  	  
var	  	  	  
number-­‐u-­‐deny	   :	  int	   init	  0	  
number-­‐u-­‐permit	   :	  int	   init	  0	  
u-­‐existence	   :	  int	   init	  0	  
decision-­‐	  permit	   :double	   init	  0	  
decision-­‐	  deny	   :double	   init	  0	  
list-­‐users	   :	  int	  [	  ]	   null	  
	   	   	  
	  
1:	  	  begin	  
2:	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  p	  in	  P	  	  do	  
3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  all	  user	  in	  	  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  and	  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟  to	  list-­‐users	  	  
4:	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  u	  ∈	  list-­‐users	  [	  ]	  do	  //	  relevant	  user	  who	  is	  derived	  from  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  and	  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  
5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  p	  in	  P	  	  do	  	  
7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  u	  ∈	  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  then	  
9:	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  number-­‐u-­‐permit	  ++	  
10:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  	  u	  ∈ 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  then	  
11:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  number-­‐u-­‐deny	  ++	  	  	  
12:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
13:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  u-­‐existence=	  number-­‐u-­‐permit	  +	  number-­‐u-­‐deny	  //	  checking	  if	  there	  are	  no	  conflicts	  
14:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  u-­‐existence=	  number-­‐u-­‐permit	  then	  	  
15:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
16:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  user	  u	  to	  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  [	  ]	  
17:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  remove	  user	  u	  from	  list	  users	  [	  ]	  
18:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
19:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  if	  	  u-­‐existence	  =	  number-­‐u-­‐deny	  then	  
20:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
21:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  user	  u	  to	  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟[	  ]	  
22:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  remove	  user	  u	  from	  list	  users	  [	  ]	  
23:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
24:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  	  //	  conflict	  case	  	  
25:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟	  who	  permites	  user	  u	  	  do	  //𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟	  is	  a	  controller	  id	  from	  p	  
26:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  decision-­‐	  permit	  +	  =	  𝒘(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟) ∗   𝒘(u)∗   𝑻𝑮. 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓  (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 → 𝑢)   ∗   𝒔𝒍  (𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚)	  
27:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟	  who	  denies	  user	  u	  	  do	  	  
28:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  decision-­‐	  deny	  +	  =	  𝒘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 ∗   𝒘(u)  ∗ 1 − 𝑻𝑮. 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 → 𝑢    	  ∗ 𝒔𝒍  (  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚)  	  	  	  
29:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  decision-­‐	  permit	  ≥	  	  decision-­‐	  deny	  then	  
30:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  user	  u	  to	  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  [	  ]	  
31:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	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32:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  user	  u	  to	  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜	  [	  ]	  
33:	  	  	  	  	  }	  //	  end	  of	  users’	  loop	  	  
34:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  return	  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟  [  ]	  and	  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟	  [	  ]	  
In the above algorithm, two steps are performed to get the final permitted users 
collection and the denied users collection given several multiparty access control policies.  
The algorithm receives policy (p) from each controller associated with targeted item as 
input and produces two lists of accessors as output. Moreover, Algorithm 1 takes as input 
the trust graph (TG), where a label is assigned to each edge to indicate the trust value of 
the relationship, to infer trust values between users. 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 is for 
users who are allowed to access the targeted item and 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟  is the list 
of users who are denied  to view the item. First of all, permitted and denied users from all 
relevant (p) are stored in list-­‐users	  list.	   Then, each user (u) in list-­‐users	  there is a loop to 
check the existence of this particular user (u) in 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 or 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 of all controllers policies. From 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 and 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 tuples in each controller’s policy (p) we determine the number of 
permitted votes for a certain user (u) and the number of denied votes for the same user 
(u). These elements are represented by the accessor specification defined in Definition 5. 
If there is full consensus among associated controllers about permitting or denying a 
certain user to access the shared item, the algorithm can yield the final decision without 
moving to the conflict resolution step. To illustrate, assume Alice and Bob are co-
controllers of particular item and David has an existing friendship with Alice as well as 
Bob. Both of them define their own access control policy (p). Alice’s policy states that 
her friends can view this item. Bob’s policy says that his friend David can view the 
shared item. Consequently, to yield the final decision about David’s access, the algorithm 
aggregates Alice’s and Bob’s policies. As a result of collaborative privacy polices, David 
is allowed to view the targeted item. Moreover, regardless of how many controllers are 
associated with a targeted item, if the algorithm finds that the number of users existence 
(u-existence) equal to the number of user’s permitted (number-u-permit) or the number of 
user’s denied (number-u-deny), it can yield the final decision without moving to the 
conflict resolution step. To illustrate this shortcut, which is expressed in lines 14 to 23 in 
the algorithm, assume that Alice, Bob and Carol took a photo together. Then, they define 
their own access control policy as follows: Alice allows her family and denies her 
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friends, Bob only denies his friends to access the photo and Carol denies her classmates. 
Suppose David is one of Alice’s family members and he does not belong to Bob’s friends 
or Carol’s classmates; the final decision about his access will be permit because one of 
the linked controllers allows him and he does not belong to the other controllers’ denied 
accessor list.  
In fact, multiple controllers of shared items often have different privacy concerns 
over the data; thus, privacy policy conflicts can always exist when taking into account the 
collaborative control over the shared item. For this reason, the lines 24 to 33 of 
Algorithm 1 attempt to reach the final collaborative access control policy by resolving the 
privacy policy conflicts. The combined use of the aforementioned principles has been 
adopted in this part of the PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm. Recall that our goal 
is that each controller associated with a shared item has the ability to affect the final 
decision. To evaluate the access of a user who has conflicting policies, the decisions of 
all controllers, who permit the user to access, are aggregated to finalize the value of the 
permitted decision (decision- permit). On the other hand, the 
PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm aggregates the values of decisions (decision- 
deny) that are regulated by controllers who denied the user’s access. The values of 
permitted decisions and denied decisions are computed with following equations: 
decision- permit + = 𝒘(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟) ∗   𝒘(u)∗   𝑻𝑮. 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 → 𝑢)   ∗   𝒔𝒍  (𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚)           (2) 
           decision- deny + =  𝒘(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟) ∗   𝒘(u)  ∗ 1 − 𝑻𝑮. 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 → 𝑢    ∗   𝒔𝒍  (𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚)    (3) 
where w(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟) is the weight of the controller derived from the Controllers’ Weight 
Scheme and w(𝑢) is the weight of the accessor that is calculated based on the Accessors’ 
Weight Scheme, which is the third principle in our conflict resolution strategy. Also, we 
believe the trust value between each controller of a shared item and users who have 
conflicting policies about their access plays a critical role in making a collaborative 
decision. The trust value between controllers and accessor (𝑇𝐺. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 → 𝑢 ) is 
inferred by the FuzzyTrust algorithm, which we discussed previously. The last element in 
the aggregation equations is the sensitivity level (𝑠𝑙) that reflects the controllers’ privacy 
concern over the shared item, and is derived from the 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 of a policy (p). The 
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𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 element is represented by a data specification, which was defined in 
Definition 6. Then, the aggregated permitted decision value (decision- permit) is utilized 
as a threshold for making the final result. The final decision of our conflict resolution 
approach is then determined as follows:  
decision- permit ≥  decision - deny = permit 
decision- permit <  decision - deny = deny 
If the value of permitted decision is higher or equal than value of denied decision, the 
final decision is permit. Otherwise, the access of the user to the shared item is rejected.  
A primary focus of our approach is based on a tradeoff between privacy and 
utility in OSNs. For this reason, we apply the aforementioned principles in our conflict 
resolution strategy. Indeed, whichever principles we consider to resolve conflicts that 
arise in a making collaborative decision, we will always find some situations for which 
they do not have a definitive scientific answer. Thus, the end result of our approach 
moves toward the permitted decision to solve the remaining conflicts. To see the 
PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm in action, let us consider the following example.  
Example 1.  
Suppose the scenario where Alice (A), Bob(B), Carol(C) and Edward (E) took a photo 
together. The photo is posted by Bob in Alice’s profile and Carol and Edward are tagged 
in the photo. Therefore, according to our classifications of ownership, which are defined 
in Definitions 1, 2, 3 and 4, Alice represents the owner, Bob is a contributor and Carol 
and Edward are stakeholders. They specify their access control policies over the shared 
photo as follows:  
𝑃 =  < 𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐,𝑂𝑊,< 𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜  𝑖𝑑  , 𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 ,𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 >  , < 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝐺𝑁 > , {  } >	  
𝑃 =  < 𝐵𝑜𝑏,𝐶𝐵,< 𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜  𝑖𝑑, 𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 , ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ >  , < 𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑑,𝑈𝑁 >, , < 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦,𝑅𝑁 > >	  
𝑃 =  < 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑙, 𝑆𝑇,< 𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜  𝑖𝑑, 𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 , ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 >  , < 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦,𝑅𝑁 > , {< 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 − 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑,𝐺𝑁 >} >	  




Suppose that David (D), who is the accessor, has friend relationship with A, B, and C. He 
is applicable to access based on Alice’s and Bob’s policies. However, Carol’s policy 
prevents David to view the shared item because he is member in her worker-friend group. 
David has not been mentioned in Edward’s policy; as a result, Edward is not involved in 
the process of making collaborative decision. The positive and negative authorizations 
about David’s access cause a conflict to decide either to allow or deny him. Thus, we 
apply the essential principles in our approach that are the weight of the accessor, the 
weights of the controllers, trust values and sensitivity level in order to resolve the 
conflicts. The permitted decisions value (decision- permit) is aggregated from Alice and 
Bob, who permit David to access.  In contrast, the algorithm computes the value of 
denied decisions from Carol who does not allow David to view the photo. Suppose that 
trust values between David and each controller are inferred as shown in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19: Inferring trust values. 
For Alice’s decision, owner’s weight 𝒘(𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒)  = 1 derived from Controllers’ Weight 
scheme, 𝒘(David) = 0.75 ,which is estimated based on the Accessors’ Weight scheme, 
Alice trusts Dave .5 and 𝑠𝑙  = 0.50 ,which is derived from the 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 of Alice’s 
policy (p) . Consequently, the value of Alice’s decision equals 0.188 based on the 
equation (2). On the other hand, Bob’s policy leads us to contributor’s weight 𝒘(𝐵𝑜𝑏)  = 
0.50 is based on Controllers’ Weight scheme that states when the contributor has a 
relationship or transitive relationship with the owner, her/his weight is 0.50, 𝒘(David) = 
1 and Bob trusts Dave 0.75 .Moreover, Bob assigns a high sensitivity level to the shared 
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photo that is represented as 𝑠𝑙  = 0.75. Thus, Bob’s decision is equal to 0.28; 
consequently, adding Alice and Bob’s values, the value of the permitted decisions 
(decision- permit) based on equation (2) equals 0.468. 
In contrast, to compute the value of the denied decisions that have arisen from 
Carol’s policy (p), we infer 𝒘(𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑙)  = 1, 𝒘(David) = 0.75 because he is member in 
Carol’s 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 − 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑 group and his privacy concern over the photo is in the highest 
sensitivity level that is equal to 𝑠𝑙  = 1. The trust level from Carol to David is low, valued 
at 0.25, and because this is a David is being denied by Carol, the trust is computed as 1 – 
0.25. Subsequently, the value of denied decisions (decision- deny) equals 0.562 based on 
equation (3), which means the final result about David’s access is to deny him to view the 
shared photo. Our strategy adapts varied factors in making collaborative decision rather 
than just a plain voting scheme; for instance, in this scenario we had two permitted votes 
and one deny vote but the final decision was denied the accessor to view shared item 
according to the PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm. Not that if letting the owner, 
Alice, taking full responsibility over who can access the shared photo, the decision would 
have been permitting only users who are members in her travelling group. Unfortunately, 
this limited decision of accessing shared item is what most of developed social networks 
(e.g. Facebook, Google+, MySpace, Twitter, etc.) offer. 
4.3.2 AccessorSharing Algorithm 
It is effective security practice to divide accessors into viewers and disseminators. 
The viewers are users who have permission to view the shared item. When a viewer 
requests to share the item with her/his friends, family members, classmates, etc. and is 
granted to disseminate the shared item, we call this viewer a disseminator. We introduce 
the AccessorSharing algorithm where the basic idea is using a trust value between 
associated controllers and accessors of the shared data as a threshold to decide whether 
the trust value is high enough to allow this. Algorithm 2 illustrates the entire procedure of 
accessor sharing. 
Algorithm 2.AccessorSharing  
input	  :	  (𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚,	  𝑃 = {< 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟,𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝐶, 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟,𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 >}    ,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ASP	  ={	  <	  controller	  1,	  tr-­‐threshold	  >	  ,	  .	  .	  	  ,	  	  <	  controller	  𝑖,	  tr-­‐threshold	  >},	  	  final	  permitted	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accessor	  [	  ]	  ,	  TG	  )	  //	  P	  set	  of	  p	  where	  each	  p	  ∈	  P	  and	  is	  access	  control	  policy	  that	  is	  
assigned	  by	  each	  associated	  controller	  for	  the	  data	  item	  in	  question	  ,	  ASP	  set	  of	  asp	  that	  
is	  accessor	  sharing	  policy	  where	  each	  controller	  identify	  her/his	  trust	  threshold	  value,	  
final	  permitted	  accessor	  [	  ]	  which	  is	  the	  output	  of	  PermittedandDeniedAccessors	  
algorithm,	  𝑇𝐺    is	  trust	  graph	  where	  each	  user	  u	  ∈	  U	  assigns	  a	  trust	  value	  to	  those	  who	  
they	  have	  direct	  relationships	  with.	  
	  
output	  :	  disseminators	  	  :	  int	  [	  ]	  	  ,	  not-­‐disseminators	  :	  int	  [	  ]	  	  	  
	  
var	  	  	  
tr	  	  	   :	  string	  	  	  	  	   init	  null	  	  
controllers-­‐permit	   :	  [	  ]int	   init	  null	  	  
controllers-­‐deny	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  :	  [	  ]int	   init	  null	  	  
decision-­‐	  permit	  	  	  	  	  	   :double	  	  	  	  	  	  	  init	  0	  	  
decision-­‐	  deny	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   :double	  	  	  	  	  	  	  init	  0	  	  
T	   :	  int	   init	  0	  
F	   :	  int	   init	  0	  
	  
	  
1:	  	  begin	  
2:	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  	  u	  ∈	  	  final	  permitted	  accessor	  [	  ]	  	  do	  	  
3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  	  
4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  controller	  c	  ∈	  U	  do	  	  //	  controllers	  who	  belong	  to	  ASP	  {	  }	  
5:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  tr	  ←	  𝑻𝑮. 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓(c,	  u)	  //	  using	  the	  FuzzyTrust	  algorithm	  to	  infer	  how	  much	  controller	  	  
trusts	  user	  u	  from	  TG	  
7:	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  tr	  ≥	  tr-­‐threshold	  	  	  //	  from	  ASP	  {	  }	  for	  controller	  c	  
8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  controllers-­‐permit	  [	  ]	  	  ←	  c	  	  
9:	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  T++}	  
10:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  	  	  
11:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  controllers-­‐deny	  [	  ]	  	  ←	  c	  	  
12:	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  F++}	  
13:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
14:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  	  	  i	  =	  T	  	  then	  	  //	  checking	  if	  there	  are	  no	  conflicts	  where	  i	  is	  number	  of	  controllers	  (size	  of	  
ASP	  set	  )	  
15:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  u	  to	  disseminators	  [	  ]	  
16:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  if	  	  i=	  F	  then	  
17:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  u	  to	  not-­‐disseminators	  [	  ]	  
18:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  //	  conflict	  case	  
19:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  controller	  c	  ∈	  controllers-­‐permit	  [	  ]	  	  do	  
20:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  decision	  -­‐	  permit	  +=	  𝒘(𝑐) ∗   𝒔𝒍(item)	  	  	  
21:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  controller	  c	  ∈	  controllers-­‐deny	  [	  ]	  	  do	  	  
22:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  decision	  -­‐	  deny	  +=	  𝒘(𝑐) ∗   𝒔𝒍(item)	  	  	  
23:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  decision	  -­‐	  permit	  ≥	  	  decision	  -­‐	  deny	  then	  
24:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  u	  to	  disseminators	  [	  ]	  
25:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  
26:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  u	  to	  not-­‐disseminators	  [	  ]	  
27:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  	  	  
28:	  	  	  	  	  	  return	  disseminators	  [	  ]	  and	  not-­‐disseminators[	  ]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 This algorithm simply returns the set of accessors who are allowed to disseminate 
the shared item (disseminators) and a not-disseminators set that has accessors who are 
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not allowed to disseminate. The algorithm takes set of policy (p) to determine the type 
controller and her/his sensitivity level of shared item. Moreover, Algorithm 2 takes as 
input the trust graph (TG), where a label is assigned to each edge to indicate the trust 
value of the relationship, to infer trust values (tr) between users. Also, a set of accessor 
sharing policy (ASP) that is defined by associated controllers is taken as input. In the first 
phase, the algorithm computes the trust value (tr) between each associated controller and 
accessor, who belongs to 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 which is the result of the 
PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm by using the FuzzyTrust algorithm 
(𝑇𝐺. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑢 ). Then it compares the trust value (tr) with the sharing policy is specified 
by each controller (tr-threshold), which is part of the input of Algorithm 2. The tr-
threshold in the sharing policy decides whether the trust value (tr) between the controller 
and the accessor is high enough for sharing or not. tr-threshold indicates how high the 
minimum trust value (tr) from the controller to the accessor should be to grant the 
accessor permission to share the item. If the trust value (tr) is equal to or higher than the 
required tr-threshold, the controller is added to the set of controllers (controllers-permit) 
that has all controllers who’s sharing policy is achieved. Otherwise, controllers whose 
sharing policy requirements have not been satisfied are sent to controllers-deny. If the 
number of users in controllers-deny set equals the number of related ownerships, the 
accessor is not granted a permission to share the item with their friends, family members, 
classmates, etc. Indeed, the trust values between this denied accessor and controllers did 
not achieve the tr-threshold requirements; hence, the accessor is sent to the not-
disseminators. 
In the last case, when the value of trust (tr) from each controller to the accessor 
does not satisfy all sharing policies that are specified by controllers, who are associated 
with the shared item, a conflict arises among them to allow or refuse the sharing request. 
Consequently, we decide to solve conflicts by combining the controllers’ weight and 
sensitivity levels that are derived from the shared item element policies and reflect the 
controllers’ privacy concerns. We believe the relationship between controllers and shared 
items, which is represented by the controller’s weight, has a significant impact to resolve 
conflicts. In addition, some controllers require high protection for shared items; 
consequently, combining sensitivity levels to make a decision is necessary to prevent 
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inappropriate handling of data. To reach the final result, we compute a decision from 
controllers whose requirements degree of trust (tr-threshold) have not been achieved, as 
well as calculate a decision value from controllers whose assign trust level (tr-threshold) 
is satisfied by the value of (tr). The values of permitted decisions and denied decisions 
are computed with following equations: 
decision - permit += 𝒘(𝑐) ∗   𝒔𝒍(item)                   (5) 
decision - deny += 𝒘(𝑐) ∗   𝒔𝒍(item)                     (6) 
Finally, when the permitted decision value is greater than or equal to the denied 
decision value, the final result to disseminate the shared data item by the accessor is 
authorized. Otherwise, the accessor is refused to share the content by the 
AccessorSharing algorithm. To illustrate the algorithm's details, we introduce the 
following example.  
Example 2.  
Suppose there are four users, Alice (A), Bob (B), Clare(C) and Dave (D), who share the 
same photo where Alice has the photo in her profile, Bob and Dave are tagged in the 
photo that was initially was posted by Clare. Figure 12 shows a similar scenario where 
Alice is called the owner, Bob and Dave are stakeholders and Clare is called a contributor 
who posted the content in Alice’s profile. When Edward (E), who is one of viewers, 
desires to share this photo with his relationship list such as friends, family members, 
classmates, etc., authorization requirements from all linked controllers are considered by 
running the AccessorSharing algorithm. A, B, C and D have specified their accessor 
sharing policies (tr-threshold), and trust values between E and each controller are 




Figure 20: Accessor sharing policies and Inferring trust values. 
Also, Figure 20 depicts that the trust value from owner (A) to E satisfies A’s trust 
requirement as well the contributor, Clare, trust requirement. However, stakeholders B 
and D refuse E to disseminate the shared photo because their policy requirements have 
not been satisfied. As a consequence, the decision for E’s sharing request includes both 
permissions and prohibitions that lead to conflicts. For this example, suppose the photo 
has diverse sensitivity levels assigned by associated controllers A, B, C and D as follows 
sl(photo(A)) = 0.25, sl(photo(B)) = 0.75, sl(photo(C)) = 0.50 and sl(photo(D)) = 1. A and C’s 
permissions are calculated by decision – permit =(  𝑤  (𝐴) ∗   𝑠𝑙(photo(A))) + ( 𝑤(𝐶) ∗  𝑠𝑙(photo(C)) ) = 0.50 , where 𝑤(𝐴) and 𝑤(𝐶) are derived from the Controllers’ Weight 
scheme. In order to resolve the conflict between controllers’policies about E sharing, 
Algorithm 2 computes a denied decision value from B and D based on the decision – 
deny equation that gives (  𝑤(𝐵) ∗   𝑠𝑙(photo(B))) + ( 𝑤(𝐷) ∗   𝑠𝑙(photo(D)) ) = 1.75 , where 
B’s and D’s weights w are derived from principle 1. To acquire a final decision about E, 
the decision – permit is used as a threshold for decision making. In our example decision 
– deny is higher than decision – permit, thus E is denied to publish the photo on his 
profile. The collaborative decision for E’s sharing request takes the privacy protection of 
highly sensitive data into account. Note this example also corresponds to the situation in 
Figure 14 and 15 where Edward reflects the contributor who desires to share and post the 
photo on his friend, family member, classmates, etc. personal page in OSN. Note that if 
the decision has been left up to the owner, Alice, the decision would have been permit 
Edward to share the photo with his relationships list. There is no consideration for the 
other parties’ privacy requirements in most existing OSN privacy protection mechanisms. 
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Furthermore, they do not support trust notion and sensitivity level of data, which play 
significant role to measure how disclosure item can affect online users. 
4.3.3 ControllerSharing Algorithm  
Shared data item dissemination comes in two varieties, both useful to increase the 
communication among users in OSNs. The first sharing model was previously introduced 
as accessor sharing. In this section, we are going to present a second way to disseminate a 
shared data item, and an algorithm which describes how possible conflicts between 
associated controllers should be solved. According to case one in the sharing scenarios, 
shown previously in Figures 8 and 9, a sharing request comes from one of the controllers, 
who is related to the shared item. When a controller desires to share the item with her/his 
friends, family members, classmates, etc., the item will be in turn posted in a new user’s 
profile; this new user could be unauthorized to access the shared item. Therefore, the 
controller sharing request has a high potential to leak data. We have formalized the 
ControllerSharing algorithm to enable controllers to regulate their privacy and protect 
items from being used against them in some way. 
Before we express algorithms in pseudo code, we need to elucidate some basic 
ideas behind the ControllerSharing algorithm. The first idea is a boolean voting matrix 
(0's and 1's) of size C   ×   C , where C is the set of controllers, which contains all sharing 
policies of a particular shared item where rows refer to controllers as voters and each 
column denotes controller as candidates and her/his receiving votes. In the voting matrix, 
all controllers can vote for or against all other associated controllers to share the content, 
which enables them to express their opinions comprehensively.   
 
Figure 21: The Voting Matrix of Controllers Sharing. 
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A cell in the voting matrix with row c1 and column c2 is filled with v(c1, c2), which is 
the value of the vote that c1 confers on c2. If v(c1, c2) = 0 that means c1 prevents c2 to 
disseminate the shared item; in contrast, v(c1, c2) =1 indicates that c1 allows c2 to share 
the item. However, v(c𝑖, c𝑖)=1 for all i.  
In the ControllerSharing algorithm, the trust value (trv) of the voter is calculated 
differently than in prior algorithms where 𝑇𝐺. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 → 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟) denotes 
to how much the controller at the tail of the edge trusts the accessor at the head of the 
edge, which may not be directly connected in the trust graph. However, 𝑡𝑟𝑣!"#$% refers to 
the trust value of the voter that is computed based on the following equation: 
𝑡𝑟𝑣!"#$% =   𝑻𝑮. 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓|C|!!! 𝑗⟶ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟                                 (7) 
where 𝑗 is candidate and 𝑇𝐺. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟  (𝑗⟶ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟) calculates the trust value from each 
candidate, who belongs to the associated controllers set, to the voter. 𝑡𝑟𝑣!"#$% indicates 
how much related controllers trust this controller (𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟). Each individual 𝑇𝐺. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑗⟶ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟  value in equation (7) is calculated by the FuzzyTrust algorithm. 
Consequently, the trust inference algorithm computes the trust value between diverse 
sources to a particular voter. The ControllerSharing algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 3. 
Algorithm 3. ControllerSharing Algorithm  
input	  :	  (𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚,	  𝑃 = < 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟,𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝐶, 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟,𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 > ,	  
voting-­‐matrix	  (voter,	  candidate),	  TRV=	  {𝑡𝑟𝑣!	  ,	  .	  .	  	  ,	  	  𝑡𝑟𝑣!})//	  P	  set	  of	  p	  where	  each	  p	  ∈	  P	  and	  is	  
access	  control	  policy	  that	  is	  assigned	  by	  each	  associated	  controller	  for	  the	  data	  item	  in	  
question,	  voting-­‐matrix	  giving	  the	  controller	  sharing	  policy	  from	  each	  controller,	  TRV	  set	  of	  trv	  
that	  is	  the	  trust	  value	  of	  each	  controller	  (voter)	  has	  been	  computed	  based	  on	  equation	  (7).	  
	  
output	  :	  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠	  :	  int	  	  [	  ]	  ,	  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠	  :int	  [	  ]	  	  
	  
var	  	  	  
vote-­‐	  permit	  	  	   :	  int	   init	  0	  	  
vote-­‐	  deny	  	  	  	  	  	  	   :	  int	   init	  0	  	  
	   	   	  
	  
1:	  begin	  
2:	  	  	  	  for	  each	  candidate	  c	  (in	  column)	  do	  //	  running	  in	  voting-­‐matrix	  	  
3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  {	  
4:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  (i=0	  ;	  i<=	  |C|	  (#voter	  in	  row)	  ;	  i++)	  	  
5:	   	  	  if	  	  voting-­‐matrix	  (  𝑖,	  c)	  =1	  then	  	  //	  checking	  if	  there	  are	  no	  conflicts	  
6:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  candidate	  c	  to	  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠  [  ]	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7:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  //	  conflict	  case	  
8:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  each	  voter  𝑖	  	  do	  
9:	   {	  
10:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  voting-­‐matrix	  (voter	  𝑖,	  candidate	  c)	  =1	  then	  
11:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  vote-­‐	  permit	  +=	  𝒕𝒓𝒗(𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒓  !) ∗𝒘(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑖)	  //	  𝑡𝑟𝑣(𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒓  !)	  from	  TRV{	  }	  
12:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  
13:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  vote-­‐	  deny	  +=	  𝒕𝒓𝒗(𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒓  !) ∗𝒘(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑖)	  
14:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
15:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  vote-­‐	  permit	  ≥	  	  vote-­‐	  deny	  then	  
16:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  candidate	  c	  to	  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠  [  ]	  
17:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  else	  	  
18:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  add	  candidate	  c	  to	  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠  [  ]	  
19:	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
20:	  	  	  	  return	  	  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠  [  ]  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠[  ]	  	  
	  
Figure 8 and 9 demonstrated the situation where one of controllers desires to 
disseminate a shared item; before it is posted in a new space, we investigate if the sharing 
requester is allowed to share or not by checking the ControllerSharing algorithm result. 
The ControllerSharing algorithm uses a voting matrix and set of policies (P) to determine 
the controller’s weight as input. Additionally, Algorithm 3 receives the set of the trust 
values of the voter (𝑡𝑟𝑣) that represents how much associated controllers trust this 
controller (𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟) based on equation (7). The ControllerSharing algorithm produces two 
sets of controllers, who, based on conflict resolution strategy in the algorithm, could be 
permitted  (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠) to share or denied (𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠), as output. 
In the ControllerSharing algorithm, for every candidate appearing in the voting 
matrix, the function getvoting-matrix translates candidate votes into a voting-value. If the 
candidate received a vote=1 from all voters then add this candidate to the 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠 set which a list of controllers who are allowed to disseminate 
the shared item. On the other hand, some conflicts might occur where we have both 
permitted and banned votes for a particular candidate to share. Hence, we use equations 
(8) and (9) in our conflict resolution strategy to manage conflicts about a candidate, 
vote- permit +=𝒕𝒓𝒗(𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒓  !) ∗𝒘(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑖)            (8) 
vote- deny += 𝒕𝒓𝒗(𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒓  !) ∗𝒘(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑖)             (9) 
where  𝑡𝑟𝑣(𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒓  !) is the trust value of the voter that is computed by the FuzzyTrust 
algorithm based on equation (7) and 𝑤(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑖) is the weight of that voter that is 
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calculated by the controller weight principle. The trust value and weight of the voter are 
considered as essential elements to solve conflicts between voters’ authorizations. 
After we compute both permitted votes and prohibited votes, the final decision 
about a candidate can be made as: 
vote- permit ≥  vote- deny = selected candidate 
vote- permit <  vote- deny = unselected candidate 
The algorithm makes a final decision based on values of voters that are in vote- permit 
and vote- deny. The candidate(s) with a higher vote- permit value will be allowed to 
disseminate the shared item with her/his friends, family members, classmates, etc. 
Nevertheless, when voters who vote against the candidate produced value of denied 
decision (vote- deny) that is higher than value of the permitted decision (vote- permit), the 
candidate is denied to share.  
As we discussed in the previous algorithms, the last result of our approach moves 
toward the permitted decision to maintain the social value of data sharing in OSNs. 
Finally, the algorithm returns a set of controllers who are allowed to disseminate shared 
items and a set of banned controllers. The following example will illustrate 
ControllerSharing algorithm precisely. 
Example 3.  
Suppose there are three controllers Alice (A), Bob (B), and Clare(C) who specify access 
control policies (P) to control who can view a shared picture. Alice owns the shared 
picture which originally was posted in her space by Clare who tagged Bob in this picture. 
Consequently, Alice is the owner, Clare is considered to be the contributor and Bob, who 
is tagged in picture, is called a stakeholder. All associated controllers are required to 
specify a controller sharing policy. Then, a voting matrix is made from Alice’s, Bob’s 






Figure 22: The voting matrix (left), a directed trust graph, and an undirected 
relationship graph (right). 
Bob wants to share the picture with his friend; therefore we check if he is able to share 
the photo based on the ControllerSharing algorithm. Suppose the trust values between 
controllers are inferred as presented in the directed trust graph in the middle of Figure 22. 
According to the voting matrix, Bob has two against votes and one for vote, then his 
situation has conflicting votes. Algorithm 3 computes vote- permit  that contains all 
voters who vote for Bob to share. On the other hand, the total of votes against Bob 
produces vote- deny value based on equation (9). vote- permit equals 1 based on equation 
(8) where 𝑡𝑟𝑣(𝑩)=1 that is calculated by equation (7) as follows : 𝑻𝑮. 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓   𝐴⟶ 𝐵 +𝑻𝑮. 𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒓   𝐶⟶ 𝐵   ,where we suppose the trust values are inferred as shown in the directed 
trust graph Figure 22 ; subsequently, 𝑡𝑟𝑣(𝑩)= 𝒕𝒓   𝐴⟶ 𝐵 + 𝒕𝒓   𝐶⟶ 𝐵  = 0.25 + 0.75 =1. 𝑤 𝐵  reflects stakeholder’s weight = 1 based on principle 1, hence vote- permit  =1. vote- 
deny = (  (𝑡𝑟𝑣(𝑨) ∗ 𝑤(𝐴)) + (𝑡𝑟𝑣 𝑪 ∗ 𝑤 𝐶 ) ), on the basis of equation (7) and according 
to inferred trust values in Figure 22 𝑡𝑟𝑣(𝑨) = 0.75 and 𝑡𝑟𝑣(𝑪) =1.50. Where 𝑤 𝐴  reflects 
the owner’s weight =1 and  𝑤 𝐶  reflects a contributor ’s weight = 0.50 which are based 
on the Controllers’ Weight Scheme. As a result, vote- deny  =1.5, so the final decision 
denies Bob to disseminate the picture. Note that the decision for regulating the sharing 
policy to the shared item still rests solely on the owner of shared item, Alice, in most 
OSN platforms (e.g. Facebook, Google+, MySpace, Twitter, etc.). As such, in these OSN 
sites the decision would have been based on Alice privacy without dealing with the 




In summary, existing OSNs support privacy decisions as individual processes 
regardless of other associated users’ privacy concerns. Basically, users are sharing their 
life actions and events with their social network. Consequently, most data in OSNs have 
multiple connected users who desire to manage their data. Sharing patterns are showing 
the risk that is posed by lacking a collaborative privacy management framework in OSNs. 
In addressing the limited access control in current OSNs, we have proposed a 
methodology for collaborative access control in OSNs. First, by abstract representation of 
OSNs, we identified the key elements of OSN to build and characterize our model and 
then represent individual access control policies where each controller, who belongs to a 
set of collaborative controllers for particular shared items can specify her/his privacy 
policy over the shared item. After local specifications, we have discussed the principles 
of our conflict resolution strategy to solve the conflicts in contradictory privacy 
requirements that are caused by different controllers’ privacy preferences. We have 
discussed and investigated how controllers’ weight, accessors’ weight and inferring fuzzy 
trust can help to resolve the conflicts and to reach a collective privacy decision. 
Furthermore, we have explored how a collaborative access control model based on these 
principles with our algorithms can be achieved. Our PermittedandDeniedAccessors 
algorithm makes a concerted attempt to reach a collaborative decision over who can 
access the shared item and who cannot. Lastly, we have introduced our AccessorSharing 
and ControllerSharing algorithms to collaboratively regulate who can disseminate the 
shared item.   
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Chapter 5  
5 Implementation and Evaluation  
This chapter describes the implementation phase of our Permitted and Denied 
Accessors algorithm to demonstrate the efficacy of the approach.Our prototype 
application is begun by generating multiple controllers’ scenarios, where more than one 
user should be involved in the process of specify the access control policies. We 
implemented our prototype as a small programming project using Java and the MySQL 
Database. In fact, the Java programming language is very appropriate because it offers an 
easy mechanism called a package that builds a namespace for each component of the 
prototype.  
We briefly review the notion of the PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm in 
order to provide the idea of how we implemented the collaborative decision. The 
algorithm generates two sets of accessors as output. The first set contains accessors who 
are permitted to view the shared data; in contrast, the second set includes those who are 
denied. The algorithm receives a policy (p) from each controller of the targeted item as 
input. To review the algorithm, two steps are performed to get the final sets of accessors. 
In the first step, we determine the final decision concerning a certain user; if all 
associated controllers agree to permit or deny her/him, the algorithm can yield the final 
decision without moving to conflict resolution phase.  
Indeed, conflicts might always exist when taking into account multiparty control 
over the shared item because co-controllers of shared items often have different privacy 
concerns over the data. In the second step of Algorithm 1, we attempt to reach the final 
decision by resolving the privacy policy conflicts. The combined use of our principles 
(Controllers’ Weight Scheme, Accessors’ Weight Scheme, Inferring Fuzzy Trust) has 
been implemented in the second step of the PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm to 
resolve conflicts. These principles are adopted as a convenient way to give the ability to 
each controller associated with a shared item to affect the final decision for viewing a 
shared item. For a user who receives conflicted policies about her/his access, Algorithm1 
evaluates this final decision by separately aggregating the value of permitted decisions 
and denied decisions. Finally, the aggregated permitted decision value is utilized as a 
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threshold for making the final decision. For more detail about this algorithm, see Chapter 
4. Algorithms 2 and 3 are not currently implemented; their evaluation is part of our future 
work.  
We organize this chapter as follows. Sect.1 we present our dataset, which is used 
for running our algorithm and creating multiple controllers’ scenarios. In Sect. 2 we show 
all sharing cases occurring in OSNs, where different controllers may have diverse access 
control and privacy policies for a single content. The final section provides a complete 
multiple-controllers’ scenario and compares the final decision that is produced from our 
algorithm with what the current Facebook decision would be. 
5.1 Dataset  
In this section we describe our test dataset for the PermittedandDeniedAccessors 
algorithm.  It involves what we hope is a realistic environment and simulates our 
relationships network and trust network. Also, it is important to generate multiple 
controllers’ scenarios efficiently. Our dataset is created in MySQL as 9 tables in a 
structure that fundamentally simulates the Facebook application. However, we 
additionally add some features in our database structure such as relationship types and a 
trust relationship to test our prototype in a suitable environment.  Our OSNWS database 
has 30 users who are connected to each other by 363 diverse relationships. We have 4 
relationship types in our dataset:  friendship, family, classmate and colleague. 
Furthermore, in the database there are 120 groups where each user has 4 groups. 
Additionally, each user randomly belongs as a member to several groups, which are 
owned by different users, hence the number of members in all groups, is 279. To measure 
the PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm’s performance in terms of efficacy, we 
design 168 shared contents that are uploaded by the users in the database and are 
disseminated among users. Also, to have shared content, we tag different users in each 
shared item. Thus the total number of tagged users is 364.  
In our prototype we can simulate scenarios which occur by creating new shared 
items or sharing items which already exist in the database, as shown in Figure 23. In 
conclusion, we attempt to design our dataset to be a realistic environment that the 
prototype can efficiently implement.  
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5.2 Multiple Controllers’ Scenarios and Policy Specification  
In this section, we are going to generate all scenarios where more than one user 
may be involved in the access control process. Actually, multiple controllers’ scenarios 
were introduced and analyzed in Chapter 3. However, we generate those scenarios as the 
first phase of our prototype because they lead us to determine all users who have the right 
to participate in the process of making a collective access control policy. Moreover, 
simulating these scenarios is a critical part to successfully testing the 
PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm, which reaches a collective decision over who 
can access the shared content. Furthermore, we present the simulation of the collaborative 
policies for authorization administration.  
5.2.1 Multiple Controllers’ Scenarios  
According to the Content Sharing Section 3.3 in Chapter 3, we organize our 
simulations here. First, we explain the interface for creating a scenario as shown below in 
Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23: Interface of creating scenarios. 
At the beginning of the scenario generation process, we have to select type of 
content as shown in box1. If the content already exists, the list of existing items will be 















owns the profile where uploader posts the item. The source user will be active when we 
choose to share the existing item, so all items that belong to the source user will appear in 
the item drop list shown in box 2. Furthermore, when the uploader desires to tag other 
users in a content, our prototype allows him/her to tag four users as shown in box 4. 
Thus, using the button shown in box 5, we can create a scenario based on previously 
determined information. Finally, the status of the generated scenario will be changed (box 
6), and then we specify our collaborative policies by moving to next interface.     
The first case is the Tagging scenario that consists of an uploader who is the 
owner and a few stakeholders who are tagged users, as previously analyzed in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 24: Tagging scenario 
Figure 24 presents a tagging scenario where Ramy uploads a new item in his profile and 
tags two users. The scenario generated has two types of controllers, as shown in the 




Figure 25: Co-controllers in Tagging scenario. 
Here we consider Ramy as owner and tagged users Ahmed and Saad as stakeholders. To 
produce collaborative policies over who can view the shared item, we aggregate policies 
from owner and stakeholders.  
Another sharing tool, for posting, (the second scenario), is shown in the following 
Figure 26.  
 
Figure 26: Posting-Tagging scenario. 
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The uploader posts an item in Kareem’s profile and tags Ramy; thus, we have Ahmed as 
contributor, Yasser as owner and Ramy as stakeholder. In Chapter 3, we investigated the 
Posting -Tagging scenario and Figure 6 shows this case. We let all associated controllers 
participate in the process of making the collaborative decision over who can access a 
shared item, as shown in the following figure.  
 
Figure 27: Co-controllers in Posting-Tagging scenario. 
Third is the sharing tool that is offered by most OSN applications to encourage 
their online users to share and distribute pictures, events or activates among their friends, 
family members or even co-workers in various ways. When users share their contents 
with others in their social network or share others users’ contents, a simple sharing 
scenario occurs which was previously explained in Chapter 3, Figures 7 and 10. We 
simulate this scenario as follows, Shady is a user who has the item in his profile and he is 
the uploader of this item. Then, he shares it with Ayman who owns the destination 
profile, so we consider him the owner of the shared item. On the other hand, Shady 
becomes the originator of the shared item. Figure 28 presents the simple sharing scenario 
creation; afterward, Figure 29 shows the multiple controllers who collaboratively set the 
privacy polices for the shared item. According to our principles the originator’s policy 




Figure 28: Simple Sharing scenario. 
 
Figure 29: Co-controllers in Simple Sharing scenario. 
By the sharing tool, diverse scenarios can arise such as a user sharing another user’s 
content and posting it in someone else’s space, which is more complicated than the 
previous scenario. When an intermediate user is involved in a sharing scenario, the 
process of making a collective decision has three types of controllers as clarified 
previously in Chapter 3 and analyzed in Figure 13. In the next figure we simulate the 




Figure 30: Simple sharing of another users' item and posting it in someone else's 
space scenario. 
Zakarya desires to share Mohamed’s item 75 with Hisham. Thus, item 75 will be in turn 
posted in Hisham’s space, who thus becomes the new owner of Mohamed’s item. We call 
Mohamed the originator and Zakarya the contributor who reposts the item. Afterward, 
each associated controller has the right to regulate her/his privacy policies concerning the 
shared item 75. Figure 31 shows how our model considers all linked ownerships in the 
process of making a collaborative decision over who can access item 75 in Hisham’s 
profile. 
 
Figure 31: Co-controllers in a sharing scenario created by an intermediate user. 
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The final simulated scenario contains all types of ownership in our model. 
Suppose Saad’s originates item 28 that Ramy desires to share with his friend Mohammed 
and Saad tags Kareem, Salah and Ayman in it. Hence, our model gives all involved users 
the right to participate in the access control process under different ownerships. When 
item 28 is reposted in Mohammed’s space, Ramy becomes a contributor, Mohammed is 
the owner, and Saad is the originator. The collaborative access control polices of the 
shared item 28 in Mohammed’s space, which are given by the result of the 
PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm, are regulated by these controllers who are 
related to the shared item by varied relationships. This case is represented in Figures 32 
and 33.  
 




Figure 33: Co-controllers of final simulated scenario. 
5.2.2 Privacy policy specification 
Associated controllers are required to feed input into the prototype, as complete 
privacy policies are necessary for the algorithms.  We presented our collaborative policy 
specification scheme for access control and authorization administration in Chapter 4. 
Our policy privacy specification scheme includes two parts, first is the accessor 
specification which was defined in Definition 5 that supports both positive and negative 
authorizations. Controllers are able to regulate accessors, with whom they want to share 
their data, and unauthorized users.  The second part is the data specification where a 
controller can determine the level of sensitivity of an item based on how much its 
disclosure would harm her/him. The interface for policy specification in our prototype is 




Figure 34: Privacy policy specification interface. 
Through this interface, we obtain the set of individual AC policies (P). Each associated 
controller first determines the sensitivity level of the shared item and then specifies the 
authorized users and unauthorized users by three parameters that are user names, group 
names and relationship types. A drop list of relationship types, in the previous figure, 
shows all relationships Ahmed has in his social network. Likewise, the group list presents 
all groups that the owner has in his profile. Also, a controller can specifically permit or 
deny particular user from the user name list. After each controller regulates her/his 
privacy policy, our algorithm runs to generate a collaborative decision concerning which 
users can access the shared item and who cannot. Consequently we will receive two lists 
of accessors as output.   
5.3 Experiments and Analysis of Results  
In this section, we study a prototype of our collaborative access control model for 
accessing shared item situation (PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm). The purpose 
of our experimental study is to assess the effectiveness and usefulness of our model in 
terms of making a collaborative decision that balances between privacy requirements and 
sociability on OSNs. The results of our approach are compared to Facebook in certain 
scenarios where multiple users have the right to participate in the process of making final 
decision of shared items. These comparisons show the lack of a joint administration 
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policy in Facebook and the feasibility of our collaborative access control model. 
Facebook’s results are computed based on its current privacy settings that take into 
account solely the owner’s privacy setting. Positive policy in Facebook can be 
customized with users names, group names and friendships. However, Facebook’s 
negative authorization can be specified by users names and group names only. 
Accordingly, in our prototype we consider the owner’s permitted and denied policies for 
Facebook results. The experimental results are obtained from our dataset where 
relationships and trust values between 30 users are randomly generated. In what follows, 
we evaluate the performance of our approach for 2 cases: sharing a new item and sharing 
a shared item, comparing to Facebook in similar scenarios.  
5.3.1 Sharing a new item Experiment  
Here we present the results acquired from the scenario of sharing a new item. The 
experiment runs as a posting-tagging scenario where the item has an owner, multiple 
stakeholders and a contributor, explained, previously in Figure 6. The scenario is 
generated and each associated controller regulates her/his privacy policy, as illustrated in 
Figure 35.  
 




Figure 36: A comparison of our collaborative model and Facebook achievements for 
co-controllers privacy polices in a shared item scenario. 
By running the PermittedandDeniedAccessors algorithm we obtain a collaborative 
decision concerning permitted accessors and denied accessors. The results from running 
Algorithm 1 and Facebook’s method are displayed in Figure 36.  The bars represent the 
percentage of the privacy policies achieved that are required from the enrolled co-
controllers in our approach and what would be achieved by Facebook. The display allows 
us to compare the policy achievement of the associated controllers for our collaborative 
decision and for Facebook.  
The first graph describes the accomplished amount of negative privacy policies of 
each involved controller for the two techniques, as a percentage. These quantities are 
calculated based on how much our model satisfies each co-controllers’ negative privacy 
requirements; on the other hand, the blue bars present the amount of negative policy of all 
associated controllers achieved based on Facebook’s setting. Although in the owner case 
both offer reasonable achievement, our model meets most of the stakeholders’ negative 
policies. In fact, our dataset is a connected graph where there is a path between any two 
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users. Thus, there is a high probability that an owner and another co-controller have 
denied accessors in common. We note that some of the contributor’s negative policy is 
accomplished by Facebook.  
The second chart represents the percentages of the positive privacy requirement of 
each co-manager achieved by our model and by Facebook. As shown in the positive 
authorization graph, our approach attempted to resolve the conflicts between the owner, 
contributor and the stakeholder 2 in permitted accessors based on the conflict resolution 
strategy. However, accessors, who are authorized by stakeholders 1 and 3, do not affect 
other co-controllers’ privacy requirements. Finally, both permitted and denied policies 
are combined to measure the percent of total accomplishment of each co-controller’s 
privacy policy that is achieved by our collaborative model and Facebook, as presented in 
the positive and negative authorizations graph.  
5.3.2 Sharing shared item Experiment 
To demonstrate the usability of the approach in terms of the need of devising a 
collaborative policy and management for access control in OSNs, we experiment with a 
complex situation where a user’s content is reposted by another user in someone else’s 
space. Consequently, in this shared item scenario, we have multiple controllers as 




Figure 37: The execution flow of sharing a shared item. 
Similar to the previous experiment, in order to make the differences between our 
approach and Facebook more obvious, we introduce our results in comparison charts, in 
Figure 38. These charts illustrate the amount of required access control rules that have 
been achieved by our collaborative model and by Facebook. Our approach in all 
authorization types was tested against Facebook’s privacy settings. The percentages of 
collaborative decisions in the graphs reflect the achievement of our model in term of 
satisfying individual co-controller policy requirements; in contrast, Facebook’s 




Figure 38: A comparison of the collaborative model and Facebook achievements for 
co-controllers privacy polices requirements in re-shared item scenarios. 
Not only does the collaborative model meet high percentage of owner negative privacy 
desires, it promotes fairness among to the contributor, originator and stakeholders’ denied 
privacy policies. As aforementioned, there is a high chance to have similarity between 
owners and other co-controllers privacy policies because our dataset is a connected 
graph. Subsequently, a contributor would have common privacy settings of denied 
accessors with the owner. Moreover, in the positive policy, there is a similarity between 
the owner’s permitted accessors and the other associated controllers (the contributor and 
two of the stakeholders). As a result, Facebook in our experiment meets some co-
controllers desired policies; however, the existing privacy protection mechanism in 
Facebook does not consider any privacy settings from other users who are respected as 
co-controllers in our mode. Compared to Facebook, the collaborative decision model 
provides more control for multiple controllers on the sharing of their content, as 





Overall, the results are formatted in order to measure achievement of our 
collaborative access control model for accessing the shared item versus Facebook. In 
conclusion, the prototype has shown that our proposed approach meets most of the 
associated controllers’ privacy policies requirements, despite the challenge of 





6 Conclusion and Future Work 
OSN applications are the most visited sites on the Web, where users can publish 
and share their personal and social information (e.g., personal data, photos, videos, 
opinions, contacts, etc.), as well as meet other users and electronically gather for a variety 
of purposes (e.g., business, entertainment, religion, education, etc.). With unexpected 
rapid expansion of OSN applications and the radical shift in the number of involved users 
around the world, OSN sites have become a rich and large repository of information 
about us as individuals. Additionally, OSNs are typically open systems and a valuable 
source of data. Due to the open nature of this huge amount of information within OSNs, 
which are especially important because they have been gaining popularity among Internet 
users, serious privacy concerns are obviously raised. Although the popularity of OSN 
applications has been increasing day after day, current OSNs offer primitive security 
mechanisms that have only limited and simple tools for controlling social network data. 
Several studies from different computer science disciplines and current news reports have 
highlighted the increase in the privacy and security issues that arise in OSNs (e.g. [Pesce, 
et al. 2012, Joshi and Kuo. 2011, Hongyu Gao, et al. 2011, Raad and Chbeir. 2013] ). 
To cope with security and privacy problems and concerns related to OSNs, we 
believe improving access control models is the first step. There is a general consensus 
that a new model of access control needs to be developed for OSNs (e.g. [Lewis, et al. 
2008, Boyd and Hargittai. 2010, Cheng, et al. 2012b, Johnson, et al. 2012, Gates. 2007]). 
Consequently, several studies have attempted to improve and propose access control 
mechanisms for OSNs (e.g. [Hart, et al. 2007, Carminati, et al. 2006, 2009b, Cheng, et al. 
2012a]). However, these schemes support privacy decisions as individual processes, 
where it is the owner of the item who is solely allowed to specify access control policies. 
Indeed, collaboration and sharing represent the main building blocks of OSN applications 
that not only are characterized by their user-driven contents, but also offer to users 
ingenious tools to share their personal and social information across social networks with 
others and take advantage of others' shared data. Typically, as a shared platform, contents 
in OSNs are in some sense co-owned by a number of users. OSNs have certain unique 
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properties; in fact, sharing is one of the prominent features of existing OSN sites. 
Consequently, access control in OSNs presents several unique characteristics and 
requirements different from traditional access control models. In spite of the fact that 
OSNs are built on interaction, it is important to have mechanism for collaborative 
management of privacy settings for shared data. However, OSN applications yet do not 
support any mechanism for collaborative privacy management. 
Although the area of OSNs has become a development part of web, access control 
research in this area is still in its early stages, especially the research of collaborative 
privacy management that is involved with multiple controllers. We believe a 
collaborative access control, where particular users can be considered associated 
controllers that all have a right to participate in the privacy management of a given shared 
item, plays an essential role in protecting privacy in OSNs. Accordingly, in this research, 
by focusing on providing methods to empower users’ collaborative control over their 
shared items, we proposed an access control model for collaborative privacy decision 
making. In this Chapter, we will briefly review some details of the contributions in 
Section 6.1, and discuss the future work in Section 6.2. 
6.1 Contributions  
To designing a suitable approach to address this problem, we first need to 
understand scenarios of shared contents in the context of OSNs where multiple users are 
explicitly identified through posts, shares, tags or other metadata. Our shared items’ 
scenarios analysis determine the set of users who have a relationship with an item by 
applying the social actions such as upload, share, tag or repost. Therefore, according to 
these relationships between users and a shared item, we distinguished the types of 
ownerships as follows: owner, stakeholders, contributor and originator. Moreover, based 
on this analysis we regulated which controllers have the right to participate in the process 
of making collaborative privacy decision over who can access or disseminate the shared 
items.  
We proposed a policy specification scheme, in order to truly capture the fine-
grained and collaborative authorization specifications requirements for OSN access 
control model. The first part of our privacy policy specification scheme is accessor 
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specification. In reality, OSN applications target to represent the community in the real 
world. To keep consistency between online and offline social networks, we allow the 
controllers to authorize who can access their data according to accessors types. There is 
agreement that being relationship-based is one of the necessary requirements to establish 
access control systems for OSNs (e.g., [Cheng, et al. 2012a, 2012b, Carminati, et al. 
2009b, 2011, Fong and Siahaan. 2011, Gates. 2007] ). Also as in the real world, a user 
can distinguish the desirable accessors depending largely on their relationships with 
them; hence, we use relationship types to define authorized users in our scheme. 
Moreover, our relationships in our real life social network can be classified into different 
groups, like fun, master project, high school classmates, etc. Consequently, we also 
enable controllers to specify the accessors by group name where desired accessros are 
members in this group. Last but not least, it is very intuitive for controllers to define 
authorized users for their contents by user name. By three parameters in our accessor 
specification scheme that are user names, group names and relationship types, we support 
a fine-grained authorization specification requirement for OSNs. Users typically do not 
want to share their data with everyone; hence, we believe there is a need for specifying 
policies that deny access through negative authorization. By our accessor specification 
scheme, controllers can regulate unwelcome relationship types, groups and particular 
users to access their data. Indeed, negative authorization encourages users to extend their 
social network and to share their information with others because users can determine 
who cannot view their contents, instead of refusing to share their data completely, which 
may lead to the negative impacts on the concept of sharing that is the main purpose of 
OSNs. Though the combined use of positive and negative authorizations offers a precise 
and easy method for controllers to specify the target audience for accessing their 
contents, this combined with the diversified ways to enable controllers to regulate their 
authorized and unauthorized users do not come for free; there are conflicts. However, we 
applied different conflict resolution policies and some rules to solve such conflicts.   
The relationships between users in the social graph are the basis that is used to 
specify authorized users in existing OSNs. While in the accessor specification scheme we 
adopted user-to-user (U2U) relationships, we believe this is not sufficient to capture our 
goal to propose fine-grained policy specification scheme for data and accessors. Thus, we 
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adopt the relationship between users and resources (U2R) for the second part of our 
privacy policy specification scheme, that is data specification. By data specification 
controllers can determine the sensitivity levels of certain content that is to be shared with 
other users. Finally, the result of our privacy policy specification scheme is an access 
control policy, p, from each associated controller. 
After each linked controller specifies individual policies, policy conflicts become 
inevitable. According to the understanding of collaborative privacy management 
requirements in OSNs and the unique characteristics that OSN access control should 
have, we included principles, which is the third contribution of the thesis, toward a 
solution for collective policy management in OSNs. The first principle is the controllers’ 
weight scheme is driven from the reality that ownership between several controllers and 
particular content is not equal. Consequently, based on our controller types, we assign 
weights to each type, as a method to determine a priority and impact level of a 
controller’s policy. Similarly, accessors have a different priority (weight) inferred from 
how they are authorized (accessors types). The accessors’ weight scheme is the second 
principle we proposed to resolve the conflicts that occur when associated controllers have 
contradictory privacy preferences. In order to maintain consistency between the ways of 
managing online and offline social networks, we adopt trust in OSNs as a principle to 
resolve conflicts. Many works adopt trust between users to play a specific role in their 
approaches[Ali, et al. 2007, Villegas, et al. 2008, Carminati, et al. 2006, Golbeck and 
Hendler. 2006, Sun, et al. 2012]. We implement trust values to address the collaborative 
privacy issue. As in the real world, trust values between people are often associated with 
different levels of information disclosure; subsequently, taking a trust value into account 
is useful in regulating who is can access OSN resources. 
As a result, these principles have been adopted to enable the collective 
enforcement of shared data through our algorithms where we achieve a collaborative 
privacy decision over who can access and share the shared contents in OSNs. These 
algorithms, which are the significant contribution of the thesis, are proposed for we 
collaborative access control model; we arrived at the three algorithms based on our 
multiple-user scenarios analysis which includes interactions between controllers and 
shared contents and the type of activities applied to these contents. 
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PermittedandDeniedAccessors is the essential algorithm where the final decision 
concerning permitted and denied sets of accessors is made. Because viewing (accessing) 
is different from disseminating in the context of OSNs, the AccessorSharing and 
ControllerSharing algorithms are formulated to reach collaborative decisions of who are 
allowed to disseminate the shared items. In the sharing scenarios’ investigation, we 
observe that a dissemination action appearing from a viewers’ side has different 
circumstances than one that comes from a controllers’ side. Consequently, the 
AccessorSharing algorithm is articulated to produce a list of accessors, who are 
collaboratively authorized to disseminate the shared item with their social networks. On 
the other hand, the ControllerSharing algorithm is designed differently to address the 
policy conflicts in disseminating shared items by one of the associated controllers.   
By analyzing multiple controllers’ scenarios in online social networking 
environments, proposing a fine-grained and collaborative privacy policy specification 
scheme, suggesting a conflict resolution approach and designing algorithms to 
accomplish collaborative decisions through dissimilar privacy policies from multiple 
controllers who co-manage shared data, we have presented our collaborative access 
control model for OSNs. Achieving the desired equilibrium between providing privacy 
protection and the utility of sharing data in OSNs is a crucial focus of our model. 
Numerous recent works [Squicciarini, et al. 2009, 2010, Carminati and Ferrari. 2011, 
Xiao and Tan. 2012, Sun, et al. 2012, Hu, et al. 2013] have recognized the demand for 
multiparty management for data sharing in OSNs but, to the best of our knowledge, none 
of the existing approaches offer a process for making a collective decision that allows all 
associated users, who may be affected by the disclosure of the shared data, to setup their 
privacy requirements as we have done. The final contribution of the thesis is 
implementing our approach in a prototype. We have described a proof-of-concept 
implementation, and carried out the evaluation of our approach to show its feasibility and 
usability.  
6.2 Future work   
OSNs users are becoming more aware of shared data privacy because, as in the 
real world, users do not want to share their data with everyone all the time. Consequently, 
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one of the fundamental requirements for OSNs users is to enable them to specify the 
audience and enforce their access control policy. When this requirement comes from 
different parties, who co-own the shared item and may be affected by disclosure of it, 
providing an efficient access control model over the information shared is a complicated 
task, especially, with the vast number of users in OSNs and the tremendous amount of 
shared data. Thus, there are a number of directions that the work presented here can be 
extended and improved.  
While this work offers a model to capture the essence of collaborative 
authorization requirements for data sharing in OSNs, we need to enhance our model to 
work appropriately in an online platform where algorithms have to run online for such 
online problem. Relationships play a significant part when improving the paradigm of 
access control for OSNs, which are based on relationships. For this reason, we will 
support our privacy policy specification scheme by adding transitive relationships with 
length 2 (R.of.R). Moreover, to handle several characteristics that relationships in OSNs 
should have, as part of future work, we will develop our scheme to offer additional 
characteristics of relationships to improve our collaborative access control model; for 
example, supporting multiple relationships that exist between two users (e.g., both co-
worker and friend). Also, adding one-direction relationships (e.g., a parent, daughter, son, 
manger, etc.) might be considered to be one direction relationships and other various 
relationship features such as its content, and strength is an interesting future direction for 
an OSN collaborative access control model.  
In our model, we assume that there is not an identical trust level between each two 
users who are in any type of relationships. We would extend our trust network to cover 
distrust property because propagation of trust and distrust values along a social network 
graph allows a user to form more validated trust value on a user who is not directly 
connected to her/him.  
Although OSNs are evolving, the topic of collaborative access control is not fully 
explored in the research literature. Therefore, we are planning to investigate and analyze 
more about multiple controllers’ scenarios in OSNs. For example, some of our sharing 
scenarios such as Figures 13 and 14 where an intermediate user shares other users’ 
content and posts it in someone else’s space, we need to verify who is the new profile’s 
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owner and if disclosing content to this new owner and her/his social network may affect 
the privacy of the previous owner and stakeholders. In our approach for sharing cases, the 
privacy policies specified by co-controllers are collaboratively enforced to regulate the 
final decision of accessing the item in a new owner’s space; however, the shared item 
may be further re-disseminated by users who belong to the new owner’s social network. 
Hence, generalizing and enhancing the access control model to cope with the shared item 
regardless of how many times it has been re-disseminated (reposted) is an interesting 
future direction.  
According to statistics from most popular OSN’s sites, photo sharing and tagging 
are an extremely popular activity and tagged users are explicitly recognized through tags; 
however, the permissions from other users appearing in the photo is not required. An 
effective idea to overcome this limitation is the face detection and face recognition 
techniques. Consequently, we would extend our work to have them automatically tagged 
by using these techniques [Shih-Chia Huang, et al. 2014, Hsu, et al. 2013, Choi, et al. 
2011]. Another automatic idea is to incorporate inference-based techniques for 
semiautomated generation of access control polices [Squicciarini, et al. 2014, 2011b]. 
The idea behind integrating this technique into an OSN’s access control model is that 
generally specifying the privacy policies may be tedious and perplexing for the ordinary 
user with large amounts of personal data and hundreds of connections on OSN platforms. 
Additionally, in collaborative privacy management, more involvements from other 
associated controllers is required.  Consequently, privacy settings become a more 
difficult and complicated task. Therefore, supporting semiautomated generation of access 
control rules seems to be the most critical aspect of developing collaborative access 
control mechanisms in the future. Finally, we would to build an application as a proof-of-
concept for our approach and show and analyze the effectiveness of our proposal by 
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